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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce the scenario in which our study was conducted, outlin-
ing the motivations stimulating our research work. Afterwards, we briefly describe the
contributions provided by this thesis while the ending part of the chapter outlines its
organization.
1.1 The Internet scenario
The Internet is the largest distributed system ever built by the human kind: this critical
infrastructure significantly contributes to the economic wealth of advanced and emerging
societies, serving applications used by 2.1 billion of users worldwide according to recent
studies [1].
While we increasingly depend on the Internet for our professional, personal and po-
litical lives, our understanding of its underlying structure, performance limits, dynamic,
and evolution appears today still largely inadequate [2]. An accurate and exhaustive
knowledge of how this infrastructure actually operates is of the utmost importance to
guarantee high operational standards and to determine a positive future evolution of such
an increasingly important communication system. However, gathering this knowledge is a
particularly challenging task due to several factors: the Internet network is characterized
by (i) high level of heterogeneity – in terms of network equipments and communication
technologies, (ii) high level of dynamicity – in terms of how the traffic exchanged be-
tween two nodes of the network flows across the physical infrastructure, (iii) numerous
networking protocols and their implementations variously interacting to make feasible
the communication between end points of the network. An additional factor dramatically
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increasing the complexity of gathering a clear understanding of the current operational
status of the network is the radically distributed ownership of the Internet among its con-
stituent parts. From the architectural point of view, Internet is partitioned in thousands
of private and public independent networks called Autonomous Systems (hereafter sim-
ply AS). An AS is defined as a domain in which routers and hosts are managed by a
single administrative authorities (a university, a company, or an Internet Service Provider
– ISP), that expose a clearly defined routing policy to the rest of the Internet [3]. An AS
has full control and visibility on its infrastructure but has no control or visibility on the
infrastructure managed by other ASes. The current evolution of the Internet is largely
determined by the forced cooperation and competition between these building blocks.
In this challenging scenario, researchers have developed over the years monitoring and
measurement methodologies and techniques in order to investigate global and local aspects
of the Internet, thus improving our visibility and comprehension of this critical yet largely
opaque ecosystem of interconnected networks [4]. Through Internet measurements, we can
better understand how the system behaves in practice, its deficiencies and vulnerabilities
as well as its evolution over time.
1.2 On the importance of tracing Internet paths
We focus our attention on the methodologies and techniques designed to trace Internet
paths. The goal of these techniques is to infer the network path followed by the traffic
exchanged between two nodes of the network. In this thesis, we define an Internet path
as the sequence of routers and links traversed by the traffic sent from a source node to a
destination node.
An Internet path is determined by the combined action of intra- and inter-domain
routing. The routing is in charge of disseminating routing information between routers
and dictates how this information must be used to forward traffic to its destination. The
inter-domain routing determines the sequence of ASes the traffic will traverse to reach its
destination while the intra-domain routing dictates how the traffic is forwarded within
each AS network, i.e. the sequence of routers the traffic must traverse to the destination
or the exit point of the AS towards the next AS along the path.
Reconstructing the sequence of routers and links traversed by the traffic exchanged
between two network nodes by inspecting the information related to the network routing
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is not practically feasible because limited or no information is available respectively about
the inter- and intra-domain routing as we explain in the following. The mostly adopted
inter-domain routing protocol is the Border Gateway Protocol (hereafter BGP) that al-
lows ASes to advertise their best routes to the neighboring ASes: a route contains several
information including the sequence of ASes that will be traversed to reach a given block
of addresses (i.e. a network prefix). By properly configuring the border routers of their
infrastructure, an AS can implement high-level policies typically driven by economic con-
straints: essentially, an AS may accept or decline routes advertised by another AS, and
advertise or not its best routes depending on the neighboring AS. Since BGP routes do not
enclose any information about the internal infrastructure of each AS, observing the inter-
domain routing messages provide only a coarse-grained information about the network
path of interest: no information is provided about the traversed routers. To make matters
worse, we only have a suboptimal access to the inter-domain routing information. Indeed,
an exhaustive view of the global inter-domain routing requires the deployment of specific
authorized network equipments (i.e. monitors) in any location of the Internet where ASes
exchange inter-domain routing messages. Currently, research projects systematically col-
lecting inter-domain routing messages such as RouteViews [5], RIPE RIS [6], PCH [7],
etc., own a forcedly reduced amount of monitors: although located in privileged positions
like Internet Exchange Points (i.e. large facilities typically owned by private companies
where ASes may easily connect to each other), the information collected provides just a
partial visibility on the global inter-domain routing.
As for the intra-domain routing, an AS can deploy any routing policy or combination
of policies independently from the other ASes. However, without a direct access to the
infrastructure managed by the AS, it is not possible to observe the intra-domain routing
messages exchanged between the routers. Since the Internet operational climate based
on the competition and cooperation among ASes generally discourages sharing data with
researchers – ASes typically consider strictly confidential any information related to the
managed infrastructure – no information is available to the research community about
the intra-domain routing of the ASes composing the Internet.
Hence, researchers and network operators willing to understand the sequence of routers
and links traversed by the traffic exchanged between any two end points of the network
cannot rely on the partial or absent information on the inter- and intra-domain routing.
Furthermore, even a theoretical exhaustive knowledge about the global routing in the
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Internet would not be helpful when investigating specific characteristics of the network
path such as its performance (e.g. delay) or in network troubleshooting operations aiming
at detecting network failues (e.g. physical link disconnection, software errors, router
misconfiguration, etc.).
For these reasons, since the dawning of the Internet, researchers developed measure-
ment techniques purposely designed to trace Internet paths (we detail these techniques in
the next chapter). Internet path tracing techniques have been extensively used to both
gather fundamental knowledge about essential properties of the Internet and as core com-
ponents of large distributed systems (e.g. overlay networks). We provide in the following
an overview of the applications enabled by path tracing techniques. This overview is not
intended to be exhaustive but to provide an overall idea of the importance of tracing
Internet paths for the research community.
1.2.1 Assessing network topology
Tracing Internet paths proved to be extremely helpful especially when the final goal is to
reverse engineer the topology of the Internet, since it provides essential information about
the network topology.
The Internet topology has attracted the interest of the research community for decades [8].
The research on this theme is concerned with the study of the various types of connectiv-
ity structures that are enabled by the layered architecture of the Internet [9]: structures
related to the physical infrastructures (such as routers, switches, etc. and interconnections
among them) and logical structures as the ones that can be defined at the several layers
of the TCP/IP stack (IP-level graph, AS-level graph, etc.). An accurate and extensive
knowledge of the topology of the Internet is of the utmost importance for the commu-
nity (i) to design and evaluate applications and innovative routing protocols through
realistic network emulation and simulation; (ii) for improving and testing novel network-
engineering practices; (iii) to manage large-scale complex and highly dynamic networks
seeking for up-to-date information on the current status of the network; (iv) to verify, cor-
rect, and improve various desirable aspects of the global Internet including its robustness,
reliability, efficiency and security. More in general, an accurate and exhaustive knowledge
of the network topology is an important aspect for a deep understanding of the complex
and ever-evolving ecosystem the Internet is.
The topology of Internet is typically investigated at several levels of abstraction and
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tracing Internet paths is the key operation to gather this knowledge. Indeed, the most
common approach is to sample the topology by performing large scale measurement cam-
paigns tracing a large amount of Internet paths. As we will deepen in the next chapter,
path tracing techniques report the traversed path essentially in terms of a sequence of
IP addresses: typically, one address (a network interface) for each traversed router is re-
ported. By tracing a large amount of Internet paths from multiple vantage points toward
a large amount of destinations, researchers can obtain a first rough representation of the
topology of the Internet by intersecting the collected sequences of IP addresses, i.e. the
IP-level topology. Since a router may have dozens of interfaces, different IP addresses
belonging to the same router may potentially appear as different nodes in the IP-level
graph: for this reason, alias resolution techniques [10] are applied to merge those ad-
dresses owned by the same network device. With alias resolution, researchers transform
the IP-level topology in a router-level topology. Furthermore, by geographically aggregat-
ing the routers, the router-level topology can be transformed into a Point of Presence-level
(PoP-level) topology. Finally, by associating to each IP address the owner AS, one can
also infer the presence of traffic exchanged between ASes, thus the IP-level topology can
be used to gather visibility on the AS-level connectivity (AS-level topology): an approach
widely adopted to complement the partial information about the AS-level connectivity
that can be derived from the BGP routes [11, 12, 13, 14].
Essentially, tracing Internet paths is at the basis of the reverse engineering of the
topology of the Internet: exploring large amount of Internet paths with the state of the
art techniques provides the basilar information to reconstruct the topology at all the
abstraction levels, an approach employed by several active research projects [2, 15, 16,
17]. On the other hand, the accuracy and completeness of the reconstructed topologies
critically depend on the accuracy and precision of the adopted path tracing techniques.
1.2.2 Assessing network routing
There has been a large amount of scientific works demonstrating the utility of Internet
path tracing as an invaluable source of information on the routing in the Internet useful
for disparate purposes.
Monitoring over time Internet paths allowed researchers to answer fundamental ques-
tions about the Internet and its internal mechanisms: for instance, thanks to the seminal
work of Paxons [18] recently reappraised by Cunha et al [19], we learned that routes in
On the importance of tracing Internet paths 6
the Internet remain stable for long period of time but with short-lived periods of insta-
bilities. By tracing paths between pairs of network nodes, we also learned that routing
in the Internet is mainly asymmetric [18, 20, 21]: the network path connecting A to B is
often different from the path connecting B to A.
Other researchers relied on path tracing techniques to investigate and pinpoint abnor-
mal behaviors of the network routing [18, 22, 23]. For instance, Spring et al. [22] used
path tracing to identify the root causes of path inflations, i.e. Internet paths significantly
longer than strictly necessary, discovering AS peering policies and latency-sensitive intra-
domain routing as the two most important causes. About ten years later, Gupta et al. [23]
discovered how path inflations still exist especially in African developing countries where
path tracing revealed how local routes often detour through Europe apparently due to
the lack of interconnectivity between local ISPs. Beside routing pathologies, researchers
systematically exploited path tracing to detect and monitor transient and permanent net-
work failures exposed by reachability problems, i.e. the inability of data packets to reach
network prefixes marked as reachable according to the available information on the rout-
ing [24, 25, 26, 27].
Tracing network paths proved helpful also to predict other non-measured Internet
routes [28, 29, 30]: for instance, Madhyastha et al. [28] proposed to stitch together path
segments extracted from previously traced paths to predict the route between arbitrary
pairs of network nodes as well as the latency of the communication. Tracing Internet
paths helps also when building and maintaining efficient overlay networks [31, 32, 33]:
for instance, one can easily verify if two apparently disjoint overlay paths share or not
common underlying links [34]. Similarly, content distribution networks continuously trace
Internet paths and their properties to select the best content server to serve the users [35].
Assessing the routing by tracing Internet paths allowed also to quantify the importance
of individual countries and their policies (e.g. censorship) on the flow of international
traffic: Karlin et al. [36] observed a primary role for the international reachability for US,
Great Britain and Germany, while only a marginal role for other countries such as China
and Iran. Similar studies relied on path tracing to directly locate the censorship in the
Internet [37]. Note that the path tracing-derived knowledge about the routing can also
be used to perform network attacks such as the link-flooding attacks whose goal is to
disconnect entire portions of the network from the Internet by targeting a limited amount
of network links [38, 39].
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Several other works exploited the information collected by tracing Internet paths to
(i) accurately geolocate resources and services over the Internet [40, 41, 42]; (i) to detect
violations of the traditional destination-based routing scheme [43]; (iii) to shed light on the
intra-domain routing of certain ASes [44]; (iv) to quantify the deployment in the Internet
of specific technologies and network engineering practices such as Multiprotocol Label
Switching (MPLS) [45]; or (v) to identify the AS causing inter-domain route changes [46].
The brief overview reported above is by no means exhaustive but it demonstrates the
existence of a large amount of applications relying on Internet path tracing techniques.
1.2.3 The need for research
The applications reported in the previous section demonstrate the great utility of path
tracing techniques not only for a deep understanding of such a complex and largely opaque
ecosystem of networks but also for managing the network, troubleshooting connectivity
problems, building efficient overlay systems, locating the censorship over the Internet,
etc. Unfortunately, despite the numerous applications, the currently available path trac-
ing techniques suffer from several severe limitations potentially causing the information
obtained about the paths under investigation to be inaccurate (e.g. the traced path may
not perfectly correspond to the actual path) and incomplete (e.g. the traced path may
miss traversed links or routers).
Some limitations are intrinsic to the path tracing techniques: for example, when using
state of the art path tracing techniques, users are well aware that no information is
provided about traversed devices implementing up to the second layer of the TCP/IP
stack such as switches, bridges, etc. Other limitations, however, are not so straightforward
and may cause the users to draw wrong conclusions about the path under investigation:
for instance, path tracing techniques may suggest that the traffic is flowing across an AS
that is not actually traversed on the path to the destination.
We observed that some limitations attracted large interest from the research commu-
nity with significant advancements. However, other important limitations with potentially
large impact on the applications relying on Internet path tracing have been largely ignored.
The lack of measurement methodologies and techniques designed to detect, quantify, and
resolve these limitations as well as the potential impact on the applications relying on
Internet path tracing motivated the research activity at the base of this thesis.
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1.3 Thesis contributions
In this section, we provide an overview of the contributions presented in this thesis.
Addressing well-known unresolved path tracing limitations
We designed, implemented and evaluated a set of active probing techniques (i.e. techniques
injecting into the network probe packets – also referred to as probes – purposely crafted
to study the reaction of the network and draw conclusions about its properties), designed
to detect, quantify and possibly resolve or mitigate, important unresolved limitations
affecting state of the art path tracing techniques. The proposed techniques are built
on top of an innovative measurement traffic composed by probe packets equipped with
optional headers of the Internet Protocol (IP). These particular probe packets proved to
collect additional valuable information about the traversed paths, information potentially
useful to address limitations in Internet path tracing.
More precisely, we propose active probing techniques and methodologies to (1) detect
and locate hidden routers in traced paths, i.e. devices configured to be transparent to
the path tracing techniques having a great impact on the inferred network topological
properties; to (2) detect third-party addresses, an important source of inaccuracy especially
when the final goal is to identify the ASes traversed towards the destination; (3) accurately
dissect the RTT experienced along the path under investigation overcoming the misleading
and inaccurate information provided by the path tracing techniques. We also present in
this thesis our attempt to explore (4) an innovative path tracing approach completely
alternative to the universally adopted mechanism with the goal of finding complementary
solutions to mitigate the limitations of path tracing.
Assessing new limitations in Internet path tracing
For the first time in literature, we report in this thesis two new limitations of the state
of art path tracing techniques we experimentally observed. We demonstrate how path
tracing techniques may induce one to (i) overestimate the number of equal cost paths
towards the destination and to (ii) infer non-existing changes in the network routing.
Essentially, we demonstrate that the representation of the path obtained through state
of the art path tracing technique may potentially be a strongly biased representation of
path under investigation.
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An architecture for Internet path tracing on demand
Finally, by reviewing the literature, we observed how researchers, network operators and
systems relying on path tracing are often interested in exploring and tracing particular
Internet routes to obtain information about the specific phenomenon or aspect of interest
(e.g. the topology of a particular AS, the connectivity between two ASes, etc.). However,
the ability to explore particular Internet routes strongly depends on (i) the availability
of multiple vantage points well-distributed in the Internet (i.e. the machines issuing path
tracing measurement) but also (ii) the ability of identifying which specific vantage point to
use and destination to target in order to explore the route of interest. Regarding the first
challenge, researchers might use the vantage points made available by several experimental
testbeds. However, the great heterogeneity of interfaces and internal mechanisms of these
testbeds represents a great disincentive: as a consequence, researchers tend to use always
the same testbed and its relatively small amount of vantage points. Regarding the second
point, to the best of our knowledge, there are no available methodologies to identify
which particular path tracing measurements to issue in order to explore a particular path
of interest.
For this reason, we designed a general architecture and implemented and evaluated
a first implementation of this architecture called PANDA. PANDA is designed to offer
a path tracing on-demand service and to satisfy complex user queries requesting path
tracing measurements for Internet routes with a priori known characteristics. This goal
is reached by also aggregating under a unique interface vantage points made available by
multiple experimental testbeds, thus masking the great heterogeneity of the interfaces of
the aggregated experimental testbeds.
1.4 Thesis organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the path tracing
techniques documented in literature as well as their limitations. We also discuss the two
open challenges researchers and network operators must often deal with when relying on
path tracing: the need for vantage points and how to select the path tracing measurements
to perform in order to explore the particular paths of interest. In Chapter 3, we detail
our research activities addressing important largely-ignored limitations of the state of the
art techniques (i.e. hidden routers, third-party addresses, misleading intermediate RTT
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values) and we also present an innovative path tracing solution totally alternative to
the approach universally adopted. Successively, in Chapter 4, we document for the first
time in literature two additional experimentally-observed limitations in Internet path
tracing. In Chapter 5, we describe the general path tracing architecture and a first its
implementation, we named PANDA, designed to support researchers, network operators
and systems relying on Internet path tracing: our system is able to explore Internet routes
with a priori known characteristics from the vantage points made available by multiple
experimental testbeds. Finally, Chapter 6 ends the thesis with concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
Tracing Internet paths
In this chapter, we first detail the techniques proposed in literature for tracing Internet
paths. Then, we discuss the limitations affecting these techniques and the partial solutions
documented in literature. Finally, we conclude the chapter by highlighting two open
challenges researchers and operators using path tracing techniques often must deal with:
the need for multiple vantage points and the problem of selecting which path tracing
measurement to perform in order to explore the Internet paths of interest.
2.1 Techniques
How to trace Internet paths in the lack of control over the infrastructure has gathered
very early the interest of the research community since this operation proved helpful
for monitoring and managing the network. In this section, we describe the techniques
proposed in literature for tracing Internet paths. The goal of these techniques is to
shed light on the path followed by the traffic sent toward a network destination: more
precisely, the objective is to obtain accurate information about network routers and links
traversed along the path. The available techniques provide an IP-level view of the path
reconstructed essentially in terms of a sequence of IP addresses, one address of each
traversed router.
2.1.1 The Record Route IP option
Researchers working on the standardization of the IP protocol recognized already in 1981
the importance of an embedded mechanism able to trace Internet paths. Among the
optional headers of the IP protocol (commonly referred to as IP options), researchers
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introduced an header specifically designed to trace the Internet path: the Record Route
option (hereafter simply RR option) [47]. When a probe packet is equipped with the
RR option, each router along the path is requested to insert one of its address in a
pre-allocated area of the IP header of the packet. In this way, the packet collects one
address for each router traversed along the path towards the destination: by inspecting
the addresses registered within the RR option, one can reconstruct the traversed path
essentially in terms of a sequence of IP addresses. Since we use this IP option for part of
our contribution, we provide much more details about the RR option such as the format
in Chapter 3.
A positive feature of using the RR option is the ability to trace the path by using only
one packet compared to other approaches that rely on the injection of multiple packets
potentially experiencing completely different network conditions and paths. On the other
hand, this approach is affected also by some relevant limitations: due to space constraints
(the space allocated for IP options is limited to 40 bytes), no more than nine addresses can
be registered by the RR option. Since network paths consist of 15 hops on average [18], a
significant portion of the path is potentially missed when using this approach discouraging
a wide adoption of this approach as a stand-alone tool for tracing Internet paths.
2.1.2 Van Jacobson’s Traceroute
Traceroute [48] together with its variants and optimizations represents today the stan-
dard de facto for tracing Internet paths. By injecting purposely crafted probe packets,
Traceroute is able to trace the path from the machine under control (hereafter also re-
ferred to as Traceroute originator or vantage point) toward any network destination since
it does not require the control on the targeted device: this universality is a key factor of
its large success.
According to the RFC1812 [49], each router forwarding a packet must first decrease
the value of the time-to-live (TTL) field of the IP header. When the TTL expires (i.e.,
reaches zero), the involved router states that the packet has consumed enough network
resources along its travel: the packet is dropped and an ICMP Time Exceeded message is
sent back to the Traceroute originator. This basic conservative mechanism of the network
can be used to infer the network path as proposed by Van Jacobson [48] with Traceroute.
The basic mechanism of Traceroute is depicted in Fig. 2.1: Traceroute injects into the
network a sequence of UDP probe packets sent towards the destination. A UDP probe
Techniques 13
Figure 2.1: Traceroute basic mechanism – Traceroute reports the source addresses of the ICMP Time
Exceeded messages solicited by issuing TTL-limited probe packets towards the targeted destination.
Traceroute also reports for each hop the length of time it takes to send the probe packet and collect the
ICMP Time Exceeded message.
packet is an IP packet carrying as transport protocol a UDP header with the destination
port set to a high and presumably unused port: a similar packet is intended to solicit
an ICMP Port Unreachable message from the targeted destination. The UDP probe
packets are injected with limited TTL values, each time incrementing the TTL from an
initial value of one. In this way, the technique solicits ICMP Time Exceeded messages
from the routers encountered along the path. By extracting the source address from the
collected ICMP error messages, Traceroute reports an IP address (i.e. an interface) for
each traversed router. Essentially, a probe packet with an initial TTL value of i solicits a
ICMP Time Exceeded reply from the i-th hop decreasing the TTL along the path towards
the destination. The path tracing process stops as soon as an ICMP Port Unreachable
message is received (i.e., the destination has been reached). The TTL values of the injected
probe packets is gradually increased since the length of the path under investigation is
not a priori known and it is important to avoid the overloading of the destination with
multiple UDP probe packets. In addition, Traceroute reports the hop-by-hop Round
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traceroute to www.google.com (173.194.35.48), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
1 143.225.170.254 0.283 ms 0.296 ms 0.325 ms
2 143.225.190.98 0.251 ms 0.245 ms 0.238 ms
3 143.225.190.146 0.339 ms 0.354 ms 0.370 ms
4 193.206.130.9 0.461 ms 0.438 ms 0.431 ms
5 90.147.80.169 24.505 ms 23.748 ms 25.929 ms
6 90.147.80.165 18.272 ms 71.520 ms 23.073 ms
7 90.147.80.62 15.193 ms 11.980 ms 31.134 ms
8 90.147.80.17 17.860 ms 16.605 ms 17.821 ms
9 90.147.80.73 31.818 ms 26.633 ms 31.029 ms
10 193.206.129.130 26.588 ms 15.512 ms 30.485 ms
11 209.85.241.67 15.978 ms 17.905 ms 15.883 ms
12 173.194.35.48 16.611 ms 17.571 ms 16.583 ms
Figure 2.2: A sample output of the standard UNIX implementation of Traceroute toward google.com.
Trip Time (RTT) computed as the length of time between sending the data packet and
receiving the corresponding ICMP Time Exceeded reply. Typically, Traceroute injects
three probe packets for each TTL value.
Fig. 2.2 reports an example of the output of the standard UNIX implementation
of Traceroute used to trace the path from our laboratory at the University of Napoli
towards the domain google.com: the traced path consists of 12 hops. For each hop,
Traceroute reports an address and the corresponding RTT values: for instance, injecting
probe packets with TTL values set to 10 solicit ICMP Time Exceeded replies with source
address 193.206.129.130.
According to a recent survey among the members of the North American Network Op-
erators’ Group (NANOG) [50], together with the tool Ping, Traceroute is the most widely
adopted network diagnostic technique for monitoring, managing and troubleshooting the
network, and definitely the number one approach for tracing Internet paths [51]. Every
operative system provides an implementation of this technique.
2.2 Limitations
Extensive literature demonstrated that, despite the great number of applications relying
on path tracing, the techniques used to trace Internet paths are affected by several lim-
itations. Essentially, Traceroute, the most widely adopted approach for tracing Internet
paths, may provide incomplete or inaccurate information about the paths under investiga-
tion. In this section, we describe the sources of inaccuracy, their impact and the solutions
documented in literature: many of the described limitations appear not definitively re-
solved and motivate the continuous interest of the research community on this theme.
In the next Chapter, we detail our contribution to investigate and resolve several among
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the most severe limitations affecting Internet path tracing techniques while in Chapter 4,
we experimentally demonstrate the existence of two new additional limitations in path
tracing not recognized before.
2.2.1 Anonymous routers
The information obtained when tracing Internet paths can be inaccurate and incomplete.
A severe source of incompleteness is represented by unresponsive routers, also known in
literature as anonymous routers. Anonymous routers are devices configured to discard
packets with an expiring TTL without generating the ICMP Time Exceeded response [52].
The presence of routers configured to not reply in case of path tracing heavily impacts the
reconstruction of the network topology and makes harder in practice to tell if the lack of
responses from the network is actually caused by ongoing network failures. Anonymous
routers also further complicates the geolocation of network resources and services and
the ability to infer properties of Internet routes such as the traversed ASes towards the
destination.
When soliciting unresponsive routers, Traceroute may indefinitely wait for the re-
sponse. To deal with this problem, implementations of Traceroute normally employ a
mechanism based on timeouts: if the response is not collected within a given length of
time, the corresponding hop along the path is marked as unresponsive (typically indicated
with the symbol asterisk – “*”) and a new probe packet with an increased TTL value is
injected into the network. Fig. 2.3 reports a path tracing scenario including anonymous
routers.
It is worth noticing that routers may also become unresponsive for reduced amount
of time in case of ICMP rate limiting: indeed, routers can be configured such that when
ICMP messages are solicited with rate exceeding specific thresholds, this is interpreted as
a potentially malicious behavior and the ICMP replies are temporarily disabled.
The incompleteness caused by anonymous routers represents a severe source of un-
certainty for many applications relying on path tracing especially when the final goal
is to reconstruct the topology of the network since it is not trivial to state if multiple
unresponsive routers observed along different paths are determined by the same unique
unresponsive router (see Fig. 2.4).
The solutions documented in literature are mainly focused on mitigating the impact
of anonymous routers on the reconstructed Internet topologies. A typical approach is to
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Figure 2.3: Traceroute and anonymous routers – The second and third hop along the path are anonymous
routers discarding the Traceroute probe packets and not providing ICMP Time Exceeded messages. The
Traceroute originator is not able to identify these nodes that appear marked with the symbol “*” in the
trace.
analyze the IP level graph obtained by performing multiple Traceroute measurements: in
this graph each symbol “*” in a trace is treated as an independent node. The techniques
investigate the properties of the graph to identify the “*” caused by the same anonymous
router to be merged. Yao et al. [53] formulates the problem of identifying the same
anonymous routers appearing in multiple traced paths as an optimization problems whose
objective is to find the minimum size topology obtained by merging the “*” under specific
consistency constraints. The authors demonstrated that this problem is NP-complete
and proposed a computationally expensive heuristic to solve the problem (O(n5) with
n indicating the number of anonymous routers observed in the collected paths). Jin
et al. [54] proposed an ISOMAP based dimensionality reduction approach to solve the
problem with a complexity O(n3). Finally, Gunes et al. [52] proposed a graph-based
induction approach to identify common structures within the topology graph and use
them to resolve anonymous routers achieving a significant lower complexity than the
previous approaches. All these solutions try to mitigate the impact of anonymous routers
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(a) Actual topology. (b) A possible inferred IP-level topology.
Figure 2.4: The impact of anonymous routers when inferring the topology of the network – B is an
anonymous routers causing the inferred IP-level topology to be biased.
on the inferred topology map. However, when the final goal is to infer the properties of a
single Internet path, none of these approaches appears useful, i.e. anonymous routers still
cause incomplete information about the path under investigation.
To the best of our knowledge, only the authors in [55, 56] tried to assign an IP
address to anonymous routers while tracing Internet paths by exploiting the RR option
since an anonymous router may register in the IP-option-equipped probe packet one of
its address. The authors jointly exploited TTL-limited probe packets and RR option to
trace the Internet paths. Unfortunately, besides the limited exploring range of the RR
option, aligning the Traceroute and the RR traces proved to be a particularly complex and
not definitively solved problem [56]: authors proposed disjunctive programming logic, an
extremely computationally expensive approach hard to replicate [10]. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no available solutions able to solicit replies from routers configured
to not generate ICMP Time Exceeded replies.
2.2.2 Hidden routers
One of the most severe source of both incompleteness and inaccuracy when tracing Inter-
net paths is represented by hidden routers: devices invisible when the paths are traced
with Traceroute. The most important impact of hidden routers is related to the inference
of the network topology. However, anonymous and hidden routers also greatly increase the
complexity of managing and troubleshooting the network since the obtained information
about the current status of the network is incomplete and thus potentially misleading.
Hidden routers are network devices configured to not decrement the TTL of the for-
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warded packets. As a consequence, these devices are totally invisible to Traceroute. Ac-
cording to [56], “hidden routers are caused by certain configurations of multi-protocol label
switching (MPLS) and result in missing nodes and incorrect link inferences”. In addition,
very recently, researchers also observed that middleboxes may also act as hidden routers,
thus being non-reported by Traceroute. A middlebox is defined as any intermediary box
performing functions apart from standard functions of an IP router on the data path be-
tween a source host and destination host [57] such as NAT, Firewalls, etc. For instance,
the CISCO Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance [58] may be purposely configured to not
appear in Traceroute traces while other middlboxes may refresh the TTL of the incom-
ing packets [59] thus preventing Traceroute to explore the remaining portion of the path.
Fig. 2.5 reports the path tracing scenario containing hidden routers. For instance, consid-
ering again the sample trace reported in Fig. 2.2, the traffic sent towards the destination
might have traversed many more devices including hidden routers potentially affecting
the experienced intermediate delays and the topological properties we may infer by ob-
serving this traced path. Note that, since Traceroute is often the only mechanism we have
to explore the path towards the destination, we cannot estimate if the traced path is ac-
curate or not, without a ground truth of the topology very rarely available due to the lack
of collaboration with the ASes.
The impact of hidden routers is potentially disruptive when the goal is to to reconstruct
the topology of the network. A clear example of this impact is reported in Fig. 2.6.
Fig. 2.6a reports the actual router-level topology: a router B is connected to the routers
A, C, D and E. Let us assume that the router B is an hidden router: Fig. 2.6b reports
an IP-level topology we could infer by using Traceroute as path tracing technique in a
large scale experimental campaign designed to discover all the possible links among these
routers. Comparing Fig. 2.6b to Fig. 2.6a, we can easily evaluate the impact of an hidden
router: the inferred topology is (a) incomplete due to missing routers (the router B) and
links (the links between A and B, B and C, B and D, B and E) but also (b) inaccurate since
the inferred links do not actually exist. Hence, hidden routers not only do not appear in
the reconstructed topology but also impact the inferred properties of the topology such
as the degree distribution (note the overestimation of the degree for the router A).
While other limitations of Traceroute have been investigated for years, the real mag-
nitude of the phenomenon related to hidden routers has been largely ignored. Sherwood
et al. [55, 56] proposed a solution based on a novel Traceroute enhanced by the RR op-
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Figure 2.5: Traceroute and hidden routers – The second hop along the path is an hidden router forwarding
the Traceroute probe packets without decrementing the TTL. Traceroute does not report any information
about this device.
tion to identify load balancers, anonymous routers, addresses owned by the same device
and, possibly, hidden routers. Thanks to the RR option, the injected probes register
along the path additional IP addresses potentially revealing IPs of devices not appear-
ing in the Traceroute trace. Authors observed 329 hidden routers, about 0.3% of all the
discovered devices. Unfortunately, as explained earlier, the approach proposed in [55, 56]
suffers from the nine-hops limited exploring range of the RR option and the not defini-
tively solved problem of aligning the Traceroute and RR traces. Middleboxes may also act
as hidden routers. The most recent work from this point of view is the one proposed by
Detal et al. [60]. Authors proposed tracebox, an extension of Traceroute that (i) sends IP
packets containing TCP segments with limited TTL values, and (ii) analyzes the packet
encapsulated in the solicited ICMP Time Exceeded packets in search of any modifica-
tions potentially revealing the presence of middleboxes. However, the approach proposed
in [60] does not allow one to discover hidden devices that do not modify the header or
the content of the forwarded packets.
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(a) Actual topology. (b) A possible inferred IP-level topology.
Figure 2.6: The impact of hidden routers when inferring the topology of the network – B is an hidden
router causing the inferred IP-level topology to incomplete (i.e. missing nodes and links) and inaccurate
(i.e. containing non-existing links).
2.2.3 Third-party addresses
Another severe source of inaccuracy largely ignored when tracing Internet paths is repre-
sented by third-party (TP) addresses, i.e. addresses reported by Traceroute but associated
to interfaces not actually traversed by the traffic sent towards the destination. TP ad-
dresses may potentially induce one to conclude that the traffic sent towards the destination
is traversing an AS or a network link that is not actually traversed.
According to the RFC1812 [49], the source address of an ICMP error packet must
correspond to the outgoing interface of the ICMP reply, rather than the interface on
which the packet triggering the error was received (i.e. the incoming interface). Hence, the
addresses reported by Traceroute may correspond to the interface used by the intermediate
routers to forward the packets back to the Traceroute originator. While it is commonly
believed that routers provide to the Traceroute originator the incoming interface [51],
routers implementing this portion of the RFC1812 exist such as the CISCO 3660 routers
running IOS 12.0(7)XK1 [61]. When a router exposes to Traceroute an address not
associated to the interfaces traversed by the issued traffic, Traceroute may potentially
suggest that the traffic sent towards the destination is flowing across an AS that is actually
not traversed.
For instance, the trace from S to D in Fig. 2.7 contains the sequence (a, b, c) of IP
addresses, where a and b are associated to the incoming interfaces of routers A and
B respectively, and c is the interface used by router C to send ICMP Time Exceeded
messages to the Traceroute originator. The IP c is a TP address since it is associated – in
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Figure 2.7: TP addresses inducing the inference of false AS links.
this specific trace – to an interface not effectively traversed by the packets sent from S to
D. The same scenario also explains why Traceroute reporting TP addresses may suggest
that the traffic is flowing across not actually traversed ASes. Consider again Fig. 2.7: if
the IP address b belongs to ASx, and c belongs to the ASz addressing space, then a correct
IP-to-AS mapping of the addresses contained in the trace may induce one to conclude
that the traffic is traversing ASz while the actual traversed AS is ASy. In addition, when
Traceroute is used to infer the connectivity between ASes [11, 12, 13], one may wrongly
conclude that there is a link between ASx and ASz, thus potentially causing a distortion
of the inferred AS-level map. While several other causes may impact the accuracy of
AS links derived from Traceroute– such as divergence between data and control paths,
anonymous routers, unmapped hops, Internet exchange points (IXPs), multi-origin AS
prefixes, and AS siblings – TP addresses (when shared between peering AS neighbors)
were recently defined by Zhang et al. [62] as “the last and the most difficult cause to be
inferred” and as “a huge obstruction towards the accuracy of Traceroute measurements”.
Fig. 2.7 also shows an additional problem caused by TP addresses. When all the solicited
routers expose the incoming interface in the output of Traceroute, one may use this
information to clearly identify also the traversed links (for instance, the interfaces a and b
identify two actually traversed network links). With TP addresses this assumption is not
valid any more: indeed, the address c, while correctly identifying a router traversed on the
path towards the destination, does not identify the traversed link. The potential inability
to identify the traversed links further complicates operations like network troubleshooting
and may strongly weaken those network attacks designed to isolate entire portion of the
network by concentrating a large amount of traffic on network links discovered thanks to
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large-scale Traceroute-based campaign [38, 39].
Several works, by using heuristic methods, tried to mitigate the impact of TP addresses
with different objectives: to explain the mismatches between BGP- and Traceroute-
derived AS paths [62, 12], or to complement the AS-level topology inferred from BGP
repositories [13, 11, 12]. However, to the best of our knowledge, only two works tried
to isolate and study the phenomenon of TP addresses in order to quantify their impact,
achieving totally different conclusions. By adopting a heuristic method based on IP-to-AS
mapped Traceroute traces, Hyun et al. [63] concluded that TP addresses mostly appear at
the border of multi-homed ASes and cannot be a significant source of AS map distortion.
On the other hand, by using pre-computed AS-level graphs and pre-acquired knowledge
about routers interfaces, Zhang et al. [62] concluded that TP addresses cause 60% of mis-
matches between BGP- and Traceroute-derived AS paths, where mismatches affect from
12% to 37% of the paths depending on the vantage point.
All the solutions proposed in literature are based on heuristics or on not always avail-
able pre-acquired information about the network topology. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no techniques in literature able to classify as TP address or not the addresses re-
ported by Traceroute. Accordingly, the actual magnitude of the phenomenon is essentially
unknown and the conflicting conclusions documented in literature appear not helpful.
2.2.4 Misleading intermediate RTTs
Traceroute reports for each discovered hop statistics about the RTT computed as the
length of time it takes to send the TTL-limited data packet and receive the corresponding
ICMP Time Exceeded response: unfortunately, these values may represent a misleading
information if interpreted as contributions to the overall RTT experienced by the traffic
sent towards the destination. As clear example, it is not uncommon to observe interme-
diate RTT values higher than RTT of the targeted destination. For instance, Fig. 2.2
exposes a clear inconsistency: the 9-th hop expose an average RTT higher than RTT of
the destination. Several explanations exist for this phenomenon: (i) first of all, each RTT
value is computed by taking advantage of different probe packets that may experience to-
tally different network conditions (e.g. congestion). In addition (ii) due to asymmetric
routing, the hop discovered by Traceroute as part of the forward path to the destination
may be not part of the reverse path from the destination: hence, the delay experienced
in the reverse path of the intermediate hop is not a contribution of the delay experienced
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along the reverse path from the destination. More in general, the reverse paths of two con-
secutive hops may differ causing the inferred link latency to be inaccurate. Finally, (iii)
when estimating the intermediate and the overall RTT, two different network nodes are
solicited: these nodes may potentially employ different amount of time to generate the re-
sponse. Although hop-by-hop RTTs reported by Traceroute proved helpful, for instance,
to predict the latency of end-to-end paths [28] or to geolocate network target [42] or aggre-
gate routers and interfaces in PoP [15], all the factors described above generates a great
uncertainty about the accuracy of the reported RTT values. Such an uncertainty strongly
impacts the possibility of profitably exploiting the hop-by-hop delays to isolate the con-
tributions of each portion of the network to the overall experienced RTT along the entire
path: a valuable information for operations like network performance troubleshooting.
2.2.5 Load balancing
Load balancing may cause Traceroute to report incomplete or inaccurate information
about the path [64].
Network operators make use of load balancing in order to improve the reliability of
their network, the robustness of the communication and the utilization of the managed
resources [65]. By properly configuring the intra-domain routing protocols and routers [66,
67], network operators can install in their network equal cost multipath: routers may not
have any more a unique next hop for the traffic issued toward a given destination, but
may be instructed to split the traffic across multiple equal cost paths.
The presence of load balancers is typically recognized when multiple addresses appear
at the same hop-distance from the Traceroute originator. According to [65], there are three
different load balancing schemes: per-packet, per-flow, per-destination load balancing.
Routers performing per-packet load balancing split the traffic on a per-packet basis (e.g.
round robin fashion). Routers adopting a per-flow load balancing scheme, instead, forward
along the same path all the packets belonging to the same traffic flow. The traffic flow
is determined by analysing particular fields of the packet. Finally, routers performing
per-destination load balancing apply a rough version of the per-flow load balancing that
is exclusively based on the destination field.1
1Per-destination is similar but different from classic destination-based routing: classic routing forwards
along the same path all packets issued towards the same network subnet, while per-destination load
balancing split packets along different paths sent toward different addresses part of the same network
subnet.
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As largely discussed in literature [64, 65, 68], the presence of per-packet and per-
flow load-balancing routers along the path may strongly impact the accuracy of the
path inferred by using Traceroute. We report in Fig. 2.8 a scenario to highlight the
phenomenon [65]. The figure shows the actual topology and a corresponding potential
Traceroute outcome: essentially, the probe packets injected by Traceroute may follow
completely different paths due to the load balancing: in this case, the traced paths ap-
pears incomplete (nodes and links are not traced) but also inaccurate (the inferred links
do not actually exist). This may happen not only in case of per-packet load balancing,
but also in case of per-flow load balancing. Indeed, in order to assign each newly discov-
ered address to a given hop of the path, Traceroute needs to match each injected probe
packet with its reply. For this operation, Traceroute assigns an identifier to each probe
packet that is then recovered from the solicited ICMP Time Exceeded response. The clas-
sic Traceroute implementation encodes the identifier in header fields normally used by the
routers to perform per-flow load balancing (e.g. the UDP destination port): by modify-
ing these fields every time, the injected probe packets appear as part of different flows
and are forwarded along different paths.
The application most affected by this inaccuracy is the inference of the network topol-
ogy since Traceroute may expose non-existing links potentially causing a distortion in
the reconstructed map of the topology [64, 69]. More in general, the inaccurate informa-
tion provided by Traceroute make more complex to investigate the properties of Internet
routes such as symmetry, stability, inflation, routing, etc. and also locate and resolve net-
work failures and outages. For instance, the same IP address may appear multiple times
along the path wrongly suggesting an abnormal routing behaviors (i.e. routing loop) when
the traffic normally reaches its destination.
The impact of load balancing on the inferred path is one of the most investigated
issues by the research community in the recent years.
Augustin et al. [64] categorized the artefacts in Traceroute measurements caused by
load balancing and proposed a solution called Paris-Traceroute: this new variant of Tracer-
oute injects probe packets as part of the same flow in order to avoid the artefacts caused
by per-flow load balancing routers. This goal is reached by encoding the probe packet
identifier in packet header fields different from those used by balancing routers to identify
the traffic flow (e.g. UDP checksum).
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(a) Actual scenario – Traceroute probe packets follow different network paths
due to a load balancer.
(b) A possible outcome of Traceroute. Note the inferred non-existing link
between the router Q and T.
Figure 2.8: Inaccuracy caused by load balancing – probe packets follow different paths causing Traceroute
to report a false link.
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By purposely injecting probe packets as part of different traffic flows, researchers
demonstrated how to trace all the equal cost multipath toward a destination: authors
in [70] proposed the Multipath Detection Algorithm (MDA), an enhancement of Paris-
Traceroute designed to systematically find the entire set of load-balanced paths that
probes can follow in the presence of per-flow load balancing.
Finally, authors in [68] quantified the magnitude of the phenomenon related to load
balancing in the Internet: load balancers are involved in about 39% of the investigated
Internet paths with a higher concentration in commercial networks compared to academic
networks. Authors also observed that multipath routes mainly span over a limited number
of hops typically concentrated inside the same AS.
Although not as common as per-flow load balancers [68], all the solutions proposed in
literature to deal with load balancing still fail in case of per-packet load balancers: in this
case, all the inconsistencies observed and investigated in [64] and successive works [70, 68]
still represent a potential source of inaccuracy for Traceroute measurements. Furthermore,
since a well-known problem in tracing Internet paths and accurately reconstructing the
topology is the lack of ground truth, validating the findings documented in literature
appears particularly hard.
2.2.6 Concurrent routing change
Routing in the network is reactive and may change any time, for example, because of
connectivity disruption between ASes. Routing changes occurring while tracing Internet
paths may cause Traceroute to report misleading results such as false links. When not
properly recognized, routing changes may introduce a distortion in the inferred topology
of the network. Tracing an Internet path with Traceroute can be significantly time-
consuming since the technique incrementally learns the path length: routers are discovered
one-by-one by increasing the TTL at each step. The process stops as soon as a response
from the destination is collected. The time required might be significant (dozens of
seconds) and larger is the amount of time required to trace the path, higher is the chance
of a routing change in the network. Routing changes cause Traceroute to report the similar
inconsistencies caused by load balancing: since probe packets injected before and after the
routing change may follow completely different paths. While tracing again the path may
potentially solve the observed inconsistencies, recognizing that a routing change occurred
when it is not obvious is a non-trivial task. Some solutions documented in literature are
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available to reduce the time required to trace the path [71, 72]. One possibility is to issue
multiple probe packets with different TTL values at the same time: it is unclear however
the exact number of probe packets to inject in order to trace the entire path. Authors
in [71] proposed the adoption of scouting probe packets to solve this issue: a preliminary
step is performed to estimate the number of hops contained in the path and thus the exact
amount of probe packets to inject. These probe packets can be injected at the same time
to strongly reduce the time required to trace the path. Authors proposed to estimate
the length of the path with the the adoption of UDP probe packets: they compare the
initial TTL value set in the injected packets with the one arrived at the destination and
contained in the probe packet brought back in the payload of the solicited ICMP Port
Unreachable reply. A similar approach has been also employed in [72]. However, when
the destination is unresponsive, it is not possible to estimate the length of the path and
thus the amount of probes to inject. In this case, the solutions proposed in literature to
speed up the tracing process cannot be applied.
2.2.7 Probing overhead
Tracing large amount of Internet paths by taking advantage of multiple vantage points
proved helpful to infer the topology of the Internet [2, 73]; to detect, monitor, locate
and repair network failures or outages [25]; to assess changes in the global routing and
so on. However, this type of experimental campaign imposes a potentially significant
overhead on the network. Reducing this overhead is of the utmost importance since
Internet measurements could be easily misinterpreted as large-scale Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks.
As a consequence of the routing in the network, all the paths originated by a given
vantage point typically form a tree-like graph where the nodes located in the proximity
of the vantage points are involved in the paths toward multiple destinations. When
tracing these paths with Traceroute, these nodes are overloaded of Traceroute probe
packets. When the goal is to infer the topology of the network, re-discovering every time
these routers do not provide any additional topological information. Similarly, the paths
originated by different vantage points targeting the same destination form a tree-like graph
where the routers located close to the destination are overloaded by Traceroute probe
packets: again, re-discovering those routers do not provide any additional information
about the topology under investigation.
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Few solutions have been proposed to reduce the Traceroute probing overhead on the
nodes located in the proximity of vantage points and targeted destinations in large-scale
measurement campaigns designed to discover the topology of the network [74, 72]. These
solutions rely on (i) adapting the Traceroute exploring direction by increasing or decreas-
ing the TTL values of the injected probe packets and (ii) stopping the tracing process
as soon as no more topological information can be obtained compared to the previously
collected paths.
For instance, in Doubletree [74], the tracing process start at the middle of the path
and proceeds towards the destination (by increasing the TTL value) as long as an inter-
face discovered by another vantage point towards the same destination is reached: the
process is interrupted because the remaining path has been already discovered by the
other vantage point. Similarly, from the middle of the path the exploring proceeds back-
ward to the vantage point (by decreasing the TTL) and it is interrupted as soon as an
interface contained in one of the paths previously traced by this vantage point toward any
other destination: the missing portion of the path from the vantage point has been al-
ready traced in the past. One weak aspect of this solution is the need for communication
and coordination between vantage points. Authors proposed the adoption of Bloom fil-
ters [75] to decrease the bandwidth consumption but false positives may cause the tracing
process to be prematurely interrupted.
Other approaches tried to reduce the probing overhead when the goal is to investigate
routing change by limiting the frequency of repeated measurements by taking into account
the stability of the routes [19] but it is non trivial to deal with the trade-off between
reducing the amount of repeated measurements while still recognizing all the ongoing
routing changes in the network.
2.2.8 Unresponsive destinations and filtering policies
Filtering policies and unresponsive destinations cause the lack of responses determining
an incompleteness and an impact similar to the one caused by anonymous routers.
Unresponsive destinations do not provide any response to the Traceroute originator.
Accordingly, Traceroute marks the corresponding hop as anonymous and injects additional
probe packets with increased TTL values. This operation, however, does not produce any
result since the destination will discard all the successively injected packets: in this case,
the traced path ends with multiple anonymous routers.
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Exactly the same result happens when network operators apply filtering policies: by
properly configuring their network (e.g. with also the deployment of Firewalls), network
operators can easily disable Traceroute measurements in their infrastructure. A common
approach is to configure the border routers of the network to drop any ICMP Time
Exceeded messages sent toward addresses out of the managed IP space. When filtering
policies are employed, Traceroute waits for the ICMP Time Exceeded responses until the
expiration of the internal timeouts and causing the process to be extremely slow and the
traced path to contain multiple hops marked as anonymous routers.
An approach proposed in literature to deal with unresponsive destinations is to inject
probe packets carrying different transport protocols. Indeed, different transport protocols
are intended to solicit different reaction from the targeted device thus potentially increas-
ing the chance to trigger a response [72]. Furthermore, Luckie et al. [76] experimentally
observed that the properties of the path inferred by relying on Traceroute depends on the
adopted transport protocol: ICMP probe packets tend to successfully solicit replies from
more destinations while UDP probe packets tend to reach less destinations but explore
the highest number of links along the path.
Unfortunately, independently from which specific transport protocols is adopted, Tracer-
oute is able to trace the path as long as ICMP Time Exceeded replies are collected from
the network: filtering policies discarding these messages prevent Traceroute to trace the
entire path. To the best of our knowledge, there are no solutions documented in literature
able to deal with this problem.
2.2.9 Lack of visibility on the reverse path
An important limitation affecting Internet path tracing technique is related to the inability
to trace the reverse path. By using Traceroute, one can trace the path from the Traceroute
originator towards the destination, however, no information is available on the path taken
by the traffic from destination back to the Traceroute originator. Several applications
of path tracing are impacted or strongly limited by this issue [77]: for instance, network
failures along the reverse path are much more complex to be located.
Katz-Bassett et al. [77] proposed reverse traceroute, a system to trace the reverse
path from any destination back to any node of the network. To reach this goal, authors
exploited different methods to incrementally discover reverse path hops and stitch them
together in a unique path. More precisely, authors make use of (i) an atlas of Internet
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paths traced with Traceroute, (ii) IP options such as the RR option and the Timestamp
option, and (iii) spoofed probe packets, i.e. packets crafted with the source address of
a different machine. The very basic mechanism used to trace the reverse path from a
given destination back to a given source is first to identify a vantage point located no
farther than 8 hops from the destination. This vantage point, then, launches an ICMP
Echo Request packet equipped the RR option towards the destination spoofing as the
source: in this way, the packet arrives at the destination and triggers an ICMP Echo
Reply response sent towards the source. Since the destination typically replicates the
incoming RR option in the response, the RR option starts registering addresses along the
reverse path. These addresses are extracted from the source and used to incrementally
build the reverse path. Authors demonstrated the great utility of tracing reverse paths
by investigating AS-level connectivity, link latency and path inflations. However, though
effective, the resulting system appears particularly complex compared to the simple stand-
alone ready-to-use solution represented by the traditional Traceroute. In addition, since
spoofing is often used to perform network attacks, this practice may easily trigger alarms
and expose the injected traffic to filtering policies.
2.2.10 Other limitations
Other limitations affect Internet path tracing.
Layer-2 clouds. Path tracing techniques are not able to provide information about
layer-2 devices such as switches, bridges, hubs, etc. Also MPLS tunnels may not be
reported by path tracing techniques [45]. The most important impact of this limitation is
related to the ability of entirely and accurately reconstructing the topology of the Internet.
In this case, clouds of layer-2 devices cause the inferred topologies to be incomplete but
also inaccurate with an impact very similar to hidden routers [9]. Also, network failures
are harder to be detected and located when using path tracing techniques if they involve
layer-2 devices.
Not routable addresses. Traceroute may also report non-routable addresses due
to router and interface misconfigurations. Since these addresses can be used by different
routers in different ASes, their presence in the trace causes uncertainty especially when
investigating the global properties of the network such as the topology: in this case,
researchers are forced to treat these addresses as anonymous routers and face them with
the same methodologies and techniques proposed for that limitation.
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2.3 Open challenges
Network operators and researchers often rely on path tracing techniques to explore and
monitor Internet paths with the goal of collecting useful information about the particu-
lar phenomenon under investigation (e.g. the topology [8, 9], the current routing [22, 23],
etc.). This methodological approach proved to be very useful and effective as demon-
strated by the applications described in Section 1.2. However, by analysing the literature
we observed how network operators and researchers must often deal with two open chal-
lenges when adopting this approach.
2.3.1 The need for vantage points
Investigating aspects or phenomena ongoing in the Internet typically requires the abil-
ity to explore particular Internet routes. One way to address this issue is to exploit a
single vantage point and trace Internet paths toward multiple network destinations. Un-
fortunately, a unique vantage point is very limited in terms of Internet routes that can
be explored: for instance, tracing the path from the vantage point A towards the net-
work destination B does not provide any useful information about the path followed by
the traffic sent from the node B back to the node A and tracing the paths toward any
destinations in the Internet from the vantage point A will not provide more insight about
this specific Internet route. This happens since asymmetric routing is predominant in the
Internet [21], i.e. one cannot simply assume that the path from the node A to the node
B is equal to the path from B to A. As a consequence, there is the possibility that the
Internet routes of interest cannot be measured by using the adopted vantage point.
Using multiple vantage points is definitively helpful. In order to investigate large-scale
phenomena in the Internet from multiple observation points, the research community has
built over time several experimental testbeds providing vantage points located at univer-
sities [78, 79, 80], homes [81, 82] and, recently, also at mobile devices [83, 84, 78]. From
these privileged observation points, researchers and network operators are potentially able
to explore a large number of Internet routes, thus potentially collecting the information
required to deeply understand the particular phenomenon under investigation. Unfor-
tunately, these vantage points are made available through a set of highly heterogeneous
interfaces: each testbed typically requires the user to (i) join a community (ii) obtain cre-
dentials (iii) access the vantage points through the specific mechanisms provided by the
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testbed management platform. In addition, each testbed may also impose particular con-
straints on the managed vantage points: for instance, RIPE ATLAS [6] provides a set of
well distributed vantage points capable of performing basic measurements such as Tracer-
oute, Ping and DNS queries. However, each measurement has a cost in terms of credits
and users gains credits over time according to how many active vantage points they host.
In this scenario, network operators and researchers are not encouraged to use the van-
tage points made available by different testbeds because this operation would require a
deep knowledge of the policies, constraints and interfaces of each specific testbed. As a
consequence, we observed in literature that most researchers exploited always the rela-
tively small amount of vantage points of the same testbed, thus obtaining visibility on
a limited amount of Internet routes providing potentially only partial information about
the phenomenon under investigation.
2.3.2 Tracing paths with a priori known characteristics
Another open challenge network operators and researchers need to deal with is the abil-
ity of current systems to satisfy only one simple query: given the possibility of issuing
Traceroute measurements from the vantage point A, what is the path taken by the traffic
from the vantage point A to the network destination B?
While tracing Internet paths is helpful to investigate several aspects of the Internet as
largely demonstrated by the scientific literature, researchers and operators need to address
much more complex queries. These queries typically imply the knowledge of at least some
properties for the subset of paths of interest: for example, researchers are interested in
Internet paths crossing a given AS to investigate its topology [85, 86, 73], intra-domain
routing [44] or performance [87] and more in general to infer the properties of the routes
crossing this specific network. Researchers are interested in the paths traversing two
given consecutive ASes to demonstrate the existence of traffic exchanged between them
and thus potentially infer an additional AS-level link not already considered in the partial
AS-level topology one can derive from inter-domain routing [13, 11, 12]. More in general,
requesting Internet paths traversing consecutive and non-consecutive ASes is potentially
useful to investigate circuitous routes and path inflations [22]. Finally, traversing a given
AS on the path to reach a destination located in another AS is helpful since it may provide
relevant information about the the reverse path from any destination in the Internet back
to any vantage point [77]: we already acknowledged how the lack of visibility of Traceroute
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on the reverse path is one of the major limitations of path tracing. The above-mentioned
categories of advanced queries is by no means complete, but illustrates that (1.) advanced
queries requiring tracing Internet paths are very common in literature and (2.) often users
are willing to trace Internet paths compliant with specific a priori-known requirements
(like the ASes to traverse) while they do not care about which specific vantage point and
destination need to be considered to reach this goal.
Unfortunately, since current systems are able to simply trace the path from a given
source toward a given destination, researchers are forced to identify the vantage points
to use and the destinations to target in order to trace the paths of interest. To deal
with this non-trivial issue, researchers and network operators usually (1) make use of a
given testbed; select some vantage points and destinations according to their expertise,
experience and the specific phenomenon they want to investigate; trace the selected paths
and verify if the measurements satisfy their needs, otherwise, new vantage points or
destinations are selected. This solution is time-consuming and provides just a suboptimal
access to the routing information. Users might not easily identify all the possible routes of
interest, thus collecting only a partial information required for a deep understanding of the
phenomenon under investigation. Other solutions are (2) to adopt a bruteforce approach
performing large-scale measurement campaigns using as many vantage points as possible
to issue Traceroute measurements toward as many network destinations as possible or
(3) to exploit the information made publicly available by large research projects adopting
bruteforce approach by monitoring millions of Internet paths every day [2, 15]. These
solutions are not only network resource-consuming but do not necessarily provide all the
desired information: although a large amount of paths is traced, this set of paths may not
necessarily contain the routes of interest. Furthermore, since tracing millions of paths is
a time-consuming process, the collected information might be also potentially stale due
to routing changes.
2.4 Final remarks
Techniques designed for Internet path tracing inject into the network purposely crafted
probe packets to reconstruct the Internet path essentially in terms of as a sequence of
IP addresses, i.e. they report an address associated to each traversed router on the path
towards the targeted destination. According to a recent survey among network opera-
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tors [50], Traceroute is the most widely adopted approach to trace Internet paths partic-
ularly helpful for managing and troubleshooting the network. At the same time, tracing
Internet paths proved to be extremely useful also for scientific purposes as demonstrated
by the numerous applications described in the previous chapter.
Unfortunately, despite the numerous applications, path tracing techniques are affected
by several important limitations causing inaccuracy (i.e. the output of path tracing does
not correspond to the actual traversed paths or the provided information is potentially
misleading) and incompleteness (i.e. the path tracing technique misses traversed nodes or
links) with an impact on the applications relying on path tracing.
In this chapter, we described the available path tracing techniques and provided an
overview of the limitations and the partial solutions discussed in literature. Some limita-
tions attracted great interest from the research community (e.g. load balancers), others
have been largely ignored (e.g. hidden routers) motivating part of the research activities
at the base of the contributions described in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we will also docu-
ment and investigate two additional experimentally observed limitations affecting Internet
path tracing.
Finally, we noticed that researchers, network operators and systems using path tracing
techniques are often interested in exploring specific Internet paths. However, the ability
of exploring the Internet paths of interest strongly depends on (i) the available vantage
points and (ii) the selection of the vantage point to use and the network destinations to
target. These two factors currently represent open challenges: even if several experimental
testbeds providing vantage points exist, the great heterogeneity of the interfaces to access
these vantage points induced researchers to use always the same testbed and its relatively
limited amount of vantage points. In addition, there are no methodologies to identify the
vantage point and the destination to select in order to explore a particular Internet path
with a priori known characteristics (e.g. the ASes to traverse). These open challenges
may potentially cause a suboptimal access to the paths of interest. In Chapter 5, we will
describe a general architecture and an its implementation designed to address both the
open challenges described in this chapter.
Chapter 3
Augmenting Internet path tracing
Several applications rely on Internet path tracing to investigate particular phenomena
or aspects of the global network. Unfortunately, the techniques widely adopted to this
end suffer from severe limitations causing the collected information about the paths under
investigation to be potentially inaccurate or incomplete. Despite the efforts of the research
community, several limitations (e.g. hidden routers, third-party addresses, etc.) appear
not definitively solved or exhaustively investigated.
In this chapter, we describe innovative methodologies and techniques developed for
augmenting Internet path tracing. Our goal is to detect, quantify and possibly resolve or
mitigate unresolved limitations affecting the path tracing techniques.
At the basis of most of the contributions described in this chapter, there is the adoption
of probe packets equipped with the IP optional headers (the IP options): as we demon-
strate in the following sections, this innovative type of measurement traffic has the great
potential to collect additional information about the traversed path. This additional in-
formation is extremely useful to address the limitations affecting path tracing techniques.
We first briefly describe the IP options adopted for augmenting Internet path tracing and
how routers proved to manage this particular type of traffic. Then, we detail and exper-
imentally evaluate the methodologies and techniques designed for augmenting Internet
path tracing: more precisely, we designed and developed methodologies and techniques
for detecting hidden routers and third-party addresses, and for accurately dissecting the
RTT in the traced paths. Finally, we explore a totally alternative path tracing approach
exposing additional information about the traversed paths when compared to the classic
Traceroute-based approach.
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3.1 Measurement traffic enhanced by IP options
In this section, we describe the particular measurement traffic we adopted for augmenting
Internet path tracing. This traffic consists of probe packets equipped with IP options
with the potential to collect additional information about the traversed path: later in
this chapter, we demonstrate how using this particular traffic one can detect and possibly
mitigate or resolve important limitations affecting Internet path tracing techniques.
3.1.1 Classic probe packets in active probing
Measurement techniques based on active probing injects into the network purposely
crafted probe packets: by observing how the network treats the injected traffic, researchers
can infer properties of the network such as the topology, the available bandwidth, the link
capacity, and so on. In this operation, researchers may have or not the control on both
the end points of the path. Tracing Internet paths, however, typically implies the lack
of control on the targeted destinations since any path on the Internet might be the one
of interest. Accordingly, active probing performed for Internet path tracing typically ex-
ploits a set of probe packets crafted in order to solicit replies from devices not under the
control of the user.
The traditional probe packets used in path tracing are briefly reported in the following:
• UDP [88] probe packets are crafted with a high and presumably unused destination
port in order to trigger an ICMP Port Unreachable message from the targeted
destination. By default, this is the transport protocol used by Traceroute.
• ICMP [89] refers to ICMP Echo Request packets created to trigger ICMP Echo
Reply messages from the destination.
• TCP [90] probe packets refer to packets carrying the TCP protocol with the SYN
flag set crafted with a high and presumably unused destination port in order to
trigger TCP Reset responses.
Note how these probe packets are intended to impose a minimum load on the targeted
destination since the goal is to investigate the properties of the path and the process ends
as soon as a message from the destination is collected: for instance, TCP probe pack-
ets with the SYN flag set are the very first packet of the multistep TCP handshake [90].
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Since during this process resources are allocated by the destination for the ongoing com-
munication, it is important to avoid that the targeted device allocates resources for a
communication that is not going to happen. This is why the destination port is set to a
presumably unused port.
Limiting the TTL of these probe packets as done in the most adopted path tracing
techniques allows to elicit ICMP Time Exceeded messages from the routers located along
the path, thus providing information about the traversed path.
3.1.2 Probe packets and IP options
The classic probe packets reported above have been used for decades to trace Internet
paths with Traceroute [76]. We demonstrate in this chapter that it is possible to strongly
improve their ability to collect information about the paths by also using IP options.
The IP options of the protocol IP version 4 are a generic and simple way of transmitting
per packet information related to network layer components like routers and hosts [47].
The options may appear or not in a packet and according to the standard they must be
implemented by all the IP modules in the Internet. Since the IP protocol is in charge of
delivering packets and involves all the network devices located along the path from the
source towards the destination, when present, the option is inspected by all the network
devices encountered by the probe packet in its travel. A single packet may carry multiple
IP options and each IP option may have a variable length. There are two cases for the
format of an option: (i) a single byte specifying the type of option and (ii) multiple
bytes where the first specifies the option-type, the second the length of the option, and
remaining bytes represent area allocated for the option-related data.
In this thesis, we exploit two specific IP options: the IP Timestamp option and the IP
Record Route option. Later in this chapter, we demonstrate how probe packets equipped
with these options provide much more information about the traversed path, thus aug-
menting Internet path tracing.
IP Record Route option - RFC791 [47]
As already discuss in Chapter 2, the IP Record Route (RR) option (type 7), provides a
way to record the route traversed by a probe packet toward its destination and represents
the first (and unique) path tracing approach included in the Internet standards. The
format is reported in Fig. 3.1a. The option header consists of 3 bytes: besides the type
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=7 | Length | Pointer | Route Data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Route Data |
+-------------------------------//------------------------------+
(a) IP Record Route option.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=68 | Length | Pointer | Ovflw | Flag |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamps Data |
+-------------------------------//------------------------------+
(b) IP Timestamp option.
Figure 3.1: Format of IP optional headers used in this thesis.
field, the length field counts the option size in terms of octets, while the pointer field
indicates the first byte of the slot reserved for the next address to register. The minimum
value of the pointer is 4. The route data area is initialized to zero and serves as a container
for IPs registered along the path. When receiving a packet equipped with this option, a
network device checks if the pointer does not exceed the option length (i.e. the option is
not full), inserts an owned IP address, and increments the pointer value accordingly. If
the option data is full, the packet is normally forwarded without inserting any address.
Considering the maximum size of the IP header, the RR option cannot contain more than
9 address slots. For this reason, the RR option represents a valuable but also limited tool
for tracing IP paths as already discussed in Chapter 2.
According to [56], the registered address is usually the one associated to the interface
selected by the router to forward the traffic to the next hop along the path. However,
authors also observed a limited but significant percentage of routers registering in the
option data the address of the interface on which the packet arrived.
IP Timestamp option - RFC791 [47]
The IP Timestamp option (type 68) or simply TS option, has the format reported in
Fig. 3.1b. Compared to the RR option, the TS option header is one byte larger and
contains additional fields. As usual, the length field indicates the size of the option in
bytes, while the pointer field is used by each traversed router to identify the first byte of
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the slot to analyze in the option data. The minimum value of the pointer is 5 and it is
possibly incremented by the router encountered along the path. When the pointer value
is higher than the option length, the option is considered full.
The flag field defines the variant of the TS option and may assume three different
values.
• Flag 0: each traversed router on the path is requested to insert inside the slot indi-
cated by the pointer a 32-bit timestamp. After this operation, the router increments
the pointer by 4 units and forwards the packet to the next router along the path.
• Flag 1: each router is requested to insert into the slot indicated by the pointer a
64-bit (IP address, timestamp) record, where IP address is an address owned by
the router. In this case, the router increments the pointer value by 8 units before
forwarding the packet.
• Flag 3: the sender can prespecify up to four addresses (and thus the devices) from
which a timestamp is requested. In this case, the option data is initialized with a
set of (IP, 0) records. When an incoming packet is equipped with this variant of TS
option, the router checks if the address contained into the slot currently indicated
by the pointer is an owned address and only in this case a timestamp is inserted in
the corresponding area. Otherwise the option is ignored and the packet is normally
forwarded along the path. Whenever a timestamp is inserted, the pointer is incre-
mented by 8 units. This TS option variant is also commonly referred in literature as
prespecified TS option. Note that according to the described mechanism, the times-
tamp are requested in a specific order. Indeed, since each traversed router inspects
the slot currently pointed by the pointer field, the second prespecified address can-
not insert its own timestamp before the first prespecified address, and third address
before the first two prespecified addresses and so on. Many of the contributions
described in this chapter rely on the order of the prespecified addresses.
Independently from the adopted variant, every time a router cannot insert a times-
tamp because the option is full (i.e. the pointer exceeds the option length), the router is
requested to increment by one the overflow field. Accordingly, this the 4-bit field counts
the number of routers encountered along the path that could not insert a timestamp due
to lack of space. According to the RFC, whenever possible, the timestamp value should
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be inserted in a standard format, which represents the elapsed time in milliseconds since
midnight UT (universal time). When such format cannot be respected, the highest order
bit of the provided timestamps is set to one, indicating the use of a non-standard value.
Since the maximum size of an IP option is 40 bytes, the TS option can potentially
contain no more than 9 timestamps (flag 0) or 4 (IP, TS) records.
3.1.3 A new research trend
According to the standard, the IP options must be implemented in any network device
of the Internet (routers and hosts). Hence, they can be exploited by the users to request
additional information about the routers encountered along the path. For instance, one
may ask routers to identify them-self with the RR option or to provide a temporal infor-
mation with the TS option. Although IP options are not universally supported and may
potentially expose the measurement traffic to higher delay, jitter and packet loss [91, 92],
a growing research trend demonstrated the great benefit of using IP options-equipped
probe packets for Internet measurements.
In this section, we recall how IP options have been recently used to investigate different
aspects of the Internet.
• Advancing path tracing: As already described in Chapter 2, one of the pioneer works
demonstrating the utility of IP options in Internet measurements is the work pro-
posed by Sherwood et al. [55]: by using Traceroute and the RR option, authors inves-
tigated the possibility to gather additional information about the traversed paths by
potentially identifying routers performing load balancing, anonymous routers, mul-
tiple interfaces of the traversed routers, etc. Authors tried to face the non-trivial
task of aligning the RR and Traceroute traces by also adopting disjunctive logic
programming [56]. Although the proposed approach is computationally complex
and hard to replicate, these two works attracted large interest from the community
and clearly demonstrated the great potential benefit of using IP options in Internet
measurements.
• Reverse path tracing: Recently, the RR and TS options as well as the adoption of
multiple vantage points and spoofed probe packets proved helpful to trace the reverse
path from any network destination back to a given source [77]. This approach tried
to address one of the most severe limitations of current path tracing techniques and
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proved a great potential when troubleshooting the network (e.g. path inflations),
infer the AS-level connectivity and measuring the properties of the network links
(e.g. one way link latency). The proposed approach received important awards in
the most important conferences in the networking field.
• Alias resolution: The TS option proved to be helpful also when facing the alias
resolution problem, i.e. the problem of gathering under a unique identifier those
addresses part of the same network device. In particular, Sherry et al. [93] proposed
a promising technique based on the prespecified variant of the TS option to identify
the IPs belonging to the same network device. The proposed approach proved to
identify a significant amount of addresses in alias not recognized by other techniques
part of the state of the art.
• Violations to the destination-based forwarding scheme: RR option has been also re-
cently used to assess violations to the destination-based forwarding scheme. Each
router is supposed to select the next hop on the path towards the destination ex-
clusively based on the destination of the packet. However, increasingly common
mechanisms such as load balancing, MPLS and default routing represent a devi-
ation from this paradigm. Flach et al. [43] exploited the great potential of the
RR option to quantify such deviation discovering that surprisingly about 29% of
observed routers violate the destination-based forwarding scheme.
• Inference of router statistics: Finally, researchers in [94] demonstrated how the IP
TS option allows one to remotely infer router statistics. Authors use the prespecified
TS option to bound the rate of UDP traffic carried by CISCO 3600-series routers
and the start and finish of multicast traffic carried by 6500-series Catalysts by no
requiring any control on the tested devices. This works demonstrate how using
IP options may provide additional information on the current status of the router
uncovering CPU-intensive operations like forwarding multicast traffic.
The works reported above proposed innovative promising measurement techniques re-
lying on the adoption of probe packets equipped with IP options: this approach allowed
to investigate, mitigate or resolve long-lasting unresolved issues like tracing the reverse
path, resolving the alias resolution, quantifying the deviation from destination-based for-
warding scheme and remotely inferring the current status of network devices. All these
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achievements were made possible thanks to the adoption of IP options.
Inspired by these works, we designed, implemented and evaluated innovative method-
ologies and techniques enabled by IP options with the goal of investigating, characterizing
and possibly mitigating or resolving largely ignored limitations in Internet path tracing.
We provide more details about these methodologies and techniques in the rest of the
chapter.
3.1.4 On the IP Prespecified Timestamp option
Part of the contributions highlighted in this chapter are based on the prespecified TS op-
tion. This variant of the TS option has been already used by several works in literature
to investigate relevant aspects of the Internet [77, 93, 94]. Thanks to a large scale mea-
surement campaign targeting 1.7M addresses [95], we tried to infer how routers manage
probe packets equipped with this particular variant of TS option. Hereafter, we adopt the
following notation: PROBE A|BCDE refers to a probe packet type PROBE sent towards
the destination A equipped with a prespecified TS option where the ordered sequence of
addresses BCDE is prespecified. In our analysis, we targeted each destination A with
classic probe packets (ICMP, UDP, TCP) equipped with A|AAAA, i.e. the destination is
requested to insert four timestamps in the option data. The destinations probed with
ICMP and TCP probe packets typically replicate the received option inside the IP layer
of the reply packet. When probed with UDP, instead, the destinations return an ICMP
Port Unreachable error message containing the original probe packet including the TS
option. Accordingly, when using ICMP and TCP, the returned option (if present) is ex-
tracted from the IP layer of the reply packet, while, for UDP, the option is extracted from
the original probe packet carried back as payload of the ICMP Port Unreachable error
packet.
We report in the following the main findings of this analysis.
Probe packet responsiveness. In line with similar studies [91, 92], we observed
that IP options-equipped probe packets can be profitably exploited to explore the core
of the network while filtering may occur at the edge of the network probably due to
Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems. The most responsive type of probe equipped
with the prespecified TS option is ICMP, followed by UDP and TCP probe packets. In
particular, TCP probes solicit very limited amount of responses. ICMP (UDP) probes
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solicited replies from about 50% (21%) of the targeted routers in the core of the network –
as a reference, without the option, ICMP (UDP) probes solicited replies from about 79%
(50%) of the targeted devices. We also observed that destinations may reply to one type
of probe but not to another: this encourages the adoption of different types of probes to
successfully solicit replies from the network.
Router behaviors. We analyzed the number of collected timestamps for each type
of probes and isolated the following two router behaviors (these behaviors have been
also recently documented in an on-line CAIDA report [96] describing the results of an
independent study):
• Per-interface stamping routers. When processing the prespecified TS option, these
routers insert one timestamp only when the probe packet passes through the inter-
face associated to the prespecified address (see Fig. 3.2a and 3.3a). A destination A
exposing this behavior provides between 0 and two timestamps when probed with
ICMP A|AAAA and zero or one timestamp when probed with UDP A|AAAA. In-
deed, when a per-interface stamping router owning the address A is targeted with
ICMP A|AAAA, it provides (i) no timestamp, if the option (i.e. the ICMP Echo
Request or the ICMP Echo Reply carrying the option) does not traverse the in-
terface associated to the prespecified address A; (ii) one timestamp, if the option
traverses the prespecified interface when entering or leaving the node; and (iii) two
timestamps when the option enters and leaves the node through the prespecified in-
terface. On the other hand, when using UDP probe packets, the option is brought
back inside the payload of the ICMP Port Unreachable message: the solicited router
inspects the option only when the probe packet enters the node. For this reason,
UDP probe packets collect no more than one timestamp in case of per-interface
stamping routers. According to [96], CISCO 6000 series routers show this particu-
lar behavior.
• Any-interface stamping routers. These routers insert all the requested timestamps
when the prespecified address is associated to any owned interface (see Fig. 3.2b
and 3.3b). For about 10% of the targeted IPs, we observed destinations providing
all the four requested timestamps both for ICMP and UDP probe packets. We
also employed IGMP probing [85] to fingerprint these devices: we discovered that
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many Juniper routers show this particular behaviors. This finding is also confirmed
by [96].
Since IP options are under specialized, there might be other router behaviors in the
Internet. For instance, we also observed non RFC-compliant behaviors for about 2.25% of
the probed destinations. We isolated the following abnormal behaviors: (i) some prespec-
ified addresses may be overwritten; (ii) the destination may stamp the option by skipping
one or more records (e.g. the second IP is stamped, but not the first one); (iii) the pointer
field is inconsistent with the respect to the number of timestamps (e.g. it does not indi-
cate the beginning of a valid record); (iv) the option returned in the payload of the ICMP
error message is truncated; (v) the overflow field counts several extra−stamps, even if
the option is not full (e.g. the number of inserted timestamps is less than four); (vi) the
option data is entirely overwritten with part of the original packet header; finally (vii)
some destinations provide timestamps even when it is not requested (extra-stampers) –
this behavior has been also recognized in [93]. Although limited in number, these behav-
iors must be taken into account when experimenting with the prespecified TS option. We
point the reader to [95] for a detailed analysis of these cases.
Timestamp values. According to the RFC791 [47], routers may provide both
standard or non-standard timestamp values: a standard value represents the elapsed
time in milliseconds since midnight UT and should always be lower than 86.4 ∗ 105
(24h∗3600s∗1000), while a non−standard values should belong to the range [231, 232] since
in this case the most significant bit is set to one. Accordingly, the range ]86.4 ∗ 105, 231[
consists of non RFC−compliant values. Among the 660k destinations stamping at least
once, we found timestamp values according to the following distribution: 87.6% standard,
11.3% non−standard, 1.15% non RFC−compliant. Surprisingly, we also found few desti-
nations providing both standard and non-standard timestamps. Non-standard values are
hard to interpret since they may indicate any time. Luckily, destinations providing stan-
dard values represent the vast majority and can be profitably exploited for measurement
purposes.
The experience and knowledge acquired with the experimental campaign described
above are the basis of many of the contributions described in the rest of the chapter.
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(a) Per-interface stamping router – a timestamp is provided only when the
option traverses the prespecified interface.
(b) Any-interface stamping router – all the requested timestamps for the
owned inferfaces are provided independently of the traversed interface.
Figure 3.2: Inferred behaviors of routers managing the prespecified TS option when the same address is
prespecified multiple times.
Measurement traffic enhanced by IP options 46
(a) Per-interface stamping router – no timestamps are collected when the op-
tion does not traverse the first prespecified interface due to the order between
the prespecified addresses.
(b) Any-interface stamping router – all the requested timestamps for the
owned interface are provided independently of the traversed interface.
Figure 3.3: Inferred behaviors of routers managing the prespecified TS option when different addresses
are prespecified.
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Figure 3.4: The three steps performed by DRAGO.
3.2 Detecting and locating hidden routers
In this section, we use IP options-equipped probe packets to detect and locate hidden
routers when tracing Internet paths.
3.2.1 Motivation
As described in Chapter 2, hidden routers are network devices configured to not decrement
the TTL value when forwarding the packets. As a consequence, these devices are totally
invisible when path tracing techniques is performed with Traceroute. Hidden routers
represent a severe source of inaccuracy and incompleteness especially when researchers
use Traceroute to infer the topology of the network. Indeed, the presence of hidden
routers causes the inferred topology to be inaccurate (e.g. it contains non-existing links)
and incomplete (e.g. it misses network nodes and links). Due to the lack of measurement
methodologies and techniques, the actual magnitude of the phenomenon is practically
unknown. This in turn raises doubts about the overall accuracy of the topology commonly
inferred by relying on Traceroute. This scenario motivated the research activities at the
basis of the contribution detailed in this section.
3.2.2 The proposed solution
In this section, we describe DRAGO, our multi-step technique designed to detect and
locate hidden routers along the traced paths.
Basic idea
The key mechanism used to detect hidden routers is based on the comparison between
the number of routers managing the TS option and those decrementing the TTL: there is
an evidence of hidden routers on the path every time the number of routers managing the
option is higher than the ones decrementing the TTL. This simple approach is applied to
any portion of the traced path to detect and locate hidden routers [97].
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The algorithm
As depicted in Fig. 3.4, DRAGO performs the following three main steps: (1.) a novel
Traceroute enhanced by the TS option is launched towards the destination; (2.) a pro-
cedure to detect and approximately locate hidden routers is applied to the Traceroute
trace; (3.) a last procedure is applied to reduce, as much as possible, the uncertainty on
the position of the detected hidden routers starting from the output of the previous step.
To highlight each step, we also refer to the sample scenario reported in Fig. 3.5.
Step 1: Traceroute enhanced by the TS option. This step aims at counting
at the same time the number of devices managing the TS option and those decrementing
the TTL along the path toward a destination. To reach this goal a novel Traceroute is
used: the injected TTL limited Traceroute probes are also equipped with the TS option
(flag 0). In this way, all the routers along the path are requested to insert a timestamp
in the option data or to increment the overflow field. This enhanced Traceroute normally
collects ICMP Time Exceeded messages from the routers along the path. From each
collected ICMP Time Exceeded reply, our Traceroute extracts the source address as usual
but also the number of devices managing the TS option up to the replying router. The
latter information is computed by inspecting the TS option brought back in the payload
of the ICMP Time Exceeded error message. Indeed, the original probe packet (TS option
included) triggering the ICMP error is inserted by the solicited router inside the payload of
the ICMP error message. The number of routers managing the TS option is computed as
the number of timestamps inserted in the option data plus the overall number of overflow
Figure 3.5: H, INCR and St in a sample scenario.
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increments: our probe packets can count up to 24 routers managing the TS option (9
timestamps plus 15 overflow increments).
Hereafter, we adopt the following notation (see Tab. 3.1 as a reference for the nota-
tion introduced across the section): let hi be the i-th router discovered by our enhanced
Traceroute along the path towards the destination; H is a generic Traceroute trace made
by the n routers h1h2...hn; let TSi be the number of timestamps plus the overflow in-
crements contained in the TS option brought back in the payload of the ICMP Time
Exceeded reply provided by hi. Basically, TSi represents the number of routers which ac-
tively managed the TS option up to the TTL-decrement performed in hi. Accordingly,
TSn represents the overall number of routers managing the TS option registered in the
path. Since Traceroute uncovered n + 1 devices in the path (considering also the source
machine), there is an evidence of hidden routers in the path every time TSn > n + 1: in
this case, the path contains more devices managing the option than those decrementing
the TTL. TS is obviously monotonically non-decreasing with i.
In the sample scenario reported in Fig. 3.5, our enhanced Traceroute discovered 10
routers towards the destination. We would like to understand if there are other devices
than the ones reported by Traceroute in this path. By inspecting the TS option brought
back in the payload of the collected ICMP Time Exceeded messages, we stored in TS the
number of routers managing the option. In our sample scenario, TS=[1 1 3 3 6 7 8 10 12 12]:
for instance, the ICMP Time Exceeded provided by the 7-th hop contained 8 timestamps,
i.e. between the source and the 7-th router decrementing the TTL we observed exactly 8
routers managing the option. Since TSn is 12 and the path contains 11 devices (including
the source machine), we can already argue that the path contains more devices than those
exposed by Traceroute. Note that TSn > n + 1 is not a necessary condition: the path
may still contain hidden routers also when TSn ≤ n+ 1.
The trace H and the associated TS represent the input of the second step.
Step 2: Detecting and quantifying hidden routers This step aims at detecting
the presence of hidden routers in the trace H pointing out also the portion of the trace
in which those devices lie. To reach this goal, DRAGO applies the condition TSn > n+1
to portions of the traced path.
To explain how the step works, we introduce a new variable called INCR:
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INCRi =
{
TS1 if i = 1
TSi − TSi−1 otherwise
(3.1)
Each element in INCR reports the number of routers managing the TS option between
two consecutive routers decrementing the TTL: INCRi = z indicates that there are exactly
z routers managing the option between the two routers decrementing the TTL hi−1 and
hi (i.e. in the transition hi−1 hi). Note that INCR1 refers to the routers managing the
option between the adopted vantage point and the first router decrementing the TTL on
the path.
Once INCR is computed, the p longest subsequences S1, ...Sp of consecutive non-zero
elements in INCR are extracted. The t-th subsequence St contains exactly st elements
and it is related to a specific portion of the trace made by st + 1 routers decrementing
the TTL. The subsequence St contains hidden routers every time the following condition
is verified:
st∑
i=1
Sti > s
t + 1 (3.2)
Basically, there are hidden routers in a subsequence when the number of involved
routers decrementing the TTL is lower than the routers managing the TS option in the
associated portion of the trace. In particular, in the subsequence St there are exactly wt
hidden routers:
wt = max
(
0 ;
st∑
i=1
Sti − (s
t + 1)
)
(3.3)
Accordingly, the overall number of hidden routers W contained in the trace is:
W =
p∑
t=1
wt (3.4)
In the sample scenario of Fig. 3.5, by applying the Eq. 3.1 on TS, we first determine
INCR=[1 0 2 0 3 1 1 2 2 0]. Then, all the p longest subsequences of non-zero consecutive
elements contained in INCR are extracted. In our example, p=3 with S1=[1], S2=[2],
S3=[3 1 1 2 2]. The Eq. 3.2 is applied on the extracted subsequences to detect hidden
routers: only S3 reveals hidden routers. By applying the Eq.3.3, we can count the exact
number of hidden routers contained in S3, i.e. w3 = 3. We discovered that there are three
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hidden routers located somewhere in the portion of trace associated to S3, i.e. between
the routers reported by Traceroute h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9.
The set of subsequences St containing hidden routers is the input of the next step.
Step 3: Positioning of hidden routers The goal of this step is to reduce, as
much as possible, the uncertainty about the position of the wt hidden routers detected in
the subsequence St: up to now, all that we know is that wt hidden routers are located
somewhere in the subsequence St. Especially when the final goal is to accurately map the
network topology, such level of accuracy is not enough. We would like to clearly identify
in which specific transition between routers managing the TTL the hidden routers lie.
We define the position range of an hidden router as the number of transitions in which
it is potentially located. The higher is the position range, the higher is the uncertainty
on the exact position of the hidden router. Initially, the position range for all the hidden
routers detected in St is st: at the end of the second step, the position range of the three
hidden routers detected in S3 of our sample scenario is 5. DRAGO performs the third
step to reduce as much as possible such uncertainty.
A first possibility is to analyze the elements of the subsequence St one-by-one. Note
Table 3.1: DRAGO: Adopted notation.
Notation Description
H h1 h2 .. hn , vector where hi is the i-th hop discovered by Traceroute
along the path.
TS TS1 TS2 .. TSn , vector where TSi is the number of routers man-
aging the TS option up to hi.
INCR INCR1 INCR2 .. INCRn , vector where INCRi is the number of
routers managing the TS option in the transition hi−1 hi.
p total number of subsequence of consecutive non-zero elements con-
tained in INCR.
St t-th subsequence of consecutive non-zero elements extracted from
INCR. It contains st elements.
wt Hidden routers contained in St.
Sti,j S
t
i , .. , S
t
j vector of elements in the subsequence S
t .
wti,j Hidden routers contained in S
t
i,j.
W Total number of hidden routers contained in the trace.
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Figure 3.6: Different implementations of the TCP/IP stack and their impact on TS and INCR.
that, while Sti > 2 definitively uncovers hidden routers (and also their exact position in the
trace), Sti = 2 is hard to interpret: it may suggest the presence of a hidden router but this
is not always the case. Indeed, both the TTL-decrement and the TS option management
are performed at the IP layer of the TCP/IP stack. In distinct implementations, the two
operations may be performed in a different order and such circumstance has an impact
on INCR and the extracted St. For example, Fig. 3.6 shows the (i-1)-th and i-th hops
discovered towards the Traceroute destination as well as the order in which the TTL and
the TS option are managed: the first hop manages the TTL before the TS option while
the opposite happens in the second hop. In this scenario, INCRi is 2 but there are no
hidden routers in this portion of the trace. More in general, analyzing one-by-one the
elements in St may not uncover all the hidden routers contained in the trace: indeed,
each node may manage at most once the TS option and its contribution should count
no more than once. Hence, analyzing entire portions of St may reveal additional hidden
routers.
Hereafter, we use Sti,j to refer to the elements S
t
i ,...,S
t
j in the subsequence S
t. In each
portion Sti,j, there are exactly w
t
i,j hidden routers:
wti,j = max
(
0 ;
j∑
k=i
Stk − (j − i+ 2)
)
(3.5)
To accurately locate the hidden routers, the technique should count the number of hidden
routers contained in all the possible portions of the subsequence St. To explore only a
subset of all the possibilities, the technique makes use of a binary tree. Each node in the
tree is related to a specific portion Sti,j and it is labelled with the corresponding w
t
i,j. The
root node in the tree is related to the entire subsequence St1,st and it is labelled with w
t,
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Figure 3.7: The binary tree for the the subsequence S3 of Fig. 3.5.
the total number of hidden routers contained in St.
At the beginning, the tree contains only the root node. The technique generates the
two child nodes of a generic node Sti,j only if w
t
i,j > 0. When this occurs, the technique
explodes the node Sti,j by generating the two child nodes S
t
i,j−1 and S
t
i+1,j : a child node is
associated to the sequence of its parent shortened of either the first or the last element.
The ratio behind this choice is that a portion of trace (a node in the tree) must be further
investigated (exploded) only if there are still evidences of hidden routers. At the end of
this process, the tree contains several levels (in the worst case, st levels). All the nodes
at the same level are related to specific portions of the subsequence with the same size:
the higher is the level the lower is the size of the portion associated to the nodes. The
paradigm adopted to build the binary tree is depth-first. The exploration of a branch ends
when one of the following conditions is verified:
• The node to explode is associated to a portion made by a unique element Sti,i: the
wti,i hidden routers are exactly located.
• Both the child nodes Sti,j−1 and S
t
i+1,j of the last exploded node S
t
i,j do not contain
hidden routers, i.e. wti,j−1 = 0 and w
t
i+1,j = 0: hidden routers are visible at the parent
node Sti,j (w
t
i,j > 0) but disappear in the child nodes. In this case, we conclude that
wti,j hidden routers are contained in the portion of the trace associated to S
t
i,j but
it is not possible to locate such devices with a higher accuracy.
The last phenomenon may also affect a subset of the hidden routers: this happens
when the parent node in the tree contains more hidden routers then the ones visible in
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the two child nodes. For those hidden routers, the technique is not able to point out their
position in the trace with an accuracy higher than the portion associated to the parent
node. The position range of an hidden router located in Sti,j is j− i+1: the hidden router
may be located in one of j− i+1 different transitions. When the hidden router is exactly
located in Sti,i, its position range is 1.
Let us apply the third step of DRAGO on the sample scenario of Fig. 3.5. To reduce
the uncertainty on the location of the three hidden routers detected in S3, the third step
builds the binary tree reported in Fig. 3.7. At the beginning, the binary tree is made
just by the root node. This node is associated to the entire subsequence S31,5 containing
w3 = w31,5 = 3 hidden routers. Since w
3
1,5 > 0, the node S
3
1,5 is exploded in S
3
1,4 and S
3
2,5.
The technique implements a depth-first exploration. Hence, the next considered node is
S31,4 and w
3
1,4 = 2 is computed by applying the Eq. 3.5. In turn, the node S
3
1,4 is exploded
in S31,3 (w
3
1,3 = 1) and S
3
2,4 (w
3
2,4 = 0). Then, S
3
1,3 is exploded in S
3
1,2 (w
3
1,2 = 1) and S
3
2,3
(w32,3 = 0). The node S
3
1,2 is further exploded in S
3
1,1 (w
3
1,1 = 1) and S
3
2,2 (w
3
2,2 = 0). The
exploration of this branch is terminated: we reached the leaf of the binary tree and we
found the exact position (S31,1) of a hidden router (in the transition h4 h5). In addition,
note that we count 2 hidden routers in S31,4 but the child nodes provided details only about
one hidden router. We forcedly conclude that another hidden router is located somewhere
in S31,4 but we could not better identify its position. According to the depth-first paradigm,
the technique analyzes S32,3 and then S
3
2,4: both nodes are not exploded since they do not
contain hidden routers. Then, node S32,5 is exploded and the exploration continues as
before until the S34,5 is exploded in S
3
4,4 and S
3
5,5. While w
3
4,5 = 1, either w
3
4,4 = 0 either
w35,5 = 0: a hidden router visible in S
3
4,5 disappeared in the lower level of the tree. We can
conclude that a last hidden router lies somewhere in S34,5 and the technique stopped.
At the beginning of the process, all that we knew was that three hidden routers exist
somewhere in the portion of the trace associated to S3 with a position range of 5 (i.e.
somewhere between the nodes h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9). By applying the third-step of our
technique, we concluded that (a.) a first hidden router is exactly located in S31,1 with
a position range of 1 (i.e. between h4 and h5); (b.) a second hidden router is located
somewhere in S31,4 with a position range of 4 (i.e somewhere between the nodes h4 h5 h6
h7 h8); (c.) the last hidden router is located somewhere in S
3
4,5 with a position range of
2 (i.e somewhere between the nodes h7 h8 h9).
This result is achieved by inspecting 14 out 15 portions of the subsequences of S3.
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Advantages and drawbacks.
A first limitation of our solution is that DRAGO is not able to distinguish if INCRi = 1 is
caused by one of the hops traced by Traceroute or it is caused by a hidden router. From
this point of view, DRAGO estimates a lower bound of the hidden routers in the path.
Compared to the techniques proposed in literature, DRAGO shows both advantages
and drawbacks. Considering the RR option-based solution proposed in [56], using the TS
option provides an almost three times larger exploring range (24 hops against 9 hops).
In addition, while the disjunctive logic programming is a computationally complex solu-
tion [56], our technique is very light and easy to replicate. On the other hand, DRAGO is
not able to assign any address of the detected hidden router and the same hidden router
could be acknowledged multiple times in different paths. Compared to tracebox [60], our
technique is potentially able to uncover also devices that do not modify the forwarded
probe packets but manage the TS option.
3.2.3 Experimental analysis
In this section, we describe the methodology adopted to evaluate DRAGO and the results
of the evaluation.
To evaluate DRAGO, we selected 25K destinations in distinct ASes among the ad-
dresses showing stable responsiveness to ICMP Echo Request probe packets according to
the PREDICT project [98]. These addresses have been selected by using the IP-to-AS
mapping service provided by the Team Cymru [99]. We launched DRAGO towards these
destinations from our laboratory at the University of Napoli. To deal with load balancers,
the enhanced Traceroute launched during the first step was instructed to generate probe
packets as part of the same flow by replicating the internal mechanism adopted in Paris
Traceroute [64]. After having removed the filtered traces and those affected by loops, the
final dataset consisted of 22K traces containing more than 45K addresses.
From the traces of the dataset, we extracted 49, 956 unique transitions hi−1hi not
involving anonymous routers and the corresponding INCRi value. Besides few exceptions,
all the transitions showed a stable number of intermediate routers managing the TS option,
i.e. every time the transition hi−1hi appears in a trace, our enhanced Traceroute reported
always the same INCRi value. About 0.2% of the extracted transitions already exposed
hidden routers, i.e. these transitions are characterized by INCRi values higher than 2.
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Figure 3.8: Step 3 - Hidden routers positioning.
Surprisingly, we observed transitions containing up to 4 consecutive hidden routers: when
tracing Internet paths with Traceroute, the traced paths may miss not only single devices
but also entire portions of the network.
While we already observed some hidden routers by simply analysing the single tran-
sitions, DRAGO discovers additional hidden routers by analysing entire subsequences ex-
tracted from INCR. Tab. 3.2 shows the number of distinct subsequences and traces con-
taining a specific number of hidden routers. We extracted 29, 756 unique subsequences
from the dataset: 1, 348 (4.5% of the total) contain at least one hidden router. From the
trace point of view, almost 6% of all the Traceroute traces in the dataset contains at least
one hidden router. Taking into account that the phenomenon has been largely ignored,
such a value appears surprisingly high suggesting that hidden routers are not uncommon
and may heavily affect the accuracy of the results achieved by classic topology discovery
approaches based on Traceroute [8, 9, 2, 15, 16].
Regarding the location of these devices, after the second step, the position range for
each hidden router coincides with the size of the subsequence: during the third step,
Table 3.2: DRAGO: Inferred hidden routers.
Hidden
Routers
Unique
Subsequences
Involved
Paths
0 28,408 20,603
1 1,222 1,211
2 98 91
3 23 22
4 5 5
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Figure 3.9: Positions of hidden routers exactly located.
DRAGO tries to reduce such uncertainty.
Fig. 3.8a shows the position range of each detected hidden router after the second and
third step. The black portion in the figure is the gain achieved in accuracy: while on av-
erage, the position range of a hidden router decreased from 5.3 to 3.3 (-37%), the hidden
routers exactly located grew from 7% to 14%. Fig. 3.8b shows the position range as a
fraction of the length of the Traceroute trace. From the second to the third step, this
fraction decreased on average from 0.32 to 0.19, i.e the final area identified by DRAGO
as affected by hidden routers represents on average less than one fifth of the Traceroute
trace containing these devices. These results were achieved efficiently thanks to the sup-
port of the binary tree: the positioning of the detected hidden routers did not require
the inspection of all the possible portions in each subsequences. Fig. 3.8c reports the dis-
tribution of the fraction of explored portions for the subsequences containing at least 2
elements: on average, only 57% of all the possible portions were explored.
Finally, for the subset of hidden routers exactly located we computed the hop distance
from the Traceroute source (Fig. 3.9a) and destination (Fig. 3.9b): 70% of these devices
appeared just one hop far from the destination. These results support the idea that a
portion of the detected hidden routers may be middleboxes located in the proximity of
the destination network.
3.2.4 Summary and discussion
In this section, we addressed a first long-lasting limitation of Internet path tracing tech-
niques: hidden routers. More precisely, thanks to the adoption of probe packets equipped
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with the TS option, we designed and experimentally evaluated a multi-step technique able
to detect and locate along the traced path these devices totally invisible to Traceroute.
The experimental analysis provided a first quantification of the magnitude of the phe-
nomenon: hidden routers appear in at least 6% of the investigated paths and are mostly
located in the proximity of the destinations, thus potentially representing middleboxes
located at targeted networks.
3.3 Detecting third-party addresses
In this section, we investigate another severe and largely ignored source of inaccuracy
when tracing Internet paths. More specifically, we design and evaluate an active probing
technique build on top of IP options-equipped probe packets able to identify third-party
(TP) addresses in Internet paths traced with Traceroute. We also investigate the impact
of this limitation when the final goal is to infer the ASes traversed on the path towards
the destination.
3.3.1 Motivation
As explained earlier in Chapter 2, TP addresses are addresses listed by Traceroute as
part of the path under investigation but they are associated to interfaces that are not
actually traversed by the traffic sent towards the Traceroute destination. Traceroute
typically reports one IP address for each router encountered along the path: this address
is commonly believed to be associated to the incoming interface of the router, i.e. the
interface on which the Traceroute probe packet has arrived. However, the RFC1812 [49]
dictates that the source address of an ICMP error message must be set as the address of the
interface chosen by the router to send the packet back to the Traceroute originator, i.e. the
outgoing interface. When the solicited router implements this part of the standard and
the incoming and outgoing interfaces differ, the address reported by Traceroute is a TP
address. The presence of TP addresses in the traced paths represent a severe yet largely
ignored source of inaccuracy for several applications relying on Internet path tracing such
as the discovery of AS-level connectivity [62, 11, 12, 13], the investigation of network
outages and routing anomalies [100, 101, 25] or the assessment of ISP performance [87].
For instance, TP addresses may potentially induce one to wrongly conclude that the traffic
sent towards the destination is flowing across an AS that is not actually traversed.
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The topic has been only marginally considered in literature and the few available
works [62, 63] reported conflicting results: as for hidden routers, the magnitude of the
phenomenon related to TP addresses is essentially unkown, mainly due to the lack of
measurement techniques able to recognize this anomaly in the traced paths. Identifying
the TP addresses is of the utmost importance: for instance, when using Traceroute to infer
the AS-level connectivity, researchers may easily improve the accuracy of the reconstructed
AS-level topology by isolating the subset of AS links affected by TP addresses that require
additional measurements to be confirmed.
3.3.2 The proposed solution
In this section, we describe our active probing technique designed to identify TP addresses
in the Internet paths traced with Traceroute. Our technique requires the injection into the
network of only two additional probe packets in order to classify an IP address discovered
by Traceroute as associated to a traversed interface (i.e. an on-path address – OP) or if
it is a TP address [102, 103].
Basic idea
Our technique is based on the IP prespecified TS option [47]. As already described in the
Sec. 3.1, this option allows to prespecify in a single packet up to four IP addresses from
which a timestamp is requested. We adopt again the notation PROBE A
∣∣BCDE, where
PROBE is the probe type, A is the targeted destination and BCDE is the ordered list of
prespecified IPs from which a timestamp is requested. We remind that the order implies
that B cannot insert its own timestamp before A, C before B and A, and so on.
The technique is able to classify an IP address when it is part of a per-interface
stamping router (see Sec. 3.1): these routers provide a timestamp only if the probe packet
traverses the prespecified interface. The very basic idea behind the technique is that, if
an address reported by Traceroute is owned by a per-interface stamping router, one can
easily state if this address is on the path or not by prespecifying it inside a probe packet
sent towards the destination: if the address inserts a timestamp, the probe packet has
traversed that interface, therefore the address is on the path; otherwise, the address is a
TP address. To reach this goal, however, it is necessary to remove from the classification
process the routers exposing non-compliant behaviors such as the any-interface stamping
routers.
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Figure 3.10: Classification of the hop Y discovered by Traceroute towards D.
The algorithm
In order to understand if the hop Y discovered by Traceroute towards the destination D
is a TP address, the proposed technique performs the following steps (see Fig. 3.10): (1.)
it targets Y with an ICMP Echo Request Y
∣∣YYYY probe to verify if it is classifiable or
not (see below); (2.) if Y is classifiable, it targets D with a UDP D
∣∣YYYY probe packet
toward a high and presumably unused port to solicit from the targeted destination an
ICMP Port Unreachable error message: if the TS option brought back into the payload
of the ICMP Port Unreachable message contains at least one timestamp, Y is classified
as OP, otherwise it is a TP address. Note that by inspecting the option returned inside
the ICMP error message we can observe the status of the option as affected exclusively
by the forward path: indeed, since the option is inside the payload of the packet, none of
the routers along the reverse path can interfere by modifying the content of the option.
The first step is necessary to remove routers not exposing a per-interface stamping
behaviors since these routers may lead to erroneous results. During the first step, we
also remove all those destinations exposing abnormal behaviors (see Section 3.1.4). By
adopting a conservative approach, a Traceroute hop Y is considered non−classifiable every
time there is no a clear evidence that its router has a per-network interface stamping
behavior, as in the following circumstances:
• Private addresses : Y is part of a private addressing block [104] and it may be
unreachable by the ICMP Echo Request message or it may be employed in different
networks along the path towards the destination. In the latter case, a timestamp
in the ICMP Port Unreachable message may be inserted by a router different from
the one under investigation.
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• Unresponsive addresses : no reply to ICMP Echo Request Y
∣∣YYYY is received, thus
either the targeted device dropped the probe or the reply was filtered along the
path. In both cases, it is not possible to clearly assess if the this device manages or
not the option and if it is a per-interface stamping router.
• Addresses removing the option: Y replies to the ICMP Echo Request Y
∣∣YYYY
with an ICMP Echo Reply messages not containing the TS option, thus either the
targeted hop did not replicate the option inside the reply or the option was removed
along the path.
• Addresses providing no timestamps : Y does not provide any timestamp when probed
with ICMP Echo Request Y
∣∣YYYY. Either, the targeted device simply ignores the
TS option or it is a per-interface stamping router but the probe packet has not
travelled across the prespecified interface. Since we are not able to distinguish this
two cases from the collected reply, we conservatively consider these addresses as
non-classifiable.
• Any-interface stamping routers : the targeted device provides 4 timestamps when
probed with ICMP Echo Request Y
∣∣YYYY. Such behavior is exposed by any-
interface stamping routers (e.g. Juniper routers), which insert their timestamp
when the prespecified address is associated to any owned interface [95]. Hence, for
these routers, the presence of a timestamp in the ICMP Port Unreachable message
obtained during the second step would not allow to clearly classify Y as a crossed
interface or not.
In conclusion, a Traceroute hop Y is considered classifiable only if it provides one or
two timestamps when directly probed with ICMP Echo Request Y
∣∣YYYY.
3.3.3 Experimental analysis
In this section, we describe the large scale measurement campaign conducted to evaluate
the proposed technique as well as the main achieved findings.
Methodology
To evaluate our technique, we selected more than 327K destinations in 14K ASes among
the ones showing stable responsiveness to both ICMP Echo Request probe packets, ac-
Detecting third-party addresses 62
Table 3.3: Root cause analysis of IPs non−classifiable as third-party addresses.
Category IPs %IPs
Private address 9,428 2.2
Unresponsive addresses 72,775 16.4
Addresses providing no timestamps 64,641 14.6
Addresses removing the option 18,039 4
Any-interface stamping routers 45,963 10.4
Multiple Behaviors 9 ∼0
Non−classifiable IPs 210,885 47.6
cording to the PREDICT project [98], and UDP probes carrying the TS option according
to a preliminary experimental campaign conducted from our laboratory at the Univer-
sity of Napoli. To perform a large scale measurement campaign, we used 53 PlanetLab
nodes [80] located in different ASes as vantage points. In particular, each node was in-
structed to (1) send UDP probes towards the destinations and select those which reply
and preserve the TS option; (2) launch UDP Paris-Traceroute towards the selected desti-
nations; (3) launch an ICMP Echo Request Y
∣∣YYYY toward each intermediate hop Y; (4)
select the classifiable hops as the ones providing one or two timestamps; (5) send a UDP
probe towards the Traceroute destination prespecifying each time a different classifiable
hop collected on the path.
In order to avoid ambiguities caused by load balancers, the UDP probes used to classify
the hops and the ones generated by Traceroute are crafted as part of the same flow [64].
After removing the traces affected by filtering, our final dataset consists of about 12M
traces for a total number of 443K addresses.
Experimental results
Since each vantage point traced IP paths towards the same destinations, a specific IP
address may be discovered by multiple vantage points: this happens especially for those
addresses located close to the targeted destinations. More than 96% of IPs were captured
by at least two different vantage points, while about a half were captured by more than
35 vantage points.
Hop classification. When an IP address is captured by multiple vantage points,
each node independently states if it is classifiable or not according to the collected times-
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tamps. We removed from the following analysis few addresses showing non-RFC compliant
behaviors (see Section 3.1).
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Figure 3.11: Third-party (TP) and on-path (OP) addresses in Internet paths traced with Traceroute.
Our vantage points unanimously agreed about more than 97% of IPs labelling 51% of
addresses as classifiable and 47.6% as non−classifiable. Conflicting verdicts regarded a
limited number of IPs (1.4%) and were mainly caused by the removal of the TS option
on a subset of reverse paths. Tab. 3.3 reports a breakdown of non−classifiable IPs per
category: our technique was unable to classify such IPs mostly because of devices not
replying (16.4%), ignoring the TS option (14.6%), or exposing an any-interface stamping
behavior (10.4%).
More than a half of IPs in the dataset were classifiable by our technique. Adopting a
per-trace point of view, Fig. 3.11a shows the fraction of classifiable hops per trace (i) for
each vantage point and (ii) over the entire dataset: on average 4%, 52% and 30% hops
are classifiable in each trace respectively by the most filtered node (Worst vantage point),
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the less filtered one (Best vantage point) and over the entire dataset. Fig. 3.11b reports
the distribution of the percentage of hops classified by the technique as TP addresses in
each path: more than 90% of the traced Internet paths contain this anomaly and about
21% of hops on average have been classified as TP addresses. This result reveals how
the phenomenon related to TP addresses is not as uncommon as suggested by previous
works [63]. In addition, most classifiable hops appeared in several paths from multiple
vantage points toward multiple destinations and have been classified each time. Fig. 3.11c
shows the percentage of classifiable IPs always classified as TP or OP and those classified
as both (Mix), on the paths in which they appeared. Such paths are aggregated in
three different ways: paths originated (1.) by the same vantage point toward multiple
destinations, (2.) by multiple vantage points toward a single destination, (3.) by multiple
vantage points toward multiple destinations. The obtained results highlight an unexpected
general trend: a classifiable address is labelled by the technique more often as TP than
OP address. According to this result, routers often reply to the Traceroute originator by
using an interface different from the ones traversed by the packets sent to the targeted
destination. For both the aggregations 1 and 2, most of addresses were always classified
as TP or OP. However, some IPs were also variably classified and this phenomenon is
much more important in the aggregation 3. Such an evidence allows to conclude that the
same address discovered with Traceroute may lie or not on the IP path depending on the
(i) originating node and (ii) the targeted destination, essentially due to both inter- and
intra-domain routing.
AS-level transitions affected by TP addresses While 224K IPs were classified
at least once as TP address, not all the TP addresses impact the AS-level links derived
from Traceroute. Mapping each hop to the owner AS [99], we identified in our dataset
14, 783 different ASes. In order to avoid ambiguities caused by the presence of IXPs, we
removed from our traces the hops associated to them according to the datasets provided
by peeringDB [105] and PCH [7] as already done in literature [12]. From the resulting
34, 414 AS-level links, we removed 38 links involving sibling ASes according to [106, 107].
Taking into account that the same AS link may appear in several traces toward distinct
destinations and may be exposed each time by different IP addresses, a single AS link
may be associated to multiple classifications according to how the two involved IPs were
classified each time by our technique. In order to deal with this phenomenon, we applied
the following methodology: (1.) if both the involved IPs were classified as OP at least once,
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we are confident that the corresponding AS link actually exists; otherwise, by adopting a
conservative approach, (2.) if both the involved IPs were non−classifiable by our technique
at least once, we consider the link as possible; finally, (3.) the AS links which always
involved at least one TP address are considered potentially false (see the link ASx−ASz
in Fig. 2.7). We counted 1, 897 existing links and 25, 990 possible links. On the other
hand, we found 6, 299 potentially false AS links corresponding to about 17% of the links
extracted from the dataset.
AS-level loops affected by TP addresses False AS links caused by TP addresses
may also generate bogus AS-level loops. In our dataset, we registered 587, 126 traces
normally reaching the destination, in which an AS-level loop appeared. Among these
traces, about 4, 144 loops involved sibling ASes. Thanks to our technique, we discovered
that TP addresses are involved in at least 37% of such loops1: 105K and 149K loops
respectively started or ended with a TP address, while 6, 083 loops involved a sequence
of consecutive TP addresses. For instance, considering the sequence AS1 AS2 AS3 AS1,
if AS2 and AS3 are associated to TP addresses, one possibility is that the corresponding
path is entirely contained in AS1, thus generating a bogus loop.
Implications of the achieved results. The surprisingly high value of AS links
affected by TP addresses can represent a significant source of AS maps distortion. This
conclusion confirms the one drawn by Zhang et al. [62] and is totally different from the one
reached by Hyun et al. [63]. Here, we investigated the basic reasons of such contradiction.
According to the heuristic method proposed by Hyun et al., a candidate TP address
is an intermediate hop that resolves to an AS that differs from the ASes of both adjacent
IPs in the same path. The method takes into account also path stability, AS ownerships
and hostnames. On the one hand, applying the Hyun’s method on our dataset, 7, 457 IPs
were classified as candidate TP addresses. Such addresses appeared in 56,595 different
IP1 IP2 IP3 sequences where all the IPs were mapped to different ASes and IP2 represents
the candidate TP address. Each sequence appeared in multiple traces and each time the
involved IPs were classified by our technique2: (i) 166 sequences resulted as real AS1 AS2
AS3 transitions, since all the three IPs were classified at least once as OP; (ii) although
the candidate TP address was non−classifiable by our technique in 39, 824 sequences, in
1Since we used a conservative approach, the real impact may be potentially wider.
2As described above, the address identified by Hyun as candidate TP address may effectively lie or
not on the IP path depending on the source and the destination.
Detecting third-party addresses 66
15, 850 of them we recognized as TP address the previous or the next hop, which could
be the real responsible of a false AS link; (iii) in the remaining 16, 605 sequences, our
technique always classified the central address as TP in 85% of cases (the two techniques
validate each other in such cases) and as OP in 14% of sequences (in contradiction to the
response of the Hyun’s method). In the last case, we also found 52 sequences classified as
both TP and OP depending on the Traceroute destination and the vantage point used.
At the same time, only 1.5% of the TP addresses identified by our technique is de-
tected by the Hyun’s method. The main reason is that a TP address is such independently
from the AS point of view. In addition, a Traceroute path may contain multiple consec-
utive TP addresses – a possibility considered remote in [63]: by inspecting our data,
we registered 680K unique sequences where about 25% were isolated TP addresses, but
more than a half consisted of more than 3 consecutive TP addresses. As for the ASy in
Fig. 2.7, if a Traceroute path only crosses border routers exposing TP addresses mapped
to other ASes, consecutive TP addresses may entirely hide an AS traversed along the path.
3.3.4 Summary and discussion
In this section, we presented and evaluated – to the best of our knowledge, for the first
time in literature – an active probing technique able to identify TP addresses in Traceroute
traces. Differently from most previous works, our technique does not rely on information
provided by BGP monitors and it allows to conclude that TP addresses are very common
affecting more than 90% of the observed paths. Thanks to a large scale measurement
campaign, we draw the following general conclusions: (i) the same address may be a
TP address or not depending on the originating host and the targeted destination; (ii)
TP addresses may also be responsible for bogus AS-level loops. We further observed
that our technique was able to classify more than half of the total discovered IPs and,
surprisingly, about 17% of Traceroute-derived AS-level links involved TP addresses, being
thus potentially false. Finally, our results confirmed the conclusion drawn by Zhang et
al.[62] on the severity of this phenomenon and allowed to explain why such conclusion
conflicts with the one achieved by Hyun et al [63]: on our dataset, their heuristic method
was able to discover only 1.5% of the TP addresses recognized by our technique.
Since TP addresses cause inaccuracy when inferring the ASes traversed on the path
towards the destination, the surprisingly high concentration of TP addresses suggests
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caution especially when Traceroute is used to assess the AS-level connectivity.
3.4 Dissecting RTT in Internet path tracing
When tracing Internet paths with Traceroute, state of the art implementation of this
technique also provides statistics about the RTT experienced for each intermediate hop.
Unfortunately, as described in Section 2.2.4, the practical utility of this information is
limited since for several reasons (e.g. asymmetric routing) these intermediate RTT values
cannot be easily interpreted as correct contributions to the overall RTT experienced along
the path. In this section, we describe our contribution to solve this limitation. More
precisely, we detail an active probing technique based on the TS option able to dissect the
RTT experienced towards the destination in two different chunks determined by different
well-identified portions of the traced network path.
3.4.1 Motivation
A common metric used to estimate the delay over a network path is the RTT [108], defined
as the length of time it takes to send a data packet toward a destination and receive its
response. Monitoring RTT provides useful information about the network status when
managing testbeds and operational networks [50]. However, an RTT sample comprises
all the delays experienced by the data packet and its response along the forward and
reverse path respectively, and it also includes the time the destination takes to inspect
the incoming packet and generate the proper response. As a consequence, it can be
difficult to interpret RTT values or tease apart the contributing factors.
From this point of view, dissecting the RTT into chunks related to specific portions
of the network path may be helpful, making it possible to evaluate the relative impact
of each subpath on the total experienced RTT. This approach is particularly useful in
several scenarios. In a home network, one could isolate the impact of the home network
on the RTT experienced toward a destination of interest, such as a website or network
service. A large corporation with multiple providers may want to evaluate the impact of
its access networks when considering performance optimization and traffic engineering.
Service providers may be interested in assessing if the ISP of a particular user has a great
impact on the RTT, thus potentially representing the main cause of poor performance
perceived by the user.
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Unfortunately, accurately dissecting RTT in a traced path is not a trivial task. As
described in Chapter 2, one possibility is to rely on the RTTs reported by Traceroute,
i.e. the time it takes to send the TTL-limited probe and receive the ICMP Time Exceeded
reply. However, it is not uncommon to observe the RTT of intermediate hops to be
higher than the RTT of the destination as reported in the sample trace of Fig. 3.12a. The
figure shows the output of a state of art implementation of Traceroute (Paris-Traceroute)
launched from a vantage point of the Planetlab testbed: the traced path is stable and
there are no routers performing load balancing towards the destination, yet the 4-th hop
shows an average RTT higher than the one of the targeted destination.
As a possible alternative approach, we could use the Ping command to monitor both
the RTT to an intermediate hop and to the destination: Ping estimates the RTT related to
a network destination as the length of time it takes to send an ICMP Echo Request packet
and receive the ICMP Echo Reply response. Let us assume that our goal is to evaluate the
contribution of the provider, AS2907 (SINET-AS), to the overall RTT experienced towards
the destination. We monitored the RTTs up to the last hop within AS2907 (150.99.2.54)
and the destination by issuing pairs of ICMP Echo Request probe packets closely in
time with the Ping command. We launched one probe pair every 200 ms for 10 minutes
and computed the average RTT obtained in one second bins. Finally, we computed
the difference between the average RTT to the destination and to the intermediate hop:
Fig. 3.12b shows the results. For about half of the bins, the intermediate hop had an
average RTT higher than the RTT of the destination, making it hard to understand how
the intermediate hop contributes to overall delay. Further analysis suggests that this
problem holds even for sophisticated advanced variants of the Ping command that injects
probe packets as part of the same traffic flow [109]. Dissecting the RTT by relying on the
information provided by the path tracing techniques or by network diagnostic tools such
as Ping provided inconsistent results.
The inaccuracy of the two methods described above may be caused by (i) asymmetric
routing [20], (ii) different network conditions experienced by the different exploited probe
packets; (iii) the different amount of time required by the solicited devices to generate
the response. Furthermore, when using Ping, the forward path up to the intermediate
hop may not represent a subpath of the forward path towards the destination, since the
forwarding in the network is typically destination-based.
In conclusion, the RTT values reported by Traceroute cannot be used to accurately
Dissecting RTT in Internet path tracing 69
c
AS2907
AS7527
AS4675
min / average / max / std
c
(a) A Traceroute trace from planet1.pnl.nitech.ac.jp: the RTT of
the 4-th hop is higher than the RTT of the destination.
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(b) Difference between the average RTTs up to the destination and
up to the last hop within AS2907 computed with Ping.
Figure 3.12: On the inaccuracy of traditional approaches useful for RTT dissecting.
estimate intermediate delays experienced along the path under investigation and alterna-
tive approaches such as using Ping seems not being helpful to this end. In this section,
we introduce a novel approach to isolate the contributions to the RTT experienced in
a traced path. We dissect the RTT into two distinct chunks, using a single purposely
crafted probe packet to avoid the complications described above.
3.4.2 The proposed solution
In this section, we describe an innovative active probing technique to dissect the RTT in
chunks when tracing Internet paths. The proposed technique is based on the prespecified
TS option and relies on an intermediate router that honors the option and appears on
both the forward and reverse paths [110]. In these cases, the technique dissects the RTT
into (a) the time the probe spends between the source and an intermediate router (in
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(a) Baseline scenario (S: source - W: compliant node - D: destination). The
proposed technique is able to dissect the overall RTT in two chunks: the time
spent by the packets between S and W (both directions) and between W and
D (both direction).
(b) Timestamps collected with D
∣∣WDDW and the extracted RTT chunks.
Figure 3.13: Dissecting RTT in Internet path tracing.
both directions) and (b) the time the probe spends between the intermediate router and
the destination (in both directions).
Algorithm
Our technique makes it possible to dissect the RTT in a path traced toward a network
destination that (i) provides at least one timestamp when probed with ICMP Echo Re-
quest D
∣∣DDDD and (ii) does not expose abnormal behaviors such as extra-stamping [93],
i.e. it does not provide more than one timestamp when probed with ICMP Echo Re-
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quest D
∣∣DXXX where X is an IP address surely not involved on the traversed path. On
these paths, we can dissect the RTT into chunks by exploiting a compliant router lo-
cated along the path (see Fig. 3.13a): a compliant node W (i) is part of both the forward
and reverse path under investigation; (ii) honors the TS option and provides standard
timestamps [47], i.e milliseconds since midnight UT; (iii) provides timestamps both on
the forward and reverse path.
Hereafter we adopt the following notation: RTTS,D(X, Y) is the time taken by probes
sent from the source S to the destination D to travel from X to Y on the forward path
and from Y to X on the reverse path. This is a portion of the RTT of the entire path,
i.e. RTTS,D(S, D). LetW be a compliant node between the source S and the destination D
(see Fig. 3.13 as a reference). Besides RTTS,D(S, D), our approach estimates RTTS,D(S,W)
and RTTS,D(W, D) by using the same single-probe packet. To this end, we send a ICMP
Echo Request D
∣∣WDDW probe from S to D. Once S receives the reply, six timestamps
are available: (a) the sending and receiving time at the source (TS1 and TS2); (b) the
timestamp provided by W along the forward (TW1) and reverse path (TW2); (c) the two
timestamps provided by the targeted destination D (TD1 and TD2). These timestamps
allow us to easily compute the RTT chunks (see Fig. 3.13b as reference): RTTS,D(S, D)
as TS2-TS1, RTTS,D(W, D) as TW2-TW1 and RTTS,D(S, W) as RTTS,D(S, D)-RTTS,D(W,
D).3 When the destination provides only one timestamp when probed with D
∣∣DDDD,
we send probe packets formatted like D
∣∣WDWW, rather than D∣∣WDDW, to dissect the
RTT.
The slow path. Packets can traverse a router either through the fast (hardware) or the
slow (route processor/software) path. The IP option on our probe packets causes routers
to inspect them and process them on the slow path. Previous work showed that IP op-
tions traffic experiences higher delay, jitter, and packet loss, compared to traffic without
IP options [111]. Ferguson et al. [94] recently observed that the processing time of packets
with the TS option depends on the status of the router (traffic and CPU load). Accord-
ingly, the estimated RTTs provide insight into the current condition of network links and
routers, a particular view of network path performance.
3Note how it would be possible to estimate also several one way delays: from S to D (TD1-TS1), D
to S (TS2-TD2), S to W (TW1-TS1), W to D (TD1-TW1), D to W (TW2-TD2) and W to S (TS2-TW2).
However, unlike the RTT considered in this section, one way delays are potentially biased if clocks at the
various nodes are not properly synchronized, a common case in the Internet.
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Accuracy concerns. Concerns about the accuracy of the estimated RTTs may arise since
we exploit timestamps provided by distinct network nodes potentially not synchronized.
However, we compute each RTT using only the timestamps provided by a single router’s
clock. Accordingly, any clock offsets do not affect the estimated RTTs. Our measurements
are subject to local clock drift, but we assume this impact is negligible over the short
duration of a typical RTT.
3.4.3 Experimental analysis
In this section, we first describe the results of an experimental campaign aiming at eval-
uating the applicability of the proposed approach. Then, we describe two use cases to
explore the utility of the proposed approach.
Degree of Applicability
We conducted a study to evaluate how many nodes per path will allow our approach to
dissect the RTT (i.e. are compliant). To identify compliant nodes on a path between a
source S and a destination D, we first need to discover all the nodes along the path. To this
end, we launch an ICMP Traceroute from S toward D. Let us suppose that the destination
D provides two timestamps when probed with ICMP Echo Request D
∣∣DDDD. For each
discovered address Y, we send two probe packets ICMP Echo Request D
∣∣YDDY and
D
∣∣DYYY: if D∣∣YDDY collects four timestamps, then Y is a compliant node. Indeed, four
timestamps imply that Y inserted the first timestamp along the forward path (otherwise,
D would not have been able to insert its own timestamp), and Y inserted its second
timestamp along the reverse path (because the destination D inserted its timestamp
before). Non-compliant nodes (i) simply ignore the TS option ( D
∣∣YDDY and D∣∣DYYY
collect none and one timestamp, respectively) or (ii) provide a timestamp only on the
forward path ( D
∣∣YDDY and D∣∣DYYY collect between two and three timestamps and one
timestamp respectively) or (iii) provide a timestamp only on the reverse path ( D
∣∣YDDY
and D
∣∣DYYY collect one and more than one timestamp, respectively). We refer to the
latter two cases as forward and backward stampers. Forward stampers are nodes that do
not appear on the reverse path while backward stampers are more challenging to explain:
these nodes are discovered along the forward path but insert a timestamp only when
traversed on the reverse path. Load balancing and third-party addresses [112, 63, 102]
may explain this behavior. When the destination provides only one timestamp, we make
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use of ICMP Echo Request D
∣∣YDYY probes instead of D∣∣YDDY. In this case, a node is
compliant when D
∣∣YDYY collects at least three timestamps.
To generate a hitlist of suitable destinations, we extracted the addresses that provided
at least one timestamp when probed with ICMP Echo Request D
∣∣DDDD in a large-scale
experimental campaign from our previous work [95]. Of 1.7M IP addresses probed, 36%
replied providing timestamps. From these addresses, we randomly selected one represen-
tative IP for each AS [99]. The final hitlist comprises 3, 133 distinct ASes, including all
Tier-1 ISP networks4 and 35 out of 50 top-10 ASes for each region, according to the AP-
NIC weekly routing table report. We then performed another experimental campaign
using 116 PlanetLab nodes [80] as vantage points (VPs). Each VP made the following
steps for each destination of the hitlist: first, it sent two probes, ICMP Echo Request
D
∣∣DDDD and D∣∣DXXX, to check if the destination is still responsive and is not an extra-
stampers. Second, it performed a Traceroute towards the destination. Third, for each
address Y discovered along the path, it sent a D
∣∣YDDY (or D∣∣YDYY depending on
the number of timestamps provided by the destination) and D
∣∣DYYY. After removing
paths toward extra-stamping and unresponsive destinations, our final dataset comprises
223, 548 distinct paths.
Fig. 3.14a reports the compliant nodes observed per path. Ideally, we would like all
the intermediate routers to be compliant, in order to split the RTT into all the available
chunks. On the other hand, just a single compliant node (W ) allows us to split the RTT
into RTTS,D(S, W) and RTTS,D(W, D), thus providing much more information on the
network status than a classic RTT estimation. We found that about 77.4% of the paths
contain at least one compliant node: dissecting the RTT thanks to our approach is possible
on a significant amount of investigated paths. In addition, 27.3% of the paths contain
more than four compliant nodes potentially allowing a dissection of the RTT in multiple
chunks. Finally, on average, we observed 2.5 compliant nodes, 2.1 forward stampers, and
2.7 backward stampers per path: this result implies that, on average, about 17% of the
nodes in each scanned path are compliant.
Since compliant nodes represent meeting points between the forward and reverse path
and most paths in the Internet are asymmetric at the router level [20, 21], we expect
most compliant nodes to appear close to the source or the destination. Our experimental
results partially confirm this hypothesis. Let Ω be the set of Traceroute traces and p
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier 1 network#List of tier 1 networks. August 1, 2013.
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Figure 3.14: Compliant nodes per path.
a particular trace comprising n nodes (a1, .. , ai, .. , an). Also, let C be the overall
number of compliant nodes contained in the dataset. To investigate the position of the
compliant nodes, we used a window ν to compute the bounded compliant nodes Φ(p, ν)
representing the number of compliant nodes on the path p appearing within ν hops from
the source or the destination, i.e the compliant nodes contained in (a1, .. aν) and (an−ν , ..
an). The global bounded compliant nodes Ψ(ν) =
∑
p∈Ω Φ(p,ν)
C
represent the global fraction
of compliant nodes contained within ν hops from the source or the destination when
considering all the paths. Fig. 3.14b depicts how the global bounded compliant nodes
varies with ν: if the hypothesis is true, then the global bounded compliant nodes should
quickly tend to one. The figure shows an evident though not sharp growth: about 72%
of all the compliant nodes occur within 5 hops from the source or the destination, with
about 15% appearing just one hop after the source or before the destination. These results
confirm that the majority of the compliant nodes are located near the two end points of
the paths but there is also a significant percentage of compliant nodes in the middle of
the paths.
Applications
We now report two use cases of the proposed approach augmenting Internet path tracing.
Per-Autonomous System RTT contribution. Our approach can isolate the contri-
bution of entire ASes to the overall experienced RTT. To this end, as the first step, we use
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Figure 3.15: Isolating the RTT contribution of AS2907 over the path of Fig.1(a).
path tracing technique to trace the particular path of interest. Consider again the trace in
Fig. 3.12a. Our goal is to isolate the RTT contribution of the provider network, AS2907.
We cannot rely on the RTT values reported by Traceroute since they are inconsistent:
apparently, packets spend more time inside the network of AS2907 compared to the time
required to reach the destination and come back to the Traceroute originator. To this
end, we monitored the path by using both the Ping command and our approach (the last
hop within AS2907, 150.99.2.54, is a compliant node). As described earlier in this section,
when using Ping to estimate the RTT up to the last hop within AS2907 and up to the des-
tination with probe packets sent closely in time, we observed again inconsistent results, as
reported in Fig. 3.12b: often, the average RTT up to the intermediate hop is higher than
the RTT up to the destination (see the negative difference values in Fig. 3.12b). Our ap-
proach, instead, always provides coherent results as shown in Fig. 3.15a: the estimated
contribution of the AS2907 is always a fraction of the whole RTT. Results obtained with
Ping do not provide any meaningful information about the impact of the AS2907 on the
end-to-end performance. As shown in Fig. 3.15b, according to Ping, the AS2907 RTT
contribution represents on average 106% of the whole RTT, an unreasonable result. On
the other hand, thanks to our approach, we can conclude that the AS2907 RTT contri-
bution on the slow path is on average 76.8% of the whole RTT. The probe packets spent
more than two-third of the time within the provider network for this specific end-to-end
communication.
Our approach allows also to isolate the RTT contribution of a target AS network when
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Figure 3.16: Home network RTT contribution toward repubblica.it monitored through a wireless link and
an ADSL connection.
the first hop within this AS is a compliant node. In the dataset collected to evaluate the
applicability, the last hop within the provider AS (the first hop within the targeted AS)
is a compliant node in 44, 846 (22, 236) paths, about 20% (9.95%) of the paths.
Home network contribution to the RTT. The proposed approach can be also used
to investigate the impact of home networks on Internet performance, a topic that has
recently attracted an increasing interest from the research community [113, 82, 81].
When the home gateway behaves as a compliant node, our approach allows us to
evaluate the RTT toward any destination, and, at the same time, the contribution of
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the home network, by using a single probe packet.5 As a case study, we monitored the
RTT toward a top-ranked Italian journal website (repubblica.it). The monitored home
network is connected to the Internet via an ADSL connection provided by Telecom Italia.
The laptop in charge of monitoring is connected via Wi-fi to a NETGEAR DGN2200v3, a
common commercial modem-router compliant with our approach. To monitor the RTT,
we used ICMP Echo Request D
∣∣WDDW probe packets where W is the private address of
the modem-router: We approximate the home network contribution as RTTS,D(S, W).
Fig. 3.16a shows the trend over time of the RTT chunks. In the beginning, the home
network is unloaded. However, from 9:14 to 9:23, another Wi-fi connected host started
downloading and uploading large files through the Internet. During the overloaded pe-
riod, the RTT grows in median by 356% (from 69.8 ms to 249 ms) but the home network
played just a marginal role (see Fig. 3.16b). On average, packets spent 4.7% and 2.6%
of the entire RTT within the home network during the unloaded and overloaded period,
respectively. At the same time, we observed spurious latency spikes inside the home net-
work probably caused by the packet-by-packet impact of contention-induced transmission
delays over the wireless link (these spikes disappear on the wired connection). In the
worst cases, the spikes represent more than 60% of the total RTT experienced in both
the unloaded and overloaded period. These results suggest that the stable performance
degradation observed during the overloaded period is not caused by the home network but
by congestion of the last mile.6 Indeed, by replicating the experiment while monitoring
the RTT on the last mile and isolating the home network contribution, we observed that
downloading and uploading large files through the Internet does not affect the intra-home
network delay while it determines a dramatic growth of the delay on the last mile (see
Fig. 3.16c).
3.4.4 Summary and discussion
In this section, we faced another important limitation in Internet path tracing: when
Traceroute is used to isolate the contribution of specific portion of the network to the over-
all RTT experienced toward a network destination, the RTT values reported by Traceroute
5In these experiments, the precise border of the home network clearly depends on when and how the
home router handles the IP option. For instance, if the home router inserts its own timestamp before
putting the probe on an overloaded buffer (an instance of home network bufferbloat), such buffering delay
is not included in the home network contribution.
6The physical connection between a customer’s home and the DSLAM or the CMTS.
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represent a misleading information. Alternative approaches based on Ping also proved to
be no more reliable. In this section, we presented an approach using a single packet to
accurately dissect the RTT of an end to end path under investigation. Our approach
makes use of standard path tracing technique to first discover the path. Then, it exploits
the prespecfied TS option to dissect the RTT in two chunks by relying on an interme-
diate compliant router along the path: compliant routers are deveices involved in both
the forward and reverse path that honors the TS option. Thanks to a large-scale mea-
surement campaign from 116 vantage points comprising 223K traced paths, we observed
that the proposed approach can be applied on about 77.4% of the considered paths with
more than 50% of the paths containing more than one compliant router, thus potentially
allowing one to dissect the RTT in multiple chunks: on average, we observed 2.5 com-
pliant routers per path. We also presented two case studies, showing how our approach
allows us to isolate the RTT contribution of (i) an home network and (ii) an entire AS in
a end-to-end communication.
3.5 Complementing Traceroute by using malformed
IP options
In this section, we explore an innovative path tracing approach totally alternative to the
classic TTL-based mechanism employed in Traceroute.
Our approach solicits ICMP Parameter Problem error messages instead of ICM Time
Exceeded messages from the routers encountered along the path by injecting packets
equipped with malformed IP options. The experimental analysis shows that routers reply
to these solicitations and this alternative tracing solution provides complementary infor-
mation about the traversed path when compared to the classic TTL-based Traceroute.
3.5.1 Motivation
Although state of the art implementations of Traceroute are much more powerful, accurate
and robust than the original version proposed by Van Jacobson more than two decades
ago [64, 114], as we explained in Chapter 2, several limitations like anonymous routers [52],
hidden routers [56], third-party addresses [102], filtering policies, etc. still cause the traced
paths to be potentially incomplete or inaccurate. By critically analysing the literature, we
observed that all the proposed improvements represent just an evolution of the original
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technique: after more than two decades, Internet paths are still discovered by relying on
the TTL field of the IP header.
The idea behind the research activity documented in this section is that totally al-
ternative path tracing solutions, i.e. not based on the TTL field, may complement the
TTL-based tracing mechanism by providing additional information on the traversed paths:
for the first time in literature, we explored this possibility by demonstrating that totally
alternative path tracing mechanisms are actually possible. More specifically, we describe
three novel active probing methods able to solicit ICMP Parameter Problem error re-
sponses instead of ICMP Time Exceeded replies from the routers located along the path.
On top of these methods, we build PP Traceroute, an innovative path tracing technique
able to emulate the traditional TTL-based Traceroute algorithm. We experimentally eval-
uate PP Traceroute to investigate its ability to provide additional information – in terms
of additional discovered IP addresses (IPs) and circumvention of ICMP Time Exceeded
based filtering rules – on the traversed path when compared to the TTL-based technique.
Since the experimental results reveal that PP Traceroute is unable to express its full po-
tential, we conduct a results-driven analysis to pinpoint the main factors affecting its
effectiveness identifying non fully RFC-compliant stack implementations as one of the
main issues. Finally, we discuss how PP Traceroute could be improved by applying the
same improvements proposed over two decades for the traditional Traceroute and we out-
line the path to follow and the challenges to carefully consider for integrating TTL-based
and PP-based mechanisms.
3.5.2 Emulating Traceroute with malformed IP options
In the following, we first briefly provide the background necessary to introduce the pro-
posed approach. Then, we detail the three active probing methods proposed to solicit
ICMP error messages from routers located along the path by not relying any more on the
TTL field.
ICMP Parameter Problem
According to the RFC1349 [115], ICMP messages can be divided in three main classes:
errors, requests and replies. The error class includes ICMP types 3 (Destination Unreach-
able), 4 (Source Quench), 5 (Redirect), 11 (Time Exceeded), and 12 (Parameter Problem).
Up to now, not all the types of ICMP message have received the same attention from the
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Pointer | unused |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Data Datagram |
+-------------------------------//------------------------------+
Figure 3.17: ICMP Parameter Problem format.
research community. For instance, in the error class most of attention has been focused
on Destination Unreachable and Time Exceeded messages, while the Parameter Problem
(PP) type has been totally ignored. In this section, we show how it is possible to solicit
ICMP Parameter Problem to trace Internet paths.
The ICMP Parameter Problem format is described in RFC792 [89], while the behav-
ior of routers and hosts with respect to this message is clarified in RFC1812 [49] and
RFC1122 [116]: a router (host) must (should) send a notification to the source by using
an ICMP Parameter Problem message when the incoming packet has to be discarded and
no other ICMP message covers the detected problem.
Fig. 3.17 reports the ICMP Parameter Problem format as documented in RFC792 [89].
The type field is set to 12 while the code field can vary among 0 (invalid IP header), 1 (a
required option is missing), and 2 (bad length). When code is 0, the pointer field identifies
the octet where the error occurred. In fact, as usual in case of ICMP error messages, part
of the original datagram which caused the error (i.e. the IP header plus the next eight
octets of the original datagram) is carried back as payload.
Soliciting ICMP Parameter Problem messages using IP options
The novel active probing methods proposed in this section exploit the TS and RR IP op-
tions to solicit ICMP Parameter Problem replies. Here, we point out the error conditions
causing the generation of ICMP Parameter Problem messages.
Considering the RR and TS options, the RFC791 explicitly states that, if the IP
module fails to check the option of an incoming packet, an ICMP Parameter Problem
message may be sent to the source in the following conditions:
• RR option: (i) there is some room but not enough room to insert a full IP address
into the option data; or (ii) the route data area is already full.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=7 | Length=14 | Pointer=4 | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Broken Address | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3.18: CRR probe packet crafted to solicit an ICMP Parameter Problem message from the 3rd
hop: the length is set such that not enough available space is allocated for the third address.
• TS option: (i) there is some room but not enough room to insert a full timestamp
into the option data; or (ii) the overflow field counts itself overflows.
According to the standard, recreating the above conditions at a specific hop should
cause the packet to be discarded and a notification to be sent to the source through an
ICMP Parameter Problem message.
It is worth noticing a contradiction existing between RFC792 and RFC791. According
to the former, an ICMP Parameter Problem message is only sent if the error caused the
datagram to be discarded, while the latter considers the possibility to generate an ICMP
Parameter Problem message when the route data area of a RR option is full, even if this
eventuality does not cause the packet to be dropped.
A novel Traceroute based on ICMP Parameter Problem
In this section, we describe three novel indirect probing methods able to solicit ICMP
Parameter Problem replies from routers along an IP path. Finally, we detail how we im-
plemented a PP-based Traceroute starting from these methods. The methods we describe
are indirect in that they target a network destination with the specific purpose of solic-
iting a response from an intermediate router whereas direct probing aims at soliciting a
reply directly from the targeted destination.
PP indirect probing. The error conditions previously described can be profitably
recreated by properly crafting probes to solicit ICMP Parameter Problem messages from
network devices along a path.
Our ICMP Parameter Problem-based indirect probing approach includes three differ-
ent methods as detailed in the following.
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Cut Record Route (CRR). A router forwarding a probe equipped with the RR option,
having some room but not enough room in the option data for a full IP address, should
consider the datagram as damaged, discard it, and eventually send an ICMP Parameter
Problem message to the source. Accordingly, to solicit an ICMP Parameter Problem
message from the ith hop on the path the CRR method sets the RR option length (RRLen)
such that there is enough space in the option data for i − 1 IPs, while only 3 bytes are
available for the ith one.
RRLen = RRHeaderLen+AddrSize× (i− 1) +BrokenAddr (3.6)
Hence, RRLen is computed as reported in Eq. 3.6, where: RRHeaderLen is the RR
header size (3 bytes); AddrSize is the size of an IPv4 address (4 bytes); BrokenAddr
refers to a malformed slot of 3 bytes, thus unable to contain a full IP address. The
pointer field value is initialized to 4, in order to point to the first slot in the RR option
data. Thus, the first i−1 hops normally manage the option, while only the ith hop detects
the malformation, eventually notifying the error to the source. An example of CRR probe
is reported in Fig. 3.18: this probe is crafted to solicit an ICMP PP reply from the third
hop along the path. Indeed, since the length field is set to 14, the option data accounts for
11 bytes. Accordingly, there is enough space to let the first two hops insert their address,
but only 3 bytes are available for the third one. Hence, only the third hop will recognize
the malformation, discard the packet and notify the event to the source with an ICMP
PP message. Note how two padding bytes are introduced to keep the packet consistent
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=68 | Length=15 | Pointer=5 |Ovflw=0| Flag=0|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Broken TS | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3.19: CTS probe packet crafted to solicit an ICMP Parameter Problem message from the 3rd hop:
the length is set such that not enough avaiable space is allocated for the third timestamp.
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with the IP header length field, while just the RR option is malformed.7 Since the RR
option data cannot contain more than 9 slots, the range of the CRR method is limited to
9 hops.
Cut Timestamp (CTS). Similar, CTS solicits an ICMP Parameter Problem message from
the ith hop on the path by exploiting a TS option in which enough space is allocated just
for i− 1 timestamps, while only 3 bytes are available for the ith one.
TSLen = TSHeaderLen+ TSSize× (i− 1) +BrokenTS (3.7)
The TS option length (TSLen) is computed as reported in Eq. 3.7, where: TSHead-
erLen is the size of the TS header (4 bytes); TSSize is the size of a standard timestamp
(4 bytes); BrokenTS refers to a malformed slot of 3 bytes, thus unable to contain a full
timestamp. An example of CTS probe crafted to solicit an ICMP PP reply from the third
hop along the path is reported in Fig. 3.19: while the pointer field value is initialized to
5, the overflow and flag fields are both set to 0, and the length field is set to 15. In this
way, the option data is able to contain the two timestamps inserted by the first two hops.
However, only three bytes are available for the third timestamp, causing the third hop to
discard the packet and notify the event to the source with an ICMP PP message. Note
how in this case, just one byte of padding is required to properly align the IP header to
32-bits words. Since the TS option data cannot contain more than 9 slots, the range of
the CTS method is limited to 9 hops.
Overflow in Overflow (OV2). Unlike CTS, the OV2 method exploits the 4 bits overflow
field of a full-size TS option. Once all the slots in the option data are filled, a probe
equipped with the TS option can travel for at most 16 additional hops before being
discarded. In fact, a router forwarding a probe with the TS option overflow field at 15
should detect an overflow exception on that field and discard the datagram, eventually
sending an ICMP Parameter Problem message to the source. The OV2 method solicits
such condition at the ith router along the path by setting the pointer and overflow fields
as reported in Eq. 3.8.
1 6 i 6 16
{
pointer = TSLen+ 1
overflow = 16 − i
7Padding bytes are treated as End of Options list [47].
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16 < i 6 25
{
pointer = TSLen− TSSize× (i− 16) + 1
overflow = 0
(3.8)
If the target is reachable within 16 hops, OV2 relies just on the overflow field: the
pointer is set such that the option appears already full, while the overflow value is set in
order to cause the overflow in overflow condition after i increments. When the target is
x hops far, with x > 16, the overflow value is set to zero and n = x − 16 slots are left
available in the TS option data. Thus, the insertion of n timestamps and 16 increments of
the overflow value cause the overflow in overflow event at the targeted hop. For example,
an OV2 probe crafted to solicit an ICMP PP reply from the third hop contains a full-
length TS option of 40 bytes, where the pointer is set to 41 (the option is full) and the
overflow field is set to 13. In this way, the first two hops on the path increment the
overflow respectively to 14 and 15. However, when the third hop tries to increment the
overflow, it recognizes the overflow in overflow exception, discards the packet, and notifies
the event the source with an ICMP PP message. Note how in this case, no padding bytes
are required. Since the overflow field allows up to 16 increments and the TS option data
can contain up to 9 slots, the range of the OV2 method is limited to 25 hops.
Algorithm 1 PP Traceroute based on the OV2 method.
Require: target IP address
1: {Prepare all the probes to send}
2: for i = 1 to 25 do
3: probes[i] = UDPFlowPacket()
4: probes[i].TTL = 100
5: probes[i].TS.type = 68
6: probes[i].TS.length = 40
7: probes[i].TS.flag = 0
8: if i ≤ 15 then
9: probes[i].TS.pointer = probes[i].TS.length + 1
10: probes[i].TS.overflow = 16 - i
11: else
12: probes[i].TS.pointer = probes[i].TS.length - 4 × (i - 16) +1
13: probes[i].TS.overflow = 0
14: end if
15: end for
16: replies = send(probes, timeout)
17: path = analyze(replies)
18: ordered path = order by ttl(path)
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PP-based Traceroute. In order to trace Internet paths with the indirect probing
methods described above, it is necessary to correctly rebuild the IP path starting from
the collected replies: this task is challenging. Indeed, crafting each probe with a pro-
gressive IP identifier (hereafter probe id) and ordering the replies according to this id is
not sufficient, because the obtained trace would potentially result incomplete. A router
ignoring the IP options always forwards the probe packets independently of the malfor-
mations and, therefore, it is not reported in the resulting trace. Furthermore, routers not
correctly implementing the standards may potentially cause the resulting trace to be also
inaccurate: we deepen this aspect later in this section. In order to correctly rebuild the
IP path and to align the discovered routers with those traced by TTL Traceroute, we also
take advantage of the TTL-based distance covered by each probe along its travel. Such
distance is computed as the difference between the TTL value initially set into the probe
and the one carried back by the payload of the ICMP Parameter Problem message. Ac-
cordingly, the resulting PP-based Traceroute (hereafter simply PP Traceroute) sorts the
collected IPs by TTL distance first, and by probe id then.
Algorithm 1 reports the pseudo code describing PP Traceroute based on OV2. The
technique starts by preparing all the 25 probes potentially able to solicit ICMP Parameter
Problem replies along the path (line 2-15). More specifically, to deal with possible per-flow
load balancers, each probe is generated as part of the same UDP flow (line 2) [64, 68].
The initial TTL value is set to 100, a custom value independent of the operative system
(line 3) and the embedded TS option is properly configured (lines 5-7). Then, the pointer
and the overflow field of the option are set according to the OV2 method (lines 8-14).
Finally, all the probes are injected into the network (line 16), the collected replies are
analyzed (line 17), and the extracted addresses are sorted based on the network distance
covered by each probe as explained above (line 18).
A prototype of PP Traceroute written in Python is publicly available8 to foster other
researchers to experiment with our technique.
3.5.3 Experimental analysis
In this Section, we describe the experimental campaign conducted to evaluate PP Tracer-
oute: our goal is to investigate the ability of this new technique to capture information
about the traversed paths and complement the TTL-based Traceroute. In this analysis,
8http://traffic.comics.unina.it/pptr/
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we do not consider aspects related to the performance of the two techniques (e.g. the
probing efficiency) and we do not adopt for PP Traceroute all the improvements proposed
in literature for the traditional Traceroute. Experimental results show that PP Traceroute
is actually able to solicit replies from the network and to provide additional information
when compared to TTL Traceroute. At the same time, although complementary, our so-
lution seems unable to express its full potential and we deepen the motivations at the
basis of these experimental evidences later in this section.
Methodology
In order to experimentally evaluate the proposed technique, starting from the list of
addresses showing a stable responsiveness to ICMP Echo Request according to the PRE-
DICT project [98] (one IP address for each available /24 subnet), we selected about 139 K
destinations proved to be responsive to UDP probe packets sent from our laboratory at
the University of Napoli. We further selected addresses responsive also to UDP probes to
detect possible filtering policies triggered by IP options, as deepened later in this section.
Our hitlist covers 19, 760 ASes, including all Tier-1 ISP networks9 and 96 of the one hun-
dred top-20 ASes for each region, according to the APNIC’s weekly routing table report.
Fig. 3.20 shows the geographical distribution of the hitlist obtained with Maxmind [117].
We traced the IP paths towards the destinations of the hitlist from our laboratory
with both PP and TTL Traceroute. We instructed the two techniques to generate probes
as part of the same flow, i.e. the same flow generated by TTL Traceroute is replicated
9http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier 1 network#List of tier 1 networks. May, 2012.
Figure 3.20: Hitlist geographical distribution.
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Table 3.4: IPs providing ICMP Parameter Problem replies and also responsive to direct probing.
ICMP PP ICMP UDP TCP SKIP
78 K 86.1% 79.4% 69.9% 57.8%
in PP Traceroute by equipping the packets with TS and RR options according to the
adopted method.
Experimental Results
Hereafter, when we refer to a generic PP Traceroute trace, we mean the trace obtained by
merging the IP paths collected with CRR, CTS and OV2 towards the same destination.
Discovering additional IPs along the path. First of all, the experimental campaign con-
firmed that by injecting probes with malformed IP options, PP Traceroute is able to
solicit ICMP Parameter Problem replies from the routers located along the path toward
a destination. Jointly, the two tracing techniques discovered 118, 242 IPs: 75, 320 IPs
were collected by both techniques, while 39, 611 and 3, 311 IPs were respectively discov-
ered only by TTL and PP Traceroute. Targeting the IPs reported by our technique with
direct probes such as ICMP Echo Request, TCP Syn, UDP, and SKIP, we observed that
not all the IPs which provided ICMP Parameter Problem messages also replied when
probed with traditional direct probing We use IP packets carrying a SKIP message to so-
licit ICMP Protocol Unreachable messages from the targeted destinations [95]. Tab. 3.4
reports the percentage of IPs discovered by PP Traceroute and responsive to a particu-
lar direct probe: globally, 4, 236 IPs providing ICMP Parameter Problem replies did not
reply to any direct probe and 307 of them were also invisible to TTL Traceroute. Hence,
we observed that PP Traceroute is able to solicit replies from network devices/interfaces
which are invisible to both traditional Traceroute and direct probing. We also notice
that some RFC1812-compliant routers returned the entire probe packet in the payload of
the ICMP Parameter Problem replies and not just the first 64 bits, i.e. ICMP Parameter
problem is subject to full ICMP [60]. Based on this result, we believe that network diag-
nostic techniques like tracebox [60] may potentially benefit from this innovative tracing
solution.
An important aspect to consider is the possibility that TTL and PP Traceroute report
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different interfaces of the same routers. This possibility is concrete since a router may ex-
pose different interfaces to PP and TTL Traceroute. This problem affects also state of the
art implementations of TTL Traceroute: for instance, as we describe in Chapter 4, multi-
ple addresses discovered at the same hop may actually correspond to different interfaces
of the same router [112]. Being aware of this phenomenon, we used an alias resolution
technique, Ally [73], to investigate if the IPs discovered along the paths exclusively by PP
Traceroute belong to the same devices listed by TTL Traceroute. Ally classifies two ad-
dresses as part of the same router when these addresses provide replies whose IP identifier
field proved to be set starting from a unique shared counter. Since this technique can gen-
erate false positives (i.e. addresses can be incorrectly classified as part of the same router
if counters of different routers are casually temporarily synchronized), we tested each pair
of addresses five times in different days to overcome such limitation10. The alias resolution
technique identified 676 IPs as in alias with the devices discovered by TTL Traceroute:
these routers used different source IPs when generating ICMP Time Exceeded and ICMP
Parameter Problem messages. It is worth noticing that even when PP Traceroute reveals
different interfaces of the routers encountered along the path, this additional information
is particularly valuable especially when the final goal is to explore the topology of the
network [8]: indeed, as described above, part of these interfaces are completely invisible
or silent to both TTL Traceroute and traditional direct probing methods.
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Figure 3.21: PP and TTL Traceroute complementarity.
Finally, by aligning TTL and PP Traceroute traces, 115 of the non-aliased IPs ap-
10This conservative process follows the basic idea behind other more advanced alias resolution tech-
niques, such as Radargun [118] and Midar [119].
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peared at the same position of anonymous routers in the corresponding TTL Traceroute
trace. According to these experimental observations, PP Traceroute is able to assign an
IP address to some devices unresponsive to traditional TTL-based Traceroute. Note how
such a potentiality, though limited, appears useful especially when the final goal is to
properly reconstruct the network topology from multiple IP traces, since this task proved
to be extremely complex in the presence of anonymous routers [52, 53, 54].
Adopting a per-path point of view, Fig. 3.21a shows the percentage of paths (y-axis)
in which PP Traceroute was able to discover a certain amount of IPs not reported by
TTL Traceroute (x-axis): CRR and CTS discovered on all the traced paths at least
one additional IP, while OV2 reached the same result in 63% of the traces. Jointly,
the three methods (PP TR) always discovered at least one address not listed by TTL
Traceroute, for a maximum of 12 IPs in a single trace. As reported in Fig. 3.21a, the
average number of invisible addresses discovered by PP Traceroute per path is higher
than the one discovered by each standalone method. Considering also the path length,
Fig. 3.21b shows the average percentage of IPs discovered exclusively by TTL Traceroute,
PP Traceroute, and by both of them. Such percentages are reported for paths aggregated
per total number of discovered IPs. On average, PP Traceroute contributed from 10% to
20% of the total IPs discovered along the aggregated paths with a growing trend: while the
percentage of IPs detected by TTL and PP Traceroute decreases, their relative coverage
smoothly increases. The figure also shows how PP Traceroute did not report addresses
invisible to TTL Traceroute in shorter paths: the main reason is that the devices located
close to our vantage point are not compliant with PP Traceroute.
These experimental observations suggest that PP Traceroute has the potentiality to
provide additional information on the vast majority of the traversed paths. This feature
finds application in different fields. For instance, it can provide useful information to
improve the accuracy and the coverage of Internet topology discovery and may help in
performing network troubleshooting.
Circumventing filtering rules. In some scenarios, PP Traceroute proved to circumvent
filtering policies. Globally, we observed 656 paths where TTL Traceroute was steadily
filtered (reporting 5 consecutive unresponsive hops). Fig. 3.22a shows the number of
paths where TTL Traceroute was filtered and the PP Traceroute methods were able
to discover a specific amount of additional hops. CRR, CTS and OV2 discovered at
least one additional hop beyond the filtering on 14.3%, 19% and 74.1% of these paths,
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Figure 3.22: Overcoming ICMP Time Exceeded based filtering policies.
respectively. The lower penetration shown by the CRR and CTS methods is due to their
limited exploring range. Indeed, as reported in Fig. 3.22b, on average, the first device
appearing steadily unresponsive to TTL Traceroute was located at the 15th hop, which is
normally out of the exploring range of CRR and CTS. Accordingly, PP Traceroute seems
potentially able to circumvent ICMP Time Exceeded based filtering in some paths.
Finally, Fig. 3.23a shows the AS permeability to PP and TTL Traceroute. Mapping
each address discovered along the paths to the owner AS [99], we estimated the capacity of
the two techniques to capture information about a specific AS: for 42 ASes, PP Traceroute
discovered more IPs than TTL Traceroute.11 The distribution of the gain in coverage
assured by PP Traceroute for these ASes is reported in Fig. 3.23b: for 20% of the ASes,
the gain was higher than 30% with a maximum of 80%. Most of these ASes are national
Internet Service Providers. While such an experimental observation seems suggesting
that PP Traceroute better fits some ASes, this analysis must be further investigated with
additional experimental campaigns. We left this per-AS analysis as future work. The
feature of circumventing filtering policies finds application in the fields of Internet topology
discovery and path diagnosis, where it enables to respectively increase the exploring range
and to infer the position of network devices filtering ICMP Time Exceeded replies along
the path.
In conclusion, compared to the traditional TTL-based approach, a totally alternative
tracing solution based on ICMP Parameter Problem provides additional information on
the traversed paths. On the other hand, several factors prevented the proposed approach
to reach its full potential as we explain in the following.
11We consider the set of ASes with more than 10 IPs jointly discovered by PP and TTL Traceroute.
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Figure 3.23: Discovered IPs per AS.
Detailed analysis of PP Traceroute performance
In this section, we experimentally deepen the main factors limiting the effectiveness of
PP Traceroute.
Intrinsic limitations of the adopted approach. Some intrinsic limitations affect
the proposed approach.
One of the factors affecting the performance of PP Traceroute is related to the reduced
exploring range of our indirect probing methods. Indeed, since the maximum option size
is just 40 bytes, the ICMP Parameter Problem-based indirect probing methods at the
basis of PP Traceroute show a limited exploring range: CRR and CTS cannot discover
more than 9 devices along each path, while OV2 can discover up to 25 devices.
Since CRR and CTS show a strongly limited exploring range compared to OV2, in our
experimental campaign these two methods provided just limited additional information
when compared to OV2. The three methods globally collected replies from 78 K IPs.
Fig. 3.24 shows the intersection of IPs replying to each method: more than 16 K IPs
replied to all the methods; most IPs which replied to both CCR and CTS also replied to
OV2, though respectively 144 and 229 IPs did not answer to OV2. Although OV2 and
CTS act on the same option, this result seems suggesting that the two events some room
but not enough room and overflow in overflow not always induce the same reaction by
a network layer device probably due to stack implementations only partially compliant
with the standards. Furthermore, note how some room but not enough room may solicit
an ICMP Parameter Problem message depending on the adopted IP option: for instance,
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Figure 3.24: IPs responsive to the PP Traceroute methods.
6, 675 IPs replied to CTS and not to CRR.
In conclusion, since no more than 25 devices can be traced in each path by PP Tracer-
oute, a subset of the collected traces may be incomplete. At the same time, this limitation
does not seem one of the main factors limiting the effectiveness of PP Traceroute. In-
deed, paths longer than 25 hops represent less than 0.2% of all the paths contained in our
dataset.
Limitations of the current networks. Besides the above mentioned intrinsic lim-
itations, PP Traceroute effectiveness is also affected by external factors.
IP options may trigger filtering policies. IP options-equipped probe packets may suffer
from in-transit filtering mainly located at the edge of the network [120]. In these cases, PP
Traceroute would not be able to trace the entire path towards the destination. In order
to quantify the impact of the filtering on the performance reached by PP Traceroute,
in our experimental campaign we also targeted the destinations of the hitlist with two
additional UDP probes, respectively equipped with the TS option (UDPTS) and the RR
option (UDPRR), both crafted with 9 available slots. Being not malformed, these probes
are purposely crafted to normally reach the targeted destination. Since the selected
destinations reply to traditional UDP probes, if a destination does not reply with the
expected ICMP Port Unreachable (PU) message, we consider the IP options as responsible
for this behavior.
In Tab. 3.5, we report a breakdown of the destinations on the type of replies received
when targeting them with UDPRR and UDPTS. Besides the expected ICMP Port Un-
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Table 3.5: Hitlist breakdown on reply types.
UDPRR
PU PU* PP TE HU NO-R
TOT 91820 10674 2205 378 152 33686
U
D
P
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PU 84309 81342 11 1810 6 76 1064
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n
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ed
PU* 10416 4 10305 17 - 3 87
PP 404 256 49 8 49 - 42
TE 322 3 - - 318 - 1
fi
lt
er
ed
HU 76 22 1 - - 52 1
NO-R 43388 10193 308 370 5 21 32491
unfiltered filtered
LEGEND
PU = Port Unreach TE = Time Exceeded
PU* = Port Unreach (Opt Removed) PP = Parameter Problem
NO-R = No Reply HU = Host Unreach
reachable (PU) reply, we collected also ICMP Parameter Problem (PP), Time Exceeded
(TE) and Host Unreachable (HU) replies. In addition, part of the addresses did not reply
at all (NO-R) and some of them provided an ICMP PU message where the original probe
sent to the destination and brought back in the payload of the ICMP error does not con-
tain any IP option (PU*). The latter circumstance is a clear evidence that the IP option
has been removed from the probe somewhere along the forward path, thus preventing PP
Traceroute to entirely trace the path. The row and column labelled as TOT show the to-
tal number of addresses replying with a particular type of ICMP message to UDPRR and
UDPTS, respectively: for instance, UDPRR solicited ICMP Parameter Problem messages
from 2,205 IPs and UDPTS from 404 destinations. The remaining elements of the matrix
in Tab. 3.5 reports the number of destinations which replied with an ICMP message type
X when probed with UDPRR and type Y when probed with UDPTS, where X and Y are
the corresponding row and column labels. For example, 76 addresses replied to UDPRR
with ICMP HU and to UDPTS with ICMP PU, while 10, 193 addresses replied to UDPRR
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with ICMP PU and did not reply to UDPTS probes. Typically, ICMP PU and ICMP Pa-
rameter Problem messages are directly sent by the probed destination, i.e. the probe was
not filtered along the path (columns and rows in Tab. 3.5 labelled as unfiltered). ICMP
Time Exceeded and ICMP HU imply that the probe has been explicitly dropped along
the path due to an error condition while, if no reply is received (NO-R), the probe has
experienced local or in transit filtering (columns and rows in Tab. 3.5 labelled as filtered).
Considering the overall number of probed destinations (139K), UDPRR (UDPTS) suc-
cessfully reached the destination in 75% (68%) of cases although the RR (TS) option was
removed in 11% (12%) of the ICMP PU replies and it was dropped in 25% (32%) of cases.
Since all the targeted destinations were reachable without IP options, IP options represent
the cause of such filtering. Comparing UDPRR and UDPTS along the same paths, they
both reached the destination in 66% of cases, while the first (second) obtained replies
where the second (first) failed on 25% (3%) of paths. Both probes were filtered when
targeting 23% of destinations. Furthermore, note how some destinations act differently
according to the type of option: for instance, 2, 205 IPs provided ICMP Parameter Prob-
lem replies when probed with UDPRR, while 1, 810 of them normally provided ICMP PU
replies when probed with UDPTS.
Therefore, these results suggest that filtering at the edge networks represents one of
the factors limiting the effectiveness of PP Traceroute.
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Figure 3.25: On the potential of PP Traceroute.
Not all the routers support IP options. A network device can be potentially discovered
by PP Traceroute only if it supports the IP options. However, not all the routers in the
Internet support the IP optional headers [92].
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In order to estimate the number of devices supporting the IP options in the paths con-
sidered in our experimental campaign, we use the information collected by targeting the
destinations with the UDPRR and UDPTS probes: since each hop along the path should
insert at most one address or timestamp into the option data, it is possible to count the
network devices which actually manipulate the IP option by wisely inspecting the orig-
inal datagram carried by the ICMP Port Unreachable (ICMP PU) replies and counting
the IPs inserted into the RR option (hereafter RRs) or the timestamps added into the TS
option plus the overflow value (hereafter TSs12). Being the proposed ICMP Parameter
Problem-based indirect probing methods able to discover only network devices manipu-
lating IP options, this analysis allows to estimate the maximum number of devices along
a path that can be potentially discovered by the methods at the basis of PP Traceroute.
We refer to this number as the method upper bound.
Fig. 3.25a shows the percentage of paths in which we observed a specific percentage
of hops supporting IP options related to the path length. On average, 86% of hops per
path supported the TS option, while 54.9% supported the RR option. Moreover, in about
15% of paths, all the involved hops managed the TS option. It is worth noticing that this
analysis is intrinsically limited for the RR option: indeed, once the option data is full,
further network devices do not leave their mark when inspecting the option and cannot
be counted. Accordingly, the real percentage of devices supporting the RR option in each
considered path may be higher than the lower bound reported in Fig. 3.25a.
According to the results, not all the devices located along a path manipulate IP
options, thus being invisible to PP Traceroute. At the same time, a significant portion of
the hops in each path supports the IP options (at least the TS option) encouraging the
application of our indirect probing approach.
Not all the routers supporting IP options provide ICMP Parameter Problem replies. We
compare for each path the number of devices discovered by the PP Traceroute methods
with their upper bound in order to evaluate how much the proposed methods reach their
full potential. As shown in Fig. 3.25b, on average CRR, CTS and OV2 respectively col-
lected replies from 51%, 57% and 42% of the devices representing their upper bound:
roughly, half of the devices managing the options also replied to PP Traceroute. Ac-
cordingly, although a significant percentage of routers in each path support at least the
TS option, not all the routers supporting the IP options provided their ICMP Parameter
12When TSs > 9, the overflow value is greater than 0.
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Problem replies to the PP Traceroute methods.
We discovered that the main reason for this experimental evidence is related to routers
not correctly implementing the RFC1812 (hereafter non RFC-compliant routers): some
network devices manipulate the IP options but do not properly recognize the probe mal-
formations. We consider these devices as non RFC-compliant and classify such an event
as an anomaly since, even if the generation of an ICMP Parameter Problem message is not
mandatory, the packet must be discarded in any case. The most common type of anomaly
affects both the CRR and CTS methods and is generated by a router which ignores the
condition some room but not enough room and just considers the option full, thus not
causing the packet drop. In this case, the option malformation is recognized and reported
by the next RFC-compliant router on the path. We named such anomaly fake-full . An-
other type of anomaly affects the OV2 method and is generated by a non RFC-compliant
router which ignores the overflow in overflow condition, but rather just increments the
current value of the overflow field causing it to roll back to zero. In this case, the packet
may proceed along the path for further 16 hops before experiencing again the error con-
dition and, normally, this bonus is enough to directly reach the destination. We refer to
this anomaly as ov-reset . During our experiments, we observed that the first two hops in
all the paths originated by our vantage point in Napoli caused both the anomalies: these
routers are part of the campus network and belong to the CISCO 6500 series.
To better explain the impact of these anomalies on the trace collected with PP Tracer-
oute, in the following we report and discuss the traces collected by using the three PP
Traceroute methods towards google.com. In order to have a reference, we also report in
Traceroute from 143.225.x.x to 209.85.148.104,
protocol udp, algo hopbyhop, duration 1 s
1 143.225.x.x 0.652 ms 0.492 ms 0.298 ms
2 143.225.190.189 1.761 ms 1.749 ms 2.838 ms
3 193.206.130.9 0.572 ms 0.630 ms 0.535 ms
4 193.206.134.246 3.549 ms 3.521 ms 3.518 ms
5 193.206.134.229 22.589 ms 12.971 ms 13.024 ms
6 193.206.129.130 12.940 ms 12.925 ms 12.943 ms
7 209.85.249.54 13.160 ms 13.020 ms 12.989 ms
8 72.14.232.76 22.481 ms 22.791 ms 22.653 ms
MPLS Label 749859 TTL=1
9 72.14.236.21 21.930 ms 22.318 ms 21.963 ms
10 209.85.254.41 32.220 ms 22.686 ms 22.677 ms
11 209.85.148.104 22.782 ms 23.037 ms 22.866 ms
Figure 3.26: TTL Traceroute toward google.com.
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Fig. 3.26 the same trace collected using TTL Traceroute: the destination appears located
11 hops away from the vantage point, where the 8th hop is part of a MPLS tunnel. As
shown in the trace reported in Fig. 3.27a, the CRR method solicited ICMP Parameter
Problem messages (type 12, code 0) from the intermediate hops, while an ICMP PU mes-
sage (type 3, code 3) from the destination. Note that the first probe (id = 1), crafted to
solicit a reply from the 1st hop, solicited a reply from the 3rd hop (193.206.130.9). Since
the first two hops added their IPs in the following probes, we deduce that they considered
the option full without detecting the malformation, thus causing a fake-full anomaly. Ac-
cordingly, three replies were received from the 3rd hop, which answered for both itself and
the first two hops. The 4th and 5th hops were equal to those detected by TTL Traceroute,
while the 6th and 7th ones were different: targeting them with an alias resolution tool [73],
we found them to be interfaces of the same network devices discovered by TTL Tracer-
oute. Since inside the MPLS tunnel the IP option is ignored, the 8th probe solicited a
reply from the 9th hop. Similarly, the 10th probe directly reached the destination, which
replied with an ICMP PU message.
The trace collected with the CTS method, shown in Fig. 3.27b, discovered 8 IPs, thus
with the same incompleteness of the CRR one. Such trace allows to better understand the
behavior of the first two hops, which cause a fake-full anomaly, thus normally forwarding
all the probes after having incremented the overflow value. This behavior can be easily
detected analysing the 3 replies collected from the 3rd hop: the first probe registered 2
overflow increments (1st and 2nd hops) before being recognized as malformed by the 3rd
network device; the second probe allowed the 1st hop to insert a single timestamp, while
the 2nd hop incremented the overflow value; the third probe allowed both the 1st and 2nd
hops to insert their timestamps, thus returning 0 in the overflow field. The same effect is
caused by the 10th hop on the 9th probe. Finally, Fig. 3.27c shows the trace collected with
OV2. Again, the first two hops appeared silent to our probes and simply incremented
the overflow value without checking the overflow in overflow condition, thus causing
the ov-reset anomaly. The corresponding replies coming from the targeted destination,
however, allow to detect the last hop while resetting the overflow field: the first two probes
directly reached the destination returning 8 and 7 as overflow value, being it already reset
respectively at the 1st and 2nd hops. The probe addressed to the 8th hop solicited a reply
from the 9th network device, while the 9th and 10th probes solicited replies directly from
the destination, respectively reporting an overflow value of 15 and 14.
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PP Traceroute from 143.225.x.x to 209.85.148.104
protocol udp, CRR method
hop id ip icmp ttl RR slot #1 RR slot #2 RR slot #3 RR slot #4 RR slot #5 RR slot #6 RR slot #7 RR slot #8 RR slot #9
1 *
2 *
3 1 193.206.130.9 I(12,0) 98 0.0.0
2 193.206.130.9 I(12,0) 98 143.225.190.190 0.0.0
3 193.206.130.9 I(12,0) 98 143.225.190.190 193.206.130.6 0.0.0
4 4 193.206.134.246 I(12,0) 97 143.225.190.190 193.206.130.6 193.206.130.252 0.0.0
5 5 193.206.134.229 I(12,0) 96 143.225.190.190 193.206.130.6 193.206.130.252 193.206.131.249 0.0.0
6 6 193.206.129.134 I(12,0) 95 143.225.190.190 193.206.130.6 193.206.130.252 193.206.131.249 193.206.129.4 0.0.0
7 7 216.239.47.128 I(12,0) 94 143.225.190.190 193.206.130.6 193.206.130.252 193.206.131.249 193.206.129.4 216.239.47.216 0.0.0
8
9 8 72.14.236.21 I(12,0) 92 143.225.190.190 193.206.130.6 193.206.130.252 193.206.131.249 193.206.129.4 216.239.47.216 209.85.249.20 0.0.0
10
11 9 209.85.148.104 I(3,3) 90 143.225.190.190 193.206.130.6 193.206.130.252 193.206.131.249 193.206.129.4 216.239.47.216 209.85.249.20 72.14.238.116 0.0.0
(a) CRR method.
PP Traceroute from 143.225.x.x to 209.85.148.104
protocol udp, CTS method
hop id ip icmp ttl TS overflow
1 *
2 *
3 1 193.206.130.9 I(12,0) 98 OV:2
2 193.206.130.9 I(12,0) 98 OV:1
3 193.206.130.9 I(12,0) 98 OV:0
4 4 193.206.134.246 I(12,0) 97 OV:0
5 5 193.206.134.229 I(12,0) 96 OV:0
6 6 193.206.129.130 I(12,0) 95 OV:0
7 7 209.85.249.54 I(12,0) 94 OV:0
8 *
9 8 72.14.236.21 I(12,0) 92 OV:0
10 *
11 9 209.85.148.104 I(3,3) 90 OV:1
(b) CTS method.
PP Traceroute from 143.225.x.x to 209.85.148.104
protocol udp, OV2 method
hop id ip icmp ttl TS overflow
1 *
2 *
3 3 193.206.130.9 I(12,0) 98 OV:15
4 4 193.206.134.246 I(12,0) 97 OV:15
5 5 193.206.134.229 I(12,0) 96 OV:15
6 6 193.206.129.134 I(12,0) 95 OV:15
7 7 216.239.47.128 I(12,0) 94 OV:15
8 *
9 8 72.14.239.63 I(12,0) 92 OV:15
10 *
11 1 209.85.148.104 I(3,3) 90 OV:8
2 209.85.148.104 I(3,3) 90 OV:7
9 209.85.148.104 I(3,3) 90 OV:15
10 209.85.148.104 I(3,3) 90 OV:14
(c) OV2 method.
Figure 3.27: PP Traceroute toward google.com.
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In conclusion, the most important factor limiting the effectiveness of PP Traceroute
is represented by routers not correctly implementing the standards. We believe that
a generalized larger adoption of IP options in the Internet not only for measurement
purposes will surely force vendors of network equipments to carefully take int account also
these portions of the standards releasing the necessary upgrade of the deployed devices.
3.5.4 Toward a hybrid tracing solution
In this section, we describe how PP Traceroute could be improved as a stand-alone tech-
nique. Then, we discuss the potential and the challenges to take into account toward a
hybrid path tracing solution.
Space for improvements.
Compared to the long history of TTL Traceroute, the study of PP Traceroute is just at
the very beginning and there is large room for improvements.
First of all, most of the improvements proposed for the traditional Traceroute such
as adapting the exploring direction to limit the intrusiveness [71, 72, 74], and exploiting
other probe types, such as TCP and ICMP [76], can be profitably applied also to PP
Traceroute. Furthermore, the OV2 limited exploring range of 25 hops can be extended.
Indeed, by adopting the prespecified variant of the TS option (flag 3), it is possible to
use any intermediate hop as pivot address to start counting the following hops on the
path. Essentially, one can request a timestamp from a specific address along the path: if
the insertion of this timestamp causes the option’s data to be full, any additional routers
inspecting the option on the remaining portion of the path will cause the increment of the
overflow field, thus potentially allowing one to solicit ICMP Parameter Problem replies
from routers located farther than 25 hops. We experimentally observed the effectiveness
of a similar approach.
Finally, since the RFC1812 [49] expressly considers the generation of an ICMP Pa-
rameter Problem message each time an incoming packet has to be discarded and no other
ICMP message covers the detected problem, several other ways to solicit the ICMP Pa-
rameter Problem error message in addition to the methods proposed in this section may
exist.
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Toward a hybrid tracing approach: potential and challenges
Our experimental campaign highlighted how PP Traceroute is able to provide additional
information on the traversed paths when compared to TTL-based Traceroute, i.e. it can
be used to complement Traceroute. This complementarity suggests the design of a hybrid
Traceroute able to solicit both ICMP Time Exceeded and ICMP Parameter Problem
messages at the same time by merging the two indirect probing mechanisms. In this
section, we describe the potential and the challenges to take into account when developing
such a hybrid tracing solution.
Potential. First of all, merging the two indirect probing approaches appears straight-
forward since a TTL-limited probe can be also easily equipped with a malformed IP
option. The resulting hybrid Traceroute would be potentially able to (i) solicit replies
from network devices/interfaces which are invisible to both traditional Traceroute and
direct probing, (ii) assign an address to devices unresponsive for the traditional TTL-
based Traceroute and (iii) circumvent ICMP Time Exceeded-based filtering policies. In
particular, the hybrid Traceroute may potentially identify both hidden and anonymous
routers along the path: indeed, such devices, respectively invisible and unresponsive to
TTL-limited probes, may normally reply when solicited with the option equipped probes
of our ICMP Parameter Problem-based approach. For instance, as we described in sec-
tion 3.2, we observed more routers manipulating the TS option than those decrementing
the TTL in about 6% of the analyzed paths: these devices invisible to the traditional
TTL Traceroute could be precisely identified by such a hybrid tracing solution.
Challenges. The most challenging issue to take into account when merging the two ap-
proaches is related to those routers replicating the IP options in the external IP header
of the reply. Indeed, the hybrid Traceroute injects into the network probes with both a
limited TTL and a malformed IP option. When an intermediate router along the path
recognizes an expiring TTL value in the probe, it sends an ICMP Time Exceeded reply
back to the Traceroute originator. However, if the router replicates the malformed IP
option in the external IP header of the ICMP Time Exceeded reply, the option malfor-
mation could be potentially recognized by another router located on the reverse path. In
such a case, an ICMP Parameter Problem message would be sent back to the intermedi-
ate router to be simply discarded. As a consequence, since the Traceroute originator does
not receive any reply, the intermediate router is erroneously labelled as anonymous. In
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these cases, issuing additional TTL-limited packets without malformed option may repre-
sent a possible solution. Furthermore, properly rebuilding the IP path from the collected
ICMP Parameter Problem and ICMP Time Exceeded replies also represents a challeng-
ing task, because both the TTL decreasing process and the integrity check of IP options
are performed at the network layer of the TCP/IP stack [55], as we also described in sec-
tion 3.2. Since the ordered sequence of these two operations depends on the particular
stack implementation, it is complex to infer the right position in the IP path of a dis-
covered address and non RFC-compliant routers causing fake-full and ov-reset anomalies
further complicate this task.
3.5.5 Summary and discussion
Traceroute, the most adopted network diagnostic technique used to trace Internet paths,
supports applications from both the industry (e.g. network troubleshooting) and research
(e.g. inference of global aspects of the Internet such as the topology). However, several
severe limitations affect this technique and despite the great effort of the research com-
munity and the improvements and workarounds proposed over the years, many of these
limitations appear not definitively solved. On the other hand, none of the proposed im-
provements changed the basic TTL-based mechanism proposed in 1989 by Van Jacobson
to trace the path: the only exception is the uncommon stand-alone adoption of the RR
option already proposed in 1981.
The contribution documented in this section explore a simple idea: since many limita-
tions are related to the basic TTL-based mechanism used in Traceroute (e.g. anonymous
routers do not generate ICMP Time Exceeded messages, hidden routers do not decrement
the TTL, etc.), totally alternative path tracing approaches not relying any more on the
TTL may potentially allow one to mitigate or resolve the limitations of Traceroute.
As first step along this direction, we demonstrated in this section for the first time
in literature that completely alternative path tracing approaches exist. We designed
and evaluated PP Traceroute, an active probing technique that emulates the traditional
TTL-based Traceroute by soliciting ICMP Parameter Problem messages from the routers
located along the path instead of ICMP Time Exceeded replies. To reach this goal, PP
Traceroute injects probe packets equipped with malformed IP options (TS and RR op-
tion): we proposed three different methods to solicit ICMP Parameter Problem messages.
By targeting destinations in 19 K distinct ASes, we experimentally observed how this
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totally alternative path tracing approach is often able to actually solicit ICMP Parame-
ter Problem messages from the routers located along the path also revealing additional
information on the traversed path when compared to the TTL-based Traceroute (e.g.
additional interfaces/devices and filtering circumvention).
We also observed, however, that the proposed approach, though complementary to
the TTL-based technique, did not express its full potential. We experimentally investi-
gated the factors at the basis of this phenomenon discovering non RFC-compliant stack
implementations as the major responsible of this result. Finally, in the light of the exper-
imentally observed complementarity – being PP Traceroute a technique at a very early
stage if compared to traditional Traceroute – we discussed (a.) how to potentially im-
prove the technique, and (b.) how the PP- and TTL-based mechanisms could be profitably
merged, by highlighting the potential and the challenges of the resulting hybrid approach.
3.6 Final remarks
In this chapter, we described methodologies and techniques designed to investigate, miti-
gate and possibly resolve important limitations affecting Internet path tracing techniques.
Most of the proposed contributions were enabled by the adoption of an innovative mea-
surement traffic enhanced by the optional headers of the IP protocol [47]. The idea behind
these contributions is that IP options have been prematurely dismissed by the research
community. Although not universally supported, probe packets equipped with IP options
collect invaluable additional information about the traversed paths. Encouraged and
inspired by the few pioneer works exploiting IP options in Internet measurements, we ex-
plored the adoption of this innovative traffic for augmenting Internet path tracing. More
precisely, after having characterized how the routers typically manage IP options (with
a particular focus on the TS option), we exploited IP options-equipped probe packets to
(a.) detect and locate hidden routers – we provided a first quantification of the magnitude
of this largely-ignored phenomenon discovering hidden routers in at least 6% of the anal-
ysed paths; (b.) identify third-party addresses – with the first active probing technique
in literature able to detect third-party addresses, we discovered that this anomaly is very
common affecting more than 90% of the investigated paths and about 17% of the AS-level
links observed through Traceroute campaigns. In addition, we used the TS option to (c.)
dissect the RTT when tracing Internet path overcoming the misleading information pro-
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vided by Traceroute about the intermediate delays experienced along the path – thanks to
the proposed approach we were able to isolate the contribution of an entire AS and home
network to the overall RTT of end-to-end communications. Finally, since most of the lim-
itations of Traceroute are related to the basic TTL-based mechanism, for the first time in
literature after the introduction of Traceroute, we propose (d.) an innovative path tracing
technique built on top of three different active probing methods that do not rely any more
on the TTL field to solicit responses from the routers encountered along the path, thus
being totally alternative to the classic Traceroute– these methods experimentally showed
the ability to solicit actual replies from the network, to identify anonymous and hidden
routers while also circumventing ICMP Time Exceeded-based filtering policies.
All these contributions aimed at augmenting the Internet path tracing techniques and
more in general demonstrate the utility of IP options in Internet measurements encour-
aging a wider adopting of this particular type of traffic to measure the different aspects
of the network.
Chapter 4
Assessing new limitations in Internet
path tracing
In this chapter, we demonstrate that not all the limitations in Internet path tracing have
been identified. More precisely, we discovered that the sequence of addresses reported by
Traceroute may be a strongly biased representation of the router-level path followed by
the traffic sent towards the destination: by using Traceroute, one may overestimate the
number of equal cost router-level paths and infer false router-level path changes.
The analysis we conducted to identify and investigate these new limitations is enabled
by alias resolution [10], i.e. the process of gathering under a unique identifier the addresses
owned by the same network device. Indeed, thanks to alias resolution, we can transform
the IP-level view of the path provided by Traceroute to a router-level view and study if
and how the properties of the path change.
We first introduce the problem of alias resolution when tracing Internet paths. Then,
we describe Pythia, a novel active probing technique we designed to address the alias
resolution problem. Finally, by relying on Pythia and other alias resolution techniques,
we discuss the experimental analysis we conducted to identify and investigate the new
limitations affecting Internet path tracing.
4.1 On alias resolution and Internet paths
The new limitations we experimentally observed are related to the IP-level view of the path
provided by Traceroute. Researchers have been using for decades Traceroute to investigate
the topological properties of the Internet [8, 85, 73]: a common approach to this end is
to perform large-scale experimental campaigns from multiple vantage points toward a
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large number of network destinations. The collected IP-level paths are then manipulated
to reconstruct a first IP-level representation of the topology obtained by intersecting
the collected traces. However, researchers are well-aware that this representation of the
topology may be a strongly biased representation of the real router-level infrastructure of
the network since a single router may have dozens of interfaces potentially representing
different nodes of the IP-level topology. For this reason, before trying to investigate and
model relevant properties of the topology like the robustness or the reliability of the
network, researchers typically apply alias resolution: the addresses owned by the same
router are identified and merged in a unique node of the graph. In this way, the IP-level
topology is transformed in a router-level topology.
While alias resolution is a well known problem in the field of Internet topology discov-
ery, network operators and researchers commonly ignored this problem when investigating
the properties of the path followed by the traffic sent toward a given network destination:
in fact, the IP-level view provided by Traceroute is typically interpreted as an accurate
view of the router-level path with each address identifying a different traversed router.
There is a specific reason at the basis of this interpretation: users commonly assume
that the addresses reported by Traceroute are associated to the incoming interfaces of the
routers encountered along the path towards the destination, i.e. the source address of the
ICMP Time Exceed messages solicited by Traceroute is interpreted as the address asso-
ciated to the router interface on which the TTL-limited packet sent by Traceroute has
arrived [121]. Hence, assuming the lack of concurrent routing change, each router should
always expose the same incoming interface to Traceroute: as a consequence, users are
typically induced to interpret different addresses in the output of Traceroute as different
routers.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that this basic assumption does not always hold.
Thanks to the adoption of alias resolution techniques, we transformed IP-level path pro-
vided by Traceroute to router-level path and observed that multiple addresses reported
by Traceroute in the same path can be part of the same router: the IP-level view of the
path reported by Traceroute may be a biased representation of the real router-level path
followed by the traffic sent towards the destination. More precisely, by interpreting dif-
ferent addresses reported by Traceroute as different routers one may (i) overestimate the
number of equal-cost paths towards the network destination and (ii) infer changes in the
network routing even when the path in terms of traversed routers is perfectly unchanged.
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4.2 A novel alias resolution technique
The analysis we conducted to uncover the new limitations affecting Internet path tracing
is based on the adoption of alias resolution techniques. Among the adopted techniques,
we also made use of Pythia, a novel active probing technique we developed to address the
alias resolution problem for a specific category of routers, i.e. the any-interface stamping
routers. In this section, we describe how this technique works in practice and the results
of an experimental campaign we conducted to evaluate it.
4.2.1 Previous efforts
Several active probing techniques have been proposed over the years to solve the alias
resolution problem [10].1 In this section, we briefly provide an overview of the previous
techniques.
Source address. One of the first alias resolution techniques is known as common
source address [122]: the addresses A and B are classified as alias if a UDP probe packet
sent toward A (B) elicits an ICMP Port Unreachable reply from B (A). A similar approach
has been recently proposed in Palmtree [123] that induces the router owning the address
A to generate an ICMP Time Exceeded message. Common source address and Palmtree
infer addresses in alias (i.e. they belong to the same router) exclusively when they collect
replies from addresses different from the targeted ones. As a consequence, these techniques
cannot directly tell if two given IP addresses are in alias or not.
Shared IP ID counter. Since some routers maintain a single counter shared among
different interfaces to set the IP-layer identifier (IPID) of the outgoing packets, other
techniques perform alias resolution by monitoring the evolution of the IPID value over
multiple solicited replies. This approach has been first proposed in Ally [73] and succes-
sively refined in Radargun [118] and Midar [119]. Recently, a similar approach has been
applied also to IPv6 routers [124]. These techniques work exclusively on devices imple-
menting an IPID counter shared among different interfaces and imply an adequate IPID
sampling rate in order to infer the addresses in alias.
Timestamp option. The most related work and source of inspiration for our proposal
is the technique introduced by Sherry et al. [93], one of the first works demonstrating the
1Active probing is not the only approach. For instance, oher techniques infer aliases by analyzing the
graph of the topology.
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potentialities of the IP prespecified TS option for Internet measurements (see Section 3.1).
The TS option allows to prespecify in a single packet up to four IP addresses from which
a timestamp is requested. By adopting the notation suggested by [93] also used in the
previous chapter, hereafter X|ABCD refers to a generic IP probe packet equipped with
the TS option, where X is the targeted destination and ABCD is the ordered list of
prespecified IPs from which a timestamp is requested. The position of each prespecified
address in the ordered list ABCD is essential since it implies that B cannot insert its own
timestamp before A, C before B and A, and D before C, B and A. The basic mechanism
proposed in [93] to determine if the addresses A and B are in alias or not is to send ICMP
Echo Request probes having the format A|ABAB and B|BABA. The technique classifies the
addresses as in alias when they provide ICMP Echo Reply messages with four timestamps
recorded. In this case, A and B are necessarily part of the same router since the only
other possible explanation is the presence of a persistent loop between the router owning
A and the router owning B: indeed, four timestamps indicates that TS option has travelled
across the router owning A, then the router owning B and then again through the router
owning A and B. However, if there is a persistent loop between these two routers, the
sender should not be able to receive the ICMP Echo Reply message. For those addresses
providing only two timestamps, further investigations are performed: in particular, two
addresses are declared as in alias only if (i) the provided timestamp values are consistent
and (ii) the experimental observations are compliant with topological constraints.
Similarly to the other active probing techniques proposed in literature, also Pythia
injects into the network synthetic traffic to solve the alias resolution problem. However,
Pythia has been purposely designed to reconstruct a well-defined category of routers, the
any-interface stamping routers. Compared to [93], Pythia uses (i) the prespecified TS
option with a different rationale for arranging the addresses in the timestamp requests
and (ii) UDP probe packets instead of ICMP Echo Request packets. Thanks to these
design choices suggested by the knowledge gathered by experimenting with IP options,
Pythia is able to potentially identify all the addresses owned by the same router, even if
only one of these addresses is responsive, unlike all the other techniques.
4.2.2 The proposed solution
In this section, we first briefly recall how any-interface stamping routers manage the TS
option and the basic principle exploited by Pythia to infer the alias relation including the
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algorithm designed to this end. Finally, we discuss the advantages and limitations of the
proposed approach.
Any-interface stamping routers
Pythia is purposely designed to solve the alias resolution problem for the any-interface
stamping routers. As already described in Section 3.1, thanks to a large-scale measure-
ment campaign targeting 1.7M addresses from multiple vantage points [95], we observed
how routers managing the prespecified TS option may manipulate the option in different
ways. In particular, any-interface stamping routers provide all the requested timestamps
when owning the prespecified addresses independently from which specific interface is
crossed by the probe packets. We observed several Juniper routers exposing a similar
behavior. The routers part of this category represent about 10% of the devices in the
Internet according to recent experimental campaigns [102].
Alias resolution with Pythia
The goal of Pythia is to identify among a set of potential candidates, all the addresses
owned by the same any-interface stamping router.
The technique exploits UDP probe packets and the TS option as detailed in the
following.
• UDP probe packets. UDP probe packets toward a high and presumably unused port
allow to avoid ambiguities caused by the devices located along the reverse path.
Indeed, these probes solicit ICMP Port Unreachable messages from the destination.
Since the ICMP error messages typically returns the original packet triggering the
error into the payload, it is possible to extract the TS option from the payload of
the reply as affected exclusively by the forward path.
• Prespecify the destination first. While UDP probe packets allow to avoid ambigu-
ities caused by the reverse path, the routers located along the forward path may
still interfere by inserting their own timestamps in the option. To exclude such
ambiguities, Pythia prespecifies the destination of the probe packet always as the
first address into the TS option: in this way, none of the routers located along the
forward path can insert its own timestamp before the destination.
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The combination of these two mechanisms allows one to conclude that any timestamp
observed into the TS option returned in the payload of the ICMP Port Unreachable reply
has been surely inserted by the targeted device.
Given an initial set of addresses to alias, Pythia performs two phases: (i) preliminary
test and (ii) alias resolution.
• Preliminary test. This phase aims to identify the subset of addresses owned by any-
interface stamping routers and to exclude devices showing anomalous behaviors.
To this end, for each address A of the initial set of addresses, Pythia sends two
UDP probe packets A|AAAA and A|AZZZ, where Z refers to an address at the
University of Napoli, known to be outside the traversed path. The first probe
(A|AAAA) allows to split the set of candidate addresses in three main subsets: (a)
unresponsive addresses, (b) compliant addresses − the ones providing 4 timestamps
being owned by any-interface stamping routers; (c) non-compliant addresses − those
providing less than 4 timestamps. As already proposed in [93], the second probe
(A|AZZZ) allows to remove from the compliant address set the routers showing
anomalous behaviors: since the address Z is surely not located on the traversed
path, observing any timestamp associated to Z demonstrates that the targeted router
inserts extra timestamps independently from the prespecified addresses. Since this
behavior may strongly affect the accuracy of our results, when it is recognized,
the corresponding address is considered non-compliant with the technique. We
also consider as non-compliant addresses the destinations exposing the other non-
RFC compliant behaviors described in Section 3.1.4. The sets of unresponsive and
compliant addresses represent the input of the following phase.
• Alias resolution. In this phase, Pythia performs all the operations required to iden-
tify the addresses contained in the initial set owned by the same any-interface stamp-
ing router. Let us denote with α and β the ordered lists of addresses respectively
compliant and unresponsive. The technique iteratively performs three steps:
1. An address A is popped from α, hereafter we refer to this address also as the
pivot. During this iteration, the technique tries to infer all the addresses in
alias with the pivot. To this end, a new ordered list, named γ, is created by
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concatenating α and β: γ contains all the addresses potentially in alias with
A. Let us assume that γ contains the addresses B,C,D,E and so forth.
2. Pythia sends a first UDP probe packet A|ABCD and counts the number of
collected timestamps to (i) infer the addresses in alias with the pivot and
(ii) determine the next probe to send as reported in Tab. 4.1. For instance,
when the probe A|ABCD solicits an ICMP Port Unreachable message where
the returned TS option contains two timestamps (i.e. the ones associated to A
and B), this is a clear evidence that A and B are in alias: indeed, the probe
is crafted such that only the router owning A is allowed to insert timestamps.
Furthermore, the lack of a timestamp associated to C implies that the same
router has not recognized this address as an owned one. At the same time, we
do not have any clue about D because this address appears just after C in the
ordered list of prespecified addresses. Accordingly, when the probe A|ABCD
collects two timestamps, we conclude that A is in alias with B but not with
C. Since B and C have been already tested, two new addresses are extracted
from γ and prespecified in the next probe (A|ADEF). Note how Pythia is able
to infer up to 4 addresses in alias within one probe when four timestamps are
collected. These UDP probe packets are sent until all the addresses in γ have
been tested against the pivot.
3. Once all the addresses contained in γ have been tested against the pivot, Pythia
stores the pivot and all the addresses recognized as in alias with it. These
addresses are also removed from α and β. As long as a new pivot is available,
i.e. α is not empty, the technique performs a new iteration starting from the
first step.
A retransmission mechanism is also adopted to deal with possible rate limiting
policies employed by the router owning the pivot address. Pythia is made publicly
available to the research community.2
2http://traffic.comics.unina.it/pythia/
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Table 4.1: Pythia - Inferences and next probes to send according to the timestamps collected with UDP
A|ABCD.
Collected Timestamps Inference Next Probe
Only A stamps A,B not in alias A|ACDE
Only A and B stamp A,B in alias; A,C not in alias A|ADEF
Only A, B and C stamp A,B,C in alias; A,D not in alias A|AEFG
A, B, C and D stamp A,B,C,D in alias A|AEFG
Advantages and drawbacks
Compared to the state-of-the-art alias resolution techniques, Pythia shows both advan-
tages and drawbacks.
First of all, to the best of our knowledge, Pythia is the unique active probing technique
in literature potentially able to identify up to four addresses in alias within a single probe
packet whereas, to reach the same result, traditional pairwise techniques would require
to test six different pairs of addresses3. Besides the linear probing complexity of the
preliminary step, Pythia requires a single probe packet to infer if two addresses are in
alias or not, whereas other pair-wise techniques such as Sherry et al. [93] and Ally [125]
require at least two and three probes, respectively. Finally, differently from all the other
techniques, Pythia is able to tell if a given address B is in alias or not with the pivot even
if B does not reply at all to active probing.
On the other hand, Pythia is not free of limitations. The TS option has an impact
on the router responsiveness [120, 95] reducing the set of addresses that could be used
as pivot. Furthermore, once selected, a pivot is targeted with multiple probe packets
and this may cause the targeted router to be silent to our probes due to the exceeding
of specific ICMP rate limiting thresholds. Note that reordering the probes may strongly
help in mitigating this limitation.
4.2.3 Experimental analysis
In this section, we describe (i) the experimental campaign we adopted to evaluate Pythia
and to compare it with other techniques; (ii) the set of performance metrics we consider
in the evaluation; (iii) the main findings for the evaluation phase.
3When transitivity closure is not applied.
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Methodology
To experimentally evaluate Pythia, we used the information provided by the MERLIN
platform [85] as a reference: MERLIN natively provides a router-level view of the network
by exploiting IGMP probing [126]. Although affected by several limitations such as fil-
tering [86] and the scope limited to the multicast enabled part of the network [85], the
information provided by IGMP probing is typically considered highly accurate and has
been already used as a reference in several previous works [93, 127].
During a preliminary experimental campaign based on MERLIN, we collected informa-
tion about 777 Juniper routers4 located in 12 distinct ASes of different size (tier-1, transit
and stub networks). We tested Pythia on Juniper routers because empirical evidences
suggest that these devices act as any-interface stamping routers [95, 102]. We compared
Pythia to Palmtree [123] and Motu, a publicly available tool developed by CAIDA5 that
implements the technique proposed by Sherry et al [93].
From the routers of the reference dataset, we extracted 6, 503 addresses and applied the
following methodology to deal with the quadratic probing and computational complexity
of the employed techniques. Each tested technique was evaluated on 100 different chunks.
To generate a chunk, we performed three steps: (1) we first randomly selected 10 routers
of the reference dataset and extracted all their addresses; (2) from this set of addresses
we randomly selected up to 50 IPs; finally (3) we generated all the possible combinations
of two addresses starting from the IPs sampled during the previous step. Techniques
requiring in input a list of addresses, such as Pythia and Palmtree, were fed with the lists
obtained during the second step, while those requiring in input IP pairs (Motu) were fed
with the lists obtained at the third step. This two-step sampling process allowed to (i)
strongly reduce the time required to obtain the experimental results and (ii) preserve in
each chunk a significant number of addresses actually in alias. Finally, since a well-known
problem for active probing technique is the dependence of the obtained results on the used
vantage point, we tested Pythia and the other techniques from 12 PlanetLab nodes [80].
4The IGMP probing provides also some indications about the brand of the router. Interested readers
may refer to [126] for more details.
5http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/motu/
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Table 4.2: Alias resolution performance metrics.
Name Acronym Formula Description
Applicability APP
|D|
|D|+|U|
How applicable is the alias resolution technique?
Positive Hit Ratio PHR |TP |
|TP |+|FN|+|UP |
What is the fraction of pairs in alias that is properly aliased
by the technique?
Negative Hit Ratio NHR
|TN|
|TN|+|FP |+|UN|
What is the fraction of pairs not in alias that is properly
dealiased by the technique?
Hit Ratio HR
|TP |+|TN|
|D|+|U|
What is the fraction of pairs properly aliased or dealiased by
the technique?
Mismatch Ratio MR |FP |+|FN|
|D|+|U|
What is the fraction of pairs wrongly aliased or dealiased by
the technique?
Positive Predictive Value PPV
|TP |
|TP |+|FP |
How much can we trust the technique when two addresses are
declared as in alias?
Negative Predictive Value NPV |TN|
|TN|+|FN|
How much can we trust the technique when two addresses are
declared as not in alias?
TP: True Positive FN: False Negative UP: Unknown Positive P= TP ∪ FP U= UP ∪ UP
FP: False Positive TN: True Negative UN: Unknown Negative N= TN ∪ FN D= P ∪ N
Performance Metrics
Properly evaluating and comparing alias resolution techniques is not straightforward. We
adopt multiple performance metrics as explained in the following. Two given addresses
can be classified by a generic alias resolution technique as (i) in alias, (ii) not in alias or
(iii) unknown − i.e. they are not-classifiable for some reasons − independently on how
the technique works. Accordingly, to compare different techniques tested over the same
initial set of addresses, one possibility is to consider all the pairs extracted from this set.
By inspecting the results generated by a specific technique, the set of pairs can be split
in three disjoint sets: P− pairs classified as in alias; N− pairs classified as not in alias;
U− not-classifiable pairs. By taking into account the ground truth, these three sets can
be further exploded in True Positive (TP ) and Negative (TN), False Positive (FN) and
Negative (FN), Unkown Positive (UP ) and Negative (UN). Obviously P = TP ∪ FP ,
N = TN ∪ FN and U = UP ∪ UN . Furthermore, we refer to the set containing all the
pairs classified by the technique as the Decision set D = P ∪ N . We used these sets to
evaluate the tested techniques according to the performance metrics reported in Tab. 4.2.
These metrics allow us to estimate the level of applicability (applicability), accuracy
(hit and mismatch ratio) and trustworthiness (positive and negative predictive value) for
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each technique.
Experimental results
In this section, we present the results obtained with a measurement campaign conducted
between the 1th and 14th of May 2013 from 12 PlanetLab nodes. For each vantage point, we
created a unique file containing all the pairs probed in the chunks and the corresponding
outcomes of the alias resolution technique tested. Since Palmtree cannot directly infer
if two given IP addresses are in alias or not, we considered transitivity closure on its
results. Fig. 4.1 reports the distributions of the performance metrics over the vantage
points (1a-g) and aggregated statistics (4.1b).
Applicability. Pythia is able to classify many more pairs than the other tested techniques
(Fig. 4.1a): on average, Pythia, Motu and Palmtree classified one pair for every 2.6, 11.6,
28.6 pairs. Thus, Pythia was 4.5 and 11 times more applicable than Motu and Palmtree,
respectively. This result can be explained by considering that, unlike the other techniques,
Pythia is able to classify a pair even if only one of the two addresses replies.
Hit and Mismatch Ratio. Pythia showed a higher hit ratio but also a higher mismatch
ratio when compared to the other techniques (Fig. 4.1c and 4.1d). However, we registered
an absolute gain in hit ratio that is much more significant than the loss we observed in
terms of mismatch ratio: by comparing Pythia to Motu (Palmtree), the hit ratio grew on
average from 8.5% (3.4%) to 37.8% whereas the mismatch ratio from 0.1% (< 0.1) to 1%.
Positive and Negative Hit Ratio. Considering that the vast majority of the pairs in the
dataset consists of addresses not in alias (about 80% of all the pairs), one could imagine
that the higher hit ratio of Pythia is determined exclusively by pairs correctly identified as
not in alias: this intuition is only partially true. Indeed, both the positive and negative hit
ratio for Pythia resulted higher than the other techniques (Fig. 4.1e and 4.1f), although the
gain was much more significant over the pairs actually not in alias. Experimental results
showed that Pythia, Motu and Palmtree were able to correctly identify respectively 57.3%,
47.3% and 19.8% of the pairs actually in alias.
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(a) Applicability.
Metric Pythia Motu Palmtree
APP 38.8 (9) 8.6 (2) 3.5 (2)
HR 37.8 (9) 8.5 (2) 3.4 (2)
MR 1.0 (0) 0.1 (0) 0.0 (0)
PHR 57.3 (6) 47.3 (12) 19.2 (10)
NHR 33.6 (10) 0.1 (0) 0.0 (0)
PPV 99.6 (0) 99.8 (0) 98.60 (2)
NPV 96.5 (1) 33.3 (33) -
(b) Statistics in%: Format Mean(St Dev).
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Figure 4.1: Performance metric distributions over the vantage points.
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Positive and Negative Predictive Value. Compared to the other techniques, Pythia showed
a similar positive predictive value and a much higher negative predictive value. Accord-
ingly, when Pythia declares a pair of addresses as in alias, its level of trustworthiness is
comparable to the other techniques. At the same time, when it declares a pair of IPs as
not in alias, its level of trustworthiness is three times higher than Motu6.
To deepen the comparative evaluation of Motu and Pythia, we also performed a per-
pair analysis. To this end, we first aggregated the data collected by all the vantage
points. In this process, we did not observe conflicts among the decisions taken by the
same technique from different vantage points.
Tab. 4.3 reports the breakdown of the pairs on the decisions taken by Motu and Pythia.
Thanks to the information provided by the reference dataset, we split the decision set of
each technique in correct and wrong decisions. No decision refers to the pairs declared as
not-classifiable by the technique. Globally, correct, wrong and no decisions account for
10.6%, 0.2% and 89.2% for Motu and 48.5%, 1.0% and 50.5% for Pythia, respectively.
The subset of pairs classified by both the techniques represent 10.8% of the total in the
dataset: when the techniques judged the same pair, they always took the same (mostly
correct) decision with very few exceptions. On the other hand, both the techniques were
not able to classify more than a half of the total pairs (50.5%). Interestingly, while Motu
is not able to provide any additional information about the pairs not classified by Pythia,
the latter showed a significant marginal utility when compared to Motu. Indeed, Pythia
was able to classify 46.7% of all the pairs not classified by Motu, taking the correct decision
in 97.9% of these cases.
This result suggests that for the subset of pairs classifiable by both the techniques,
Motu and Pythia are essentially equivalent. However, Pythia was able to take correct
decisions on a wide set of pairs not classifiable by Motu.
4.2.4 Summary and discussion
Alias resolution techniques represent an invaluable tool for measuring the network. They
are commonly exploited to reconstruct the topology of the Internet but as we will shortly
describe in the next sections, they also proved extraordinary helpful to uncover new lim-
itations in Internet path tracing. In this section, we contribute to the state of the art
6Palmtree does not perform dealiasing.
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Table 4.3: Pythia versus Motu: pair breakdown on classification (%)
MOTU
Correct
Decision
Wrong
Decision
No
Decision
P
Y
T
H
IA Correct Decision 10.6 0 37.9 → 48.5
Wrong Decision 0.001 0.2 0.8 → 1.0
No Decision 0.007 0 50.5 → 50.5
↓ ↓ ↓
10.6 0.2 89.2
in the alias resolution field by designing, implementing and evaluating Pythia, an inno-
vative active probing technique based on probe packets equipped with the prespecified
TS option. The idea behind Pythia is diluting the great heterogeneity of devices charac-
terizing the Internet in well-defined and easy to recognize categories of routers: for each
category, researchers should identify the most accurate and reliable technique (or set of
techniques) in order to address the alias resolution problem at the Internet scale. As first
step according to this new research direction, we identified a first category of routers,
i.e. any-interface stamping routers. Then, we designed our technique to purposely solve
alias resolution for this specific category: the experimental evaluation demonstrates how
Pythia is able to reach over this category of routers performance higher than state of the
art techniques being able to classify with similar or higher accuracy many more addresses
by also injecting into the network a lower amount of measurement traffic.
4.3 New limitations in Internet paths tracing
In this section, we describe the new experimentally observed limitations affecting Internet
path tracing. Our analysis is supported by the adoption of Pythia and other state of the
art alias resolution techniques.
4.3.1 Overestimation of equal-cost paths
In this section, we describe how Traceroute may induce one to overestimate the number
of equal cost paths towards the destination when each address is interpreted as a different
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router.
As explained in Chapter 2, recent achievements in Internet path tracing allow users to
trace all the equal-cost paths towards the network destination [65]. This goal is achieved
by injecting into the network TTL-limited probe packets part of different traffic flows.
The ratio behind this approach is that routers performing load balancing on a per-flow
basis should forward packets of different flows along different paths. Note that routers
may perform load balancing also on a per-packet basis: each packet is forwarded along
a different path possibly according to a round-robin strategy. In [65], authors observed
that about 39% of the investigated source-destination pairs in the Internet traverse a
load balancer: multiple equal cost paths toward the destination seems a very common
phenomenon.
The presence of a load balancers along the path is normally recognized when probe
packets crafted with the same initial TTL value solicit ICMP Time Exceeded messages
from different IP addresses. For example, Fig. 4.2 reports the three traces discovered with
the probe packets part of three different traffic flows: packets part of flow 1 discover the
sequence of addresses A B C E F G D; probes part of the flow 2 discovers A H C I L G
D; probes part of flow 3 discovers A H C M F G D. In this stylised Traceroute’s output,
we observe that there are two addresses at the second hop (B and H) and at the fifth hop
(L and F), and three addresses at four hop (I E M). Commonly this output is interpreted
as follows: the routers (addresses) followed by multiple addresses perform load balancing
(per-flow load balancing in this sample scenario) across multiple equal-cost paths towards
the destination, i.e. the routers owning A and C are load balancers.
As extensively described later in this chapter, there are several reasons for which the
actual path in terms of sequence of routers traversed by the traffic might have completely
different properties. More precisely, we experimentally observed that different addresses
appearing at the same hop may be part of the same router. In the sample scenario
of Fig. 4.2, the addresses B and H, L and F, and I, E and M may represent different
interfaces of the same routers: in this case, (i) differently from what Traceroute suggests,
the real router-level path is unique and (ii) there are no load balancers at all along the
path towards the destination. By applying alias resolution, we can resolve IPs to routers:
this allows us to differentiate if addresses belong or not to the same router.
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(a) IP-level paths reported by Traceroute with probe packets part of different
flows.
(b) Multiple equal cost paths inferred towards the destination.
Figure 4.2: Traceroute reports multiple equal cost paths towards the destination. We discovered that
addresses reported at the same hop often belong to the same router: H and B, M E and I as well as F
and L may belong to the same router: in this case, despite what Traceroute suggests, there is only one
router-level path towards the destination.
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Figure 4.3: Equal-cost paths per source-destination before and after the alias resolution process.
Experimental analysis
In order to assess the existence of the phenomenon, we considered Internet routes traced
with Traceroute and exposing multiple equal-cost paths: we launched Paris Traceroute
with the Multi-path Discovery Algorithm injecting probe packets as part of different
flows [65] from 14 PlanetLab vantage points toward about 2.3K destinations in distinct /12
prefixes randomly selected among those addresses responsive to ICMP Echo Request probe
packets according to the PREDICT project7. We focused on Internet routes exposing
multiple equal-cost paths (8, 066) and applied Pythia and other state of the art alias
resolution techniques [128, 125, 10, 123] on the addresses appearing in the same trace at
the same hop. Our goal is to discover if multiple equal cost paths still persist at the router
level. We consider two addresses as in alias only when declared as such by the majority
of the adopted techniques.
Our results suggest that Paris Traceroute– a Traceroute variant specifically designed to
accurately capture equal-cost paths [64] – in fact drastically overestimates the prevalence
of load balanced paths. Fig. 4.3 reports the distribution of equal-cost paths at the IP
level as suggested by Traceroute, and at the router-level after having applied the alias
resolution: the figure shows that the number of paths between a source-destination pair
decreased by 45% on average as we went from Paris Traceroute’s IP level paths to router
7IP Address Hitlist, PREDICT USC-LANDER http://www.isi.edu/ant/traces/dataset list.html
New limitations in Internet paths tracing 121
Figure 4.4: Two Traceroute traces collected towards the same destination at two different points in time
reveals different addresses at the 3rd and 5th hops suggesting that the path has changed. We discovered
that often differing addresses belong to the same router: if R and Y, and W and J belong to the same
routers, despite what Traceroute suggests, the path towards the destination is perfectly unchanged.
level paths. In fact, 14% of traces identified by Traceroute as having multiple equal-cost
paths turned out to actually be a unique router-level path. In all these cases, Traceroute
provides misleading information and impact the properties of the traced paths. Our results
suggest that the phenomenon of router-level load balancing is potentially overestimated:
multiple equal cost paths towards the destination might often be just an artefact of the
adopted Internet path tracing technique. In our data, we observed a reduction of the
inferred per-flow load balancers by 25% (from 4,500 to 3,376 units) and by 10% of per-
packet load balancers (from 486 to 436 units).
Later in this chapter, we describe the possible causes explaining this result.
4.3.2 Inference of false path changes
In this section, we describe how using Traceroute to monitor an Internet path over time
may also suggest a false path change. According to Traceroute, the traffic sent to the
destination is forwarded along a new different path compared to what previously observed
while in fact the path is perfectly unchanged: the traffic sent towards the destination
traverses exactly the same unchanged sequence of routers.
Let us imagine that we are interested in monitoring over time the path between a
source S and a destination D. Fig. 4.4 reports two sample traces obtained by launching
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Traceroute from S to D in two different instant of time. We want to understand if the
path has changed or not. Similar studies are performed for instance to investigate the
stability of the routes in the Internet [18, 19] or to troubleshoot the network [100] or
build and maintain an overlay network [34]. By comparing the two collected traces, we
discover two different addresses at the 3rd (R and Y) and 5th (W and J) hops. Due to
these differing hops, the common interpretation of a similar outcome is that the path has
changed since each address in a trace reported by Traceroute is interpreted as a different
router. However, even if Traceroute suggests a routing change, there are several reasons
for which the actual router-level path towards the destination may be perfectly unchanged
as we describe later in this chapter: the IP-level view provided by Traceroute may change
even if the actual router-level path has not changed at all. One possibility to assess similar
circumstances is to exploit alias resolution: by applying alias resolution on the differing
hops (R and Y, and W and J in Fig. 4.4) it is possible to check if these addresses are part
or not of the same router and thus if the path has really changed or not.
Experimental analysis
In order to investigate this phenomenon, we analyzed the Traceroute traces made publicly
available by the iPlane project [15]. We inspected the paths collected in two consecutive
days related to the same source-destination pairs (about 721,780 pairs).
We adopted a conservative approach by considering only those source-destinations
for which the paths collected in the consecutive days (i) differ for at least one hop (a
differing hop), (ii) are unchanged in terms of number hops and (iii) do not contain un-
responsive routers. This process generates a final set of 38,844 source-destination pairs.
Finally, we adopted again multiple alias resolution technique [125, 128, 10, 123] to check
if the addresses appearing as differing hops belong or not to the same router. Globally,
we investigated 18,943 pairs of addresses but only 14,225 have been successfully judged
as in alias or not due to unresponsive addresses: 37.1% of these pairs of addresses were
classified as part of the same router . The impact of the alias resolution on the ob-
served routing changes is depicted in Fig. 4.5 reporting the number of differing hops per
source-destination pair at the IP-level as suggested by Traceroute and at the router-level
after having applied the alias resolution. Experimental results demonstrate that the phe-
nomenon exists and it is not uncommon: surprisingly, 32.1% of the paths changed at the
IP-level turned out to be unchanged at the router-level (due to unresponsive addresses,
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Figure 4.5: Differing hops per path before and after the alias resolution process - conversely to what
Traceroute suggests, 32.4% of the paths are actually unchanged.
we estimated the lower bound of the actual magnitude of the phenomenon). We observed
unchanged paths containing up to 6 differing hops, but, in most of the cases, unchanged
paths differed at a single IP hop: globally, we observed that about 54% of the paths with
a single differing hop are actually unchanged. Our results suggest that when a routing
change is determined by a unique differing hop there is a significant probability that the
path is actually unchanged. Note that in our analysis, we focused on the Internet routes
where the IP-level path has changed but the number of hops has not. Authors in [19]
discovered that this phenomenon is very common: for 62% of the path changes observed
in the range of a large-scale experimental campaign, the number of hops towards the
destination remained perfectly the same.
In conclusion, when Traceroute is used to monitor Internet paths over time, researchers
and network operators may wrongly conclude that the path towards the destination has
changed.
4.3.3 Causes overview
In this section, we discuss several causes explaining the experimentally observed phenom-
ena described above.
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Figure 4.6: Multiple equal cost paths merging at a given hop cause Traceroute to report at this hop
different addresses being actually part of the same router. The router X in this scenario exposes two
different addresses to the Traceroute originator.
Merging of multiple equal-cost paths
Two different IP addresses reported by Traceroute at the same hop and part of the same
router might be explained in case of multiple equal-cost paths merging at the same router.
Fig. 4.6 depicts a sample scenario also acknowledged in [65]: the router P is balancing the
traffic on two different equal cost router-level paths. On the route towards the network
destination, these two paths reach the same router (X) through two different interfaces.
When solicited multiple times by Traceroute, the router X exposes different interfaces
according to which equal-cost path is followed by the TTL-limited probe packet.
This scenario does not explain the overestimation of equal-cost paths because it does
imply the presence of multiple paths. Furthermore, it does not provide useful information
to explain the inference of false routing changes since different IP addresses in different
traces should still identify different routers.
Multiple links between routers
Researchers in [65] also marginally described another scenario potentially explaining at
least part of the observed inaccuracy. Indeed, an approach used by network operators to
increase the link capacity between two routers is to connect multiple cables between them,
i.e. the traffic sent by the first router to the second router may arrive at different interfaces
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Figure 4.7: Multiple links between consecutive routers may cause Traceroute to report multiple addresses
of the same router. In this scenario, the router B exposes different addresses to the Traceroute originator.
of the second router (see Fig. 4.7). If there are multiple cables connecting the router A to
the router B and A performs load balancing, different probe packets with the same initial
TTL value may reach the router B crossing each time a different link among the ones
connecting A to B and, each time, a different incoming interface of B is reported in the
Traceroute’s output. This scenario allows us to explain the overestimation of equal-cost
paths: more precisely, although Traceroute correctly discovers that packets flow across
different links and reach different interfaces, the number of equal cost router-level paths
towards the destination is overestimated with an impact on the inferred properties of the
path such as the robustness of the communication to network failures involving routers.
On the other hand, this scenario does not explain the inference of false path changes.
Indeed, according to this explanation, Traceroute reports all the incoming interfaces of
the routers encountered by the traffic along the path towards the destination. If at a cer-
tain point in time Traceroute reports different addresses, the only possible explanation
according to this scenario is that the path has changed. However, thanks to the alias res-
olution we observed that, although the IP-level view provided by Traceroute has changed,
the sequence of traversed routers towards the destination may be perfectly unchanged
(this happened for about 32.1% of the monitored paths). Hence, not all the observed
cases can be explained by relying exclusively on this scenario.
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RFC-compliant routers
Differently from the cases reported above, we describe in this section a scenario able to
explain all the experimentally observed inaccuracy.
A possible source of inaccuracy causing both the overestimation of equal-cost paths
and the inference of false path changes is represented by those routers implementing
the RFC1812 [49]: we refer to these routers as RFC-compliant. These routers expose
to Traceroute the outgoing interface (i.e. the interface selected by the router to send the
ICMP Time Exceeded packet back to the Traceroute originator) rather than the incoming
interface (i.e. the interface on which the Traceroute probe packet has arrived). Although
generally considered not very common, RFC-compliant routers exist: the Cisco 3660
routers running IOS 12.0(7)XK1 are RFC-compliant routers [61]. The presence of these
routers in the network may easily explain both the observed phenomena as we discuss in
the following.
Overestimation of equal-cost paths. The overestimation of equal-cost paths can be eas-
ily explained in case of RFC-compliant routers performing load balancing on the reverse
path. Indeed, RFC-compliant routers may expose different interfaces when solicited mul-
tiple times with the TTL-limited probe packets issued by Traceroute because there are
multiple equal cost paths between the RFC-compliant router and the Traceroute origina-
tor: according to which specific reverse path is selected each time by the router, a different
IP address is reported by Traceroute.
Discovering the presence of multiple equal-cost paths between an intermediate router
and the Traceroute originator may be interesting but it also seems totally not related to the
goal of this type of measurements: researchers and network operators use Traceroute to
infer the properties of the forward path followed by the traffic sent towards the destination
but in this way they may observe how the intermediate routers decide to forward the traffic
to reach the Traceroute originator. Also, note that due to routing asymmetry prevalent
in the Internet [21], discovering how an intermediate router decides to foward the traffic
to the Traceroute originator may not reveal any useful information about the reverse path
from the destination: indeed, the intermediate router may be not part of the reverse path
from the destination.
False routing change inference. RFC-compliant routers explain also the inference of false
routing changes. Traceroute traces collected at the time T1 and T2 expose different
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addresses at a given hop. A possible explanation of this outcome is the presence at the
differring hop of an RFC-compliant router: at the time T1, this router selects a first given
interface to issue the ICMP Time Exceeded reply to the Traceroute originator. However,
at the time T2, probably due to a routing change, the same router uses a different interface
to reply to the Traceroute originator. Essentially, the traffic issued from the Traceroute
originator to the destination is always forwarded along the same forward path (links,
interfaces and routers). However, the IP-level view provided by Traceroute may still differ
if an intermediate RFC-compliant router uses different interfaces to reach the Traceroute
originator.
Again, in this case, Traceroute reports information about how the intermediate routers
forward the traffic to reach the Traceroute originator and not about the actual forward
router-level path followed by the traffic sent towards the destination.
4.4 Final remarks
In this chapter, by using alias resolution, we experimentally demonstrated the existence of
two additional limitations of the most widely adopted path tracing technique: Traceroute
may induce one to overestimate the number of equal cost paths towards the destination
and may also suggest non-existing changes of the network routing. Essentially, Traceroute
reports interfaces not routers and we observed that this IP-level view of the path can be
a poor representation of the real router-level path followed by the traffic sent to the
destination.
Our analysis is enabled by alias resolution, the set of techniques aiming at identifying
those addresses owned by the same network device. To advance the state of the art in
this research field, we proposed Pythia, a novel alias resolution technique able to reach
performance higher than other state of the art techniques when solving the alias resolution
problem for a specific category of routers, i.e. the any-interface stamping routers. Thanks
to the adoption of Pythia and other alias resolution techniques, we observed how over the
set of considered paths, about 14% of the Internet routes that expose multiple equal-cost
paths at the IP-level turned out be a unique router-level path. In addition, we observed
that 32.1% of the paths that has changed at the IP-level according to Traceroute turned
out be perfectly unchanged at the router-level. We discussed the potential causes of
such an inaccuracy identifying RFC-compliant routers exposing the outgoing interface to
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Traceroute as a possible explanation for both the observed phenomena.
As a general lesson, independently from which specific cause or combination of causes
determine the inaccuracy described above, we learned that the common assumption that
each address in the Traceroute’s output identifies a different router does not hold any
more. A first immediate impact of our analysis is that Traceroute cannot be considered
any more as a reliable stand-alone approach to investigate properties of the Internet such
as the path stability (e.g. the overal likelihood that a path remains unchanged over a long
period of time [18]). Indeed, by relying on Traceroute, researchers observed that Internet
paths are stable 96% of the time, but experience short-lived instability periods [19, 18].
These short-lived instabilities may represent just an artefact of Traceroute: the paths
may only have changed at the IP-level but may be perfectly unchanged at the router-
level. Accordingly, Internet paths may be much more stable than what currently assessed
in literature: the limitations of the adopted measurement tools must be very carefully
considered.
Chapter 5
An architecture for Internet path
tracing on demand
Researchers trace Internet paths for several reasons: to infer the topology of the Inter-
net [8, 85], to detect, investigate and resolve issues like outages, reachability problems and
network failures [100, 101, 25, 24], to geolocate network resources and services [40, 41, 42],
to monitor and predict over time the Internet paths and their performance [29, 19, 18, 15],
and so on.
Researchers, network operators and systems often exploits path tracing techniques
to explore specific Internet routes. However, two open challenges must be faced when
reaching this goal as already discussed in Section 2.3: (i) the lack of a large number of
well-distributed vantage points from which issuing path tracing measurements and (ii)
the inability of current methodologies and techniques to identify the vantage point to use
and the destination to target in order to explore an Internet routes with a priori known
characteristics (e.g. the sequence of ASes to traverse). These two challenges cause a
suboptimal access to the routes of interest and potentially impact the ability of researchers
to collect all the information required for a deep understanding of the phenomenon under
investigation.
In this chapter, we propose our contribution toward the solution of these challenges.
More precisely, after having highlighted the previous efforts related to the proposed ap-
proach, we describe a general architecture of a system designed to (i) integrate multiple
experimental testbeds such that researchers and network operators can have access to
their vantage points through a unique common interface that masks the heterogeneity of
the interfaces and constraints characterizing each testbed and (ii) satisfy complex user
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queries describing the characteristics of the paths of interest rather than the vantage points
to use or the destinations to target. Finally, we present PANDA (PAth oN-DemAnd), a
first working implementation of the proposed architecture, and provide the results of the
experimental analysis we conducted to highlight its performance.
5.1 Related work
In this section, we describe the works and projects related to the system detailed in this
chapter.
5.1.1 Experimental testbeds
Over time, several experimental testbeds have been developed and deployed to allow
researchers, network operators and systems to perform measurements over the Internet.
We report here a brief description of some of these testbeds.
Planetlab [80]. PlanetLab is a global overlay network for developing and accessing
broad-coverage network services. It currently consists of 1,182 nodes at 580 sites located
at academic institutions and industrial research labs mostly covering Europe and North
America but with vantage points located all over the world.1 Thanks to the virtualization,
researchers share the computational resources of the same vantage point and can perform
in an isolated environment the network experiments. Users usually access the vantage
points through ssh connections. Compared to other testbeds, very few constraints are
imposed by Planetlab: for instance, not all the probe packets are allowed (e.g. IGMP
packet probing is not permitted [85]).
RIPE ATLAS [6]. This project comprises a well-distributed set of USB-powered em-
bedded devices that allow users to issue low-volume non-intrusive measurements such as
Ping, Traceroute and DNS lookup. The project includes a credits-based system: users
hosting probes gain credits over time. Once acquired, these credits can be spent to per-
form measurements. Each measurement has a specific cost: for instance, tracing an
Internet path with Traceroute has a cost of 60 credits. Since a user gains once per day
21,600 credits for each hosted probe, a user hosting a single probe can trace no more than
1March 2014.
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360 Internet paths per day. Once the credits are depleted no more measurements can
be issued. Measurements can be orchestrated by using either a web-based interfaces or a
Restful API. Currently, the project comprises about 4,987 active probes primarily located
in the RIPE NCC service region (Europe).
Looking glasses. Many ASes expose web-based form that allow users to issue Tracer-
oute from machines deployed inside their network. In order to trace Internet paths from
this set of vantage points one must face a strong heterogeneity in terms of (a.) web tech-
nologies – these pages may strongly differ as well as the mechanism required to request
to trace a given path (HTTP post, HTTP get, name of required parameters, etc.); (b.)
the mechanism adopted to report the obtained results – they may also strongly in terms
of underlying tools used to perform the measurements. The latter factor requires the
ability to correctly identify and parser the relevant information generated by different
looking glasses after the measurement is performed. Since this type of websites strongly
suffer from network attacks, they are typically very carefully monitored: any minimally
suspicious user behavior causes the user IP to be banned. Hence, while there are no cred-
its when using these systems, these vantage points are constrained in that Traceroute
measurements must be issued with a very conservative rate.
Other testbeds. Several other testbeds regularly performing Traceroute measurements
from multiple vantage points exist. MobiPerf [83] is an open source application for mea-
suring network performance on mobile platforms. Tracing Internet paths is part of the
measurements allowed by this application. Users can download and install the appli-
cation on their smartphone to regularly monitor the performance of the network they
are connected to. The data are anonymously collected and made available for scientific
purpose. Archipelago proposed by CAIDA [2] is an active measurement infrastructure
regularly tracing Internet paths. The collected data is used to reconstruct the topology
of the Internet made publicly available to the research community. DIMES [16] relies
on an altruistic approach in which users join the platform for the betterment of sci-
ence. Researchers managing the platform can issue Traceroute measurements from the
client downloaded by the volunteers. Dasu [129] is built on top of a BitTorrent client and
exploits the success of this application to reach a large amount of users. Despite the previ-
ously cited projects, Dasu provides visibility on broadband performance from residential
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networks as well as the opportunity to trace Internet paths originated from these net-
works. Similar projects are Hobbit [82] and Bismark [81] that characterize the broadband
performance by respectively exploiting a client- and a home router-based approach. The
previously cited projects issue Traceroute measurements to investigate Internet routes for
disparate purposes. However, to the best of our knowledge, while the collected datasets
are made publicly available to the research community, most of these projects do not
allow researchers or network operators to autonomously plan and perform experimental
campaigns by using the vantage points managed by these projects.
The list reported above is far from being exhaustive but it provides a clear idea that
several experimental testbeds exist with multiple vantage points located in completely dif-
ferent locations (universities, residential networks, ISP backbones, industry labs, smart-
phones) providing complementary point of views on the Internet routes. Unfortunately,
due to the highly heterogeneous interfaces adopted by these projects, we noticed that
researchers tend to use always the same testbed, thus not taking advantage of a more
complete visibility of the Internet routes that one could reach by jointly using the van-
tage points made available by multiple experimental testbeds. Aggregating the vantage
points of these projects and making them available to the research community through a
unique simple interface is one of the goal of the architecture we propose.
5.1.2 Path prediction techniques
Several scientific works proposed techniques and methodologies to predict Internet paths.
These works try to answer the question: what is the path followed by the traffic sent by a
given node A toward a given node B? These works try to predict the path followed by the
traffic originated by an arbitrary node toward an arbitrary destination. One approach
to this end is to exploit already collected paths: in this case, by assuming no routing
changes, the predicted paths can be approximated with the results obtained the last time
the path has been monitored. If no previous results are available, other works stitched
trace segments extracted from previously traced paths. Such an approach has been pro-
posed in [28], slightly modified in [30] and currently exploited in the iPlane project [15].
Other approaches, like iPlane Nano [130], models the inter-domain routing and exploits
BGP-related information to predict the paths with a coarse-grained granularity. Finally,
recently proposed approaches exploited the likelihood of path changes to improve the path
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prediction accuracy [29].
Compared to these approaches, we aim at answering a completely different question:
given a set of vantage points, what are the (vantage point, destination) pairs to consider
such that the traced paths satisfy specific a priori known characteristics? The input and
output of the proposed system are therefore completely different: the input of our system
is not a pair of network nodes but a partially defined Internet path. In addition, while
the cited works aim at providing in output predicted yet accurate paths, the users of the
proposed system expect to receive real traced paths.
5.2 An architecture for tracing Internet paths
In this section, we highlight the general architecture of a system designed to integrate
multiple testbeds and to satisfy complex queries.
5.2.1 Desirable features
The following features are desirable for the system under investigation.
• Monitoring on-demand: the system should be able to trace Internet paths nearly
in real-time, i.e. the system should trace the path as soon as possible after the user
queries is received such that the user can investigate the current routing in the
Internet.
• Highly expressive queries: the system should accept user queries specified in a highly
expressive and intuitive language. A user query describes the characteristics of
the paths of interest: starting from these characteristics, the system identifies the
vantage points to use and the destinations to target. As for the characteristics
of the paths of interest, we consider in this thesis the traversed ASes. We left as
future work queries at a finer-granularity specifying the PoPs, routers or geographic
locations to traverse.
• Campaign-oriented: the system should be designed to support measurement cam-
paigns providing an interface through which the user is allowed to submit a query
and monitor its evolution over time.
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• Public access to the collected measurements: the system should store all the per-
formed measurements and make the collected dataset periodically publicly available
to the research community as done by similar projects [15, 2].
• Comprehensive: the system should be able to trace Internet paths from as many
experimental testbeds providing public access to vantage points able to issue Tracer-
oute measurement as possible.
• Completeness: if there exists at least one path in the Internet with the characteristics
required by the user, the system should be able to satisfy the user query. However,
since the system forcedly manages a limited amount of vantage points, the system
should be able to satisfy any user query that can be satisfied by at least one path
originated by the managed vantage points according to the current routing in the
Internet.
• Scalability: the time required to manage a user query should be independent of the
current load of the system.
A system designed with these goals in mind allows users to (i) asynchronously submit
complex queries to the system; (ii) monitor the evolution of the query in the system; (iii)
retrieve the results when ready; and (iv) observe Internet paths as dictated by the current
routing in the Internet. This path monitoring on demand service combined with the ability
to satisfy complex user queries and the integration of multiple experimental testbeds make
the system a promising tool for researchers and network operators investigating complex
phenomena on the Internet.
5.2.2 Architecture overview
In this section, we describe a general architecture designed to solve the issues described
in the previous sections. Fig. 5.1 reports the general architecture consisting of several
functional blocks that interact to satisfy a user query. The main modules of the architec-
ture are in charge of (i) interacting with the user (System Front End); (ii) permanently
storing the collected results (Data Manager); interacting with the experimental testbeds
(Testbed Drivers); and (iv) performing all the steps required to satisfy the user query
(Query Manager and Prediction Engines).
We detail in the following the functionality of each block of the proposed architecture.
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Figure 5.1: General path tracing system architecture.
System Front End
The System Front End is the module of the system in charge of managing the interaction
with the user. The users interact with the System Front End in order to (i) submit their
queries; (ii) monitor the status of the submitted queries and (iii) retrieve the collected
results.
By also learning from similar projects [6], the interaction between the system and the
user should follow the following steps:
1. The user makes use of a generic text editor to create a query according to a specific
highly expressive and intuitive path-query language.
2. The user exploits the mechanism provided by the System Front End to submit the
query. The user is not requested to wait for the completion of the path tracing op-
erations since one of the desired features of the system is working in asynchronous
mode according to a measurement-oriented paradigm: the system immediately re-
turns to the user a numeric identifier that uniquely identifies the submitted query.
Thanks to this identifier, the user is allowed to monitor the evolution of the query
inside the system and retrieve the collected results when ready.
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3. The user monitors the status of the query through the mechanisms provided by the
System Front End. Essentially, by polling the system, the user can easily understand
if the system has collected the required results or if any problem occurred during
the execution of the query.
4. Once the results are available, the user can retrieve the results by interacting with
the System Front End.
To reach this goal, the System Front End needs to interact with the other modules of
the architecture.
Query Dispatcher
The Query Dispatcher is in charge of scheduling the incoming queries to the currently
allocated Query Managers, the modules of the architecture taking care of all the steps
required to satisfy a given user query. The Query Dispatcher can also allocate new
Query Managers to manage the high volume of the incoming requests considering also the
available resources of the system. Different Query Manager allocation strategies and query
scheduling policies can be implemented in the Query Dispatcher: different approaches may
have an impact on the scalability of the system defined as the ability of the system to
satisfy a given user query as independently of the current load of the system as possible.
Testbed Drivers
The Testbed Drivers allow the system to exploit the vantage points made available by
different experimental testbeds (see Sec. 5.1). A driver is in charge of interacting with
a specific testbed. These modules mask the heterogeneity of the interfaces of different
testbeds and operate a first homogenization when collecting the results. More precisely,
these modules should implement the following functionalities:
• Provide the identifiers of those ASes where the vantage points of the experimental
testbed are located.
• Provide the identifiers of the vantage points located within a given AS.
• Issue a Traceroute measurement from a given vantage point toward a given network
destination.
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• Retrieve and convert the traced Internet path.
The interaction with the Testbed Drivers can potentially follow exactly the same
paradigm imagined for the interaction between the user and the System Front End. Fur-
thermore, not necessarily these modules need to be part of the system: they can also be
imagined as external services exploited by the system to perform the required measure-
ments.
Prediction Engines
The Prediction Engine receives as input the queries defined by the user. The output of
the Prediction Engine is a set of measurements potentially able to satisfy the user query.
More specifically, for each query, the Prediction Engine returns multiple records including
(i) the experimental testbed to use; (ii) the identifier of the vantage point from which the
measurement must be issued; (iii) the range of addresses in which the destination must
be selected, (iv) the predicted AS-level path, (v) the originating and destination AS, and
(vi) a confidence score indicating the likelihood that the predicted path corresponds to
the actual path.
The system is designed to interact with different Prediction Engines and combine
the results such that only the most likely-to-match measurements are performed by the
system.
Data Manager
This module of the system is in charge of permanently storing all the relevant informa-
tion related to each query submitted to the system. This information includes but it is
not limited to: (i) the original user query, (ii) its identifier, (iii) the submission and com-
pletion time, (iv) any errors encountered in the system while serving the query, (v) the
current status of the query, (vi) aggregated information about the performed measure-
ments. Finally, the Data Manager stores the information about all the results collected
by the system to satisfy the user request comprising (vii) the exploited testbeds, vantage
points and targeted destinations, (viii) the collected IP level traces and their AS-level
conversion, (ix) the AS-level path predicted by the adopted prediction engine, (x) the
originating and targeted ASes, (xi) some indications related to if the collected paths sat-
isfy the user query. Periodically, the Data Manager dumps, compresses and stores all the
collected results to share the measurements with the research community.
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All the data managed by the Data Manager are made available to the other modules
of the system. More specifically, the Query Manager interacts with the Data Manager to
update the information related to the managed query (like its status); the System Front
End interacts with the Data Manager when the user is requesting an update about the
current status of a given query or to retrieve the results collected by the system.
Configuration Manager
The Configuration Manager is in charge of managing the current configuration of the sys-
tem since many modules rely on a set of global and local parameters. For instance, a
sample parameter of the system is the length of time the system needs to consider before
making the collected data publicly available or the file system directory where storing this
information. Since the system is designed to support large-scale measurement campaigns,
it is reasonable to imagine that the system must be always on-line: a static configu-
ration approach would forcedly imply the rebooting of the system potentially affecting
the ongoing measurements. Conversely, by acting through the Configuration Manager,
the administrator can easily modify the parameters of the system without impacting the
current measurements.
Query Manager
The Query Manager is the core of the system since it manages all the steps required to
satisfy a given user query. Each Query Manager is spawned by the Query Dispatcher and
sequentially performs the steps described as follows.
1. Parser: during this phase, the user query is parsed and syntactic and semantic
checks are applied to assess the correctness of the query according to the rules of
the path-query language. The relevant information are extracted and stored to be
easily accessed in the following steps by also interacting with the Data Manager.
2. Prediction: the user query manipulated during the previous step is provided as
input to the available Prediction Engines. In this way, the Query Manager collects
a set of measurements likely-to-match the user query. Aggregated statistics related
to the available measurements are stored by interacting with the Data Manager. In
addition, since the Prediction Engines typically predict AS-level paths, they do not
indicate a specific destination to target but usually an entire range of destination.
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Hence, the Query Manager also identifies during this phase for each likely-to-match
measurement which specific destination must be targeted.
3. Ranking: at this point, the Query Manager may potentially have multiple measure-
ments to issue. The system must decides the subset of measurements to actually
perform in order to satisfy the user query. During this phase, different strategies
could be applied.
4. Measuring: once the subset of measurements to issue have been selected, the Query
Manager interacts with the Testbed Drivers in order to trace the identified Internet
paths. In order to reduce as much as possible the serving time of each query, these
measurements should be issued in parallel whenever the exploited experimental
testbeds allow a similar workload. The Internet paths traced during this step are
also enriched with additional information. For instance, the traced paths are usually
sequences of IP addresses: these addresses must be associated to the owning AS in
order to verify if the user query has been satisfied or not. All the traced paths and
their details are permanently stored by interacting with the Data Manager.
5. Verification: the final step is to verify if the collected paths satisfy the user query.
Any severe error occurred during the phases described above causes the interruption of
the execution of the query and all the relevant information about the encountered errors
is permanently stored for debugging purposes. After the Verification step, the final results
are stored by the Data Manager and can be accessed by the user by interacting with the
System Front End.
Challenges
The general architecture described above implies the resolution of the following challenges.
Selecting responsive destinations. As described above, the Prediction Engine typ-
ically predicts paths at the AS-level. These engines may not provide a clear indication
about which specific network destination must be targeted but report an entire range of
addresses (a network prefix). In order to monitor an Internet path, however, the system
must decide which specific destination to target. This decision is non-trivial: if the se-
lected destination is non-active, i.e. it is not associated to any active network interface,
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the traced path reported by Traceroute will appear as filtered showing multiple anony-
mous routers at the end of the trace. As already described in Chapter 2, tracing Internet
paths toward unresponsive destinations is largely time-consuming: since it is not pos-
sible to distinguish between few routers along the path discarding the Traceroute probe
packets from an unresponsive destination, Traceroute further explores the path with addi-
tional probe packets and increased TTL values. In case of unresponsive destination, these
additional steps won’t lead to the discovery of any additional router along the path caus-
ing the expiration of the internal timeout considered by Traceroute to receive a response
from a router. Furthermore, tracing a complete path is of the utmost importance to ver-
ify if the user query has been satisfied. For these reasons, it is important that the system
identifies a responsive destination in the range of addresses suggested by the Prediction
Engine.
Note that devices in the Internet may reply or not depending on the type of adopted
probe packets: packets equipped with different transport protocols proved to have differ-
ent responsiveness levels [95, 131]. Hence, changing the transport protocol of the probe
packets issued by Traceroute may potentially help to solicit a reply from the targeted des-
tination [76]. Unfortunately, not all the experimental testbeds allow the users to select
the transport protocol to adopt.
Selecting sources and destinations. Methodologies and techniques proposed in liter-
ature allow to predict the path from a given source toward a given destination [15, 29, 30].
However, the Prediction Engines part of the system must perform a completely different
task: they must identify the vantage point and the destination connected by a network
path that satisfies the characteristics requested by the user as dictated by the current
routing. Accordingly, there is not a direct way to adopt the methodologies proposed in
literature to solve the query submitted by the user.
Ranking the measurements. The system may identify multiple likely-to-match mea-
surements to perform in order to satisfy the user query. When only a subset of paths
are requested by the user, the system must identify which measurements to issue. In this
process, several factors might be considered:
• Convenience of the vantage point: this metric allows the system to consider the cost
of issuing a new measurements from the specific experimental testbed. For example,
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for the Planetlab testbed, a measurement is costless so the convenience is very high.
For a RIPE ATLAS probe, instead, a new measurement has a great cost due to
the very limited number of measurements that can be issued every day from this
testbed. Looking glasses are also very convenient but no as convenient as Planetlab
nodes since looking glasses can be used with a very limited rate.
• Confidence score of the prediction: it is the confidence provided by the Prediction
Engine representing the probability that the user query would be satisfied by issuing
this measurement.
• Vantage point availability: it captures the instability of some vantage points that are
not always available over time. For example, it may happen that Planetlab nodes
are temporarily not available being not reachable through the Internet. Similarly,
all the RIPE ATLAS probes become unavailable when the credits are depleted.
• Prediction benefit: it provides an indication of the benefit in terms of future im-
proved accuracy the Prediction Engines would gain if the measurement would be
performed.
By properly combining the factors above, one can compute an overall score for each
measurement, rank them and issue the subset of measurements with the highest score.
Modelling and combining these factors is non-trivial.
5.3 Internet path tracing with PANDA
As first implementation of the general architecture described in the previous section, we
developed PANDA– PAth tracing oN DemAnd. The goal of PANDA is to demonstrate the
potential of the proposed path tracing on-demand paradigm.
5.3.1 The path-query language
One of the desirable feature of the system is to provide to the user a simple and effective
way to express complex queries. By analysing the literature, we noticed that several sci-
entific works are interested in tracing Internet paths originated by, traversing or reaching
one or multiple ASes. Accordingly, PANDA comprises a path-query language that allows
the users to easily specify the ASes that must be contained by the paths to trace.
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SELECT {PATH-QUERY-REGEX}
WITHIN {DEADLINE}
LIMIT {N}
WHERE {DISCRIMINATOR}
Figure 5.2: Basic structure of a query according to the proposed path-query language.
Any query submitted to PANDA must be compliant with the scheme reported in
Fig. 5.2. A user query is a SQL-like statement where only the first line is mandatory.
The keyword select is followed by a regular expression2 through which the user can
easily specify the AS numbers the paths of interest must traverse or simply contain. The
keyword within in the second (optional) line allows the user to specify a deadline for the
system: any result obtained after this deadline is meaningless for the user. The deadline is
a length of time relative to the query submission time: accepted values must be compliant
with a format comprising a number followed by s - seconds, m - minutes, h - hours or d -
days. By default, the deadline is infinite. The third line starting with the keyword limit
is optional and allows the user to specify the number of paths the system must returns.
This is an upper bound such that no more than these number of paths are traced by the
system. By the default, the system is requested to return a single traced path. Finally,
the last optional line starting with the keyword where is intended to provide a way for the
user to influence the decision related to which subset of likely-to-match measurements the
system should perform. Accepted values are max-different-(source or destination)-(pref24,
pref16 or pref8).
SELECT [" "]20965[" "]1239[" "]
WITHIN 5m
LIMIT 10
WHERE max-different-destination-pref24
Figure 5.3: PANDA: A first example of query.
A sample query is reported in Fig. 5.3: the user is requesting the system to trace
no more than 10 different paths (LIMIT 10), crossing the link between the GEANT
(AS20965) and SPRINT (AS1293) networks (SELECT [” ”]20965[” ”]1239[” ”]); re-
sults must be made available within the next 5 minutes (WITHIN 5m) and the traced
paths must reach network destinations contained in different /24 subnets (WHERE max-
different-destination-pref24). Other sample queries are reported and explained in Fig. 5.4.
2Regular expressions represent a special text string for describing a search pattern.
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5.3.2 PANDA’s modules
PANDA includes all the modules of the general architecture implementing the function-
alities already described as well as new modules. In the following, we briefly provide few
implementation details.
System Front End. The user interacts with PANDA through an XMLRPC interface.
Three methods are made available by the System Front End: (i) submit invoked to submit
a query; (ii) status invoked to check the status of a previously submitted query and (iii)
results invoked to retrieve the results collected by PANDA to satisfy the user query. The
submit method provides an identifier to the user, this identifier is a mandatory input for
the other methods. The identifier is obtained by the System Front End by interacting
with the Data Manager. Each new user query is inserted by the System Front End in a
queue shared with the Query Dispatcher module.
Query Dispatcher. When resources are available, the Query Dispatcher extracts a
query from the queue shared with the System Front End and spawns a new Query Manager
thread that autonomously performs all the steps required to satisfy the user query.
Query Manager. Each Query Manager in the system is a thread performing all the
steps described in the previous section. More precisely, the user query inside the system
is a data structure that contains all the intermediate results achieved by the Query Man-
ager while performing the steps. After each step, results as well as possible errors are
permanently stored by the Data Manager. Severe errors cause the execution of the query
to be interrupted.
a) SELECT ^137[" "]
b) SELECT [" "]137$
c) SELECT [" "]137[" "]
d) SELECT (^|[" "])137[" "]29065($|[" "])
r) SELECT (^|[" "])137([" "]|.+[" "])29065($|[" "])
f) SELECT (^|[" "])137([" "]|.+[" "])29065$
Figure 5.4: Sample queries – (a) Any path originated from the GARR network (AS137); (b) Any path
targeting the GARR network; (c) Any path traversing the GARR network; (d) Any path traversing the
direct link between the GARR and GEANT networks; (e) Any path traversing the GARR and, at a
certain point, also the GEANT networks; (f) Any path traversing the GARR network when targeting
destinations inside the GEANT network.
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Data Manager. The Data Manager module exposes to the other modules of the system
a set of interfaces that allows to permanently store all the relevant information about the
submitted queries. Data are stored by interacting with a MySQL database.
Testbed Drivers. PANDA interacts with external Testbed Drivers developed and main-
tained by the Networked System Laboratory of the University of Southern California
(USC) headed by professor Ramesh Govindan. These Testbed Drivers provide an API to
issue Traceroute measurements from (i) the RIPE ATLAS testbed comprising almost 5
thousands vantage points and (ii) about 500 different web-based looking glasses. Together
these two testbeds cover 1,912 distinct ASes: this coverage may appear limited if com-
pared with the total number of existing active ASes in the Internet (more than 40,000).
Note, however, that Planetlab, one of the most used testbeds in literature, provides van-
tage points located in no more than 600 different sites.
Configuration Manager. The Configuration Manager is invoked by most of the mod-
ules of the system to retrieve the current value of the configuration parameters of interest.
This module periodically reads a configuration file to load the values for the global and
local parameters. The administrator can easily modify the current configuration of the
system by overwriting the values of the parameters contained in the configuration file.
This approach does not require the system to be rebooted when the configuration has
changed.
Prediction Engines. PANDA exploits the inter-domain routing information to identify
the (vantage point, destination) pairs likely to satisfy the user query. We provide more
details about the process in the next section.
Beside the modules originally contained in the general architecture, PANDA comprises
the following two additional modules:
Responsive destination lookup module. One of the challenge for the system is
to trace Internet paths toward responsive destinations. To face this problem, PANDA
exploits the hitlist of responsive addresses made available by the PREDICT project [98]:
this project periodically probes with ICMP Echo Request packets a significant portion
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of addresses in the Internet and reports for each subnet /24 the most responsive address
along with a responsiveness score. By using this information, PANDA can select responsive
destinations to target when available. Since by default Traceroute issues UDP probe
packets, we recomputed the responsiveness score of the addresses by also considering
UDP probe packets: whenever it is possible, PANDA selects destinations responsive to
both UDP and ICMP Echo Request probe packets. When no responsive destinations are
available in the range of addresses returned by the Prediction Engine, the destination
is randomly selected. Within PANDA, this module interacts exclusively with the Query
Manager. However, its functionality may be helpful in any measurement system requiring
addresses responsive to UDP or ICMP Echo Request probe packets and could be easily
extended toward a stand-alone service.
IP-to-AS mapping module. Since the user query is related to the set of ASes to
traverse, the IP-level view provided by Traceroute must be converted to the AS-level to
verify if the query has been satisfied. To this end, the IP-to-AS mapping module exposes
API to (i) map a given IP address to the owning AS or (ii) map an entire Traceroute
trace. Internally, this module invokes an online public service made available by the Team
Cymru [99]. The module also exploits an internal cache such that only the not already
mapped addresses are submitted to the online service in order to moderate as much as
possible the probing overhead.
BGP data crawling module. As described later in this section, PANDA exploits the
information related to the inter-domain routing to identify the (vantage point, destination)
pairs likely to satisfy the user query. For this reason, PANDA comprises a module in
charge of downloading from the Internet all the available data related to the current
inter-domain routing. Several international projects like RouteViews from the University
of Oregon [5] and RIPE RIS [6] have routers (BGP feed) located in specific locations of
the Internet that receives BGP routes advertised by peering ASes (BGP feeders) as their
best routes toward network prefixes. A snapshot of all the active received BGP routes
is made periodically available by the two cited projects (data from 23 BGP feeds made
available by RouteViews every 4 hours, and from 17 BGP feeds made available by RIPE
RIS every 8 hours). This module automatically downloads and converts this compressed
data to be then easily managed by the Prediction Engine.
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Figure 5.5: BGP-based prediction engine: An inter-domain routing sample scenario.
5.3.3 A BGP-based prediction engine
In this section, we describe the Prediction Engine exploited by PANDA to satisfy the user
query. As already described above, this process is based on the information related to the
inter-domain routing.
Currently, BGP is the standard inter-domain routing protocol adopted in the Internet.
Through this protocol, ASes exchange their best routes to reach network prefixes [132].
Each BGP route contains several information including (i) the destination network prefix
and (ii) an AS path indicating the sequence of ASes that the traffic would traverse to
reach that network prefix if the traffic would be forwarded to the advertising AS.
Let us consider the Fig. 5.5 as a reference: the BGP feed receives the best routes
advertised by AS1. Let us suppose that AS1 advertises the route towards the network
prefix 1.1.1.1/24 containing the AS path AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5. This information can
be interpreted as follows: the 1.1.1.1/24 is part of the AS5 (this is also the basic scheme
adopted to map IP addresses to the owning AS [99]); the best route to reach these
addresses for the AS4 is to directly forward the traffic to the AS5, for AS3 is to forward
the traffic to AS4, for AS2 is to forward the traffic to AS3, finally, AS1 has selected as best
route toward 1.1.1.1/24 to forward the traffic to AS2. Hence, according to the information
owned by the BGP feed, the traffic sent by AS1 toward addresses in 1.1.1.1/24 should
flow across the AS2 AS3 AS4 before reaching AS5. Let us imagine that the BGP feed
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is also able to issue Traceroute measurements. If the user is looking for paths crossing
the AS2 or the link between the AS3 and AS4, thanks to the information provided by
the BGP feed, we can select as vantage point the BGP feed itself and as destination one
address in 1.1.1.1/24 in order to satisfy the user query.
Unfortunately, the BGP feeds from RouteViews and RIPE RIS cannot be used to
issue Traceroute measurements and the vantage points made available by the experimental
testbeds are not always co-located with the BGP feeds. In this case, not all the information
provided by the BGP feeds are helpful. Let us consider again Fig. 5.5 and let us imagine
to have only one vantage point located in the AS3: this AS does not directly announce
its best routes to the BGP feed. However, by inspecting the best routes advertised by the
AS1 to the BGP feed, we can still infer at least part of the best routes of the AS3. For
example, AS1 advertises as best route toward 1.1.1.1/24 the AS path AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4
AS5: we can easily state that the best route of AS3 toward 1.1.1.1/24 is AS3 AS4 AS5.
Note that we might not be able to infer all the best routes of AS3: for instance, if the
best routes of AS1 toward 2.2.2.2/24 is AS1 AS2 AS6 AS7, this does not provide us any
information about the best route of AS3 toward 2.2.2.2/24.
Essentially, the BGP feeds provide useful information to predict the AS-level path
taken by the traffic originated by the vantage points toward network prefixes. However,
when the BGP feeds and the vantage points are not co-located, only a subset of best
routes originated by the ASes hosting vantage points can be inferred. On the other hand,
the lack of information might be mitigated by combining the routes captured by multiple
BGP feeds.
To exploit the mechanism described above, the data periodically downloaded and
uncompressed by the BGP data crawling module is manipulated in order to extract all
the best routes for the ASes hosting the vantage points of the system. More precisely,
each best route containing the AS-level path AS1, .. ,ASi, .., ASn is inspected: if no
ASes hosting vantage points are contained, the path is discarded. Otherwise, for each
ASj hosting vantage points, the subpath ASj , ASj+1, .. ASn is extracted and stored as
best route for the ASj . At the end of this process, PANDA has a repository containing all
the available best routes for the ASes hosting vantage points.
In order to satisfy the user query, the Prediction Engine must simply apply the regular
expression on the best routes extracted from the BGP feeds: if a path AS1, .. ASi, ..
ASn towards the network prefix a.b.c.d/xx satisfy the regular expression, the Prediction
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Engine extracts all the vantage points contained in AS1 and returns to the Query Manager
all the pairs (vantage point in AS1, a.b.c.d/xx ). This operation is made for any matching
routes contained in the route repository. Successively, the Query Manager interacts with
the Responsive destination lookup module to select one responsive IP for each network
prefix returned by the Prediction Engine.
5.4 Experimental analysis
In this section, we reports the results of the evaluation of PANDA, a first implementation
of the general path monitoring architecture reported in Sec. 5.2.
Several scientific works would have benefited from using a system like PANDA. By
analysing the literature, we have extracted the following three categories of user queries
of interest for the research community:
• Traverse the ASx [85, 86, 73, 44, 87].
• Traverse the link between ASx and ASy [13, 11, 12, 22].
• Traverse the ASx on the path to reach the ASy [77].
In order to evaluate PANDA, we downloaded the best routes made available by Packet
Clearing House (PCH) [7] and collected by BGP feeds located in ASes different from
those hosting the BGP feeds exploited by PANDA3. From the extracted AS-level paths,
we randomly generated 1,000 queries for each category. We used this test set of queries
to evaluate PANDA and to compare it with other projects as described in the following.
Note that the process described above allows us to generate queries related to existing
Internet paths whereas totally randomly generated queries might correspond to paths not
allowed by the current routing in the Internet.
5.4.1 BGP-derived best routes
In order to obtain a complete view of the AS-level paths followed by the traffic originated
by the ASes hosting the vantage points, PANDA exploits BGP-derived information ob-
3Note that PANDA does not exploit the information provided by PCH since most of the BGP feeds
of this project are located at IXP and, treated as peers, provide information about a very limited amount
of Internet routes compared to the other projects [14].
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Figure 5.6: Best routes extracted from RouteViews and RIPE RIS for the ASes hosting vantage points
made available by RIPE ATLAS and through looking glasses.
tained by periodically crawling the dataset made publicly available by RouteViews and
RIPE RIS.
Fig. 5.6 reports the distribution of the number of best routes extracted from the BGP
feeds related to the ASes hosting vantage points. A complete view of the AS-level paths
originated by a given AS normally implies best routes toward more than 400,000 network
prefixes (the exact number might be hard to estimate due to route aggregations [132]). The
figure shows how BGP feeds provide an exhaustive view of the best routes for about 5%
of the ASes hosting vantage points (94 distinct ASes). For most of the other ASes, BGP
feeds provide less than 10,000 routes. The figure also shows the distribution of best routes
observed for ASes hosting vantage points but also directly feeding BGP feeds. Over this
set, the fraction of ASes providing an exhaustive view of their best routes represent about
45%: even when the BGP feed and the vantage point are co-located in the same AS, the
BGP feed may provide only a partial view of the best routes of the AS. Several factors may
explain this result. BGP feeds are known to be an incomplete source of information [14]:
being not well distributed in the Internet, BGP feeds provide much more information
about large transit ASes than ASes in the lower part of the AS hierarchy. In addition,
some BGP feeds are treated as peers and not as customers as expected: since according to
the valley-free policy [132] an AS does not forward routes learned from non-customers to
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Figure 5.7: Likely-to-match measurements per query grouped by category.
non-customers, the feeders provide to the BGP feeds treated as peer information related
only to the internal routes and the routes learned from their customers.
In conclusion, by using the information related to the inter-domain routing passively
collected by international research projects, we can predict part of the paths followed by
the traffic originated by the ASes hosting our vantage points (on average, about 42M of
paths): although partial, gathering this knowledge does not actually require any active
measurements on the network.
5.4.2 Query coverage
For a given regular expression, the Prediction Engine may identify several (vantage point,
network prefix) pairs likely to satisfy the user query. Fig. 5.7 reports the distribution of
the number of likely-to-match measurements for each query grouped by category. Queries
like traversing a given AS or two consecutive ASes can be satisfied by a large number of
likely-to-match measurements: for both categories, more than 99.98% of the queries have
at least one likely-to-match measurement. The situation is slightly different for those
queries requesting to traverse an AS on the path toward another AS. As a much more
complex type of query to satisfy, the location of the used vantage points is critical. For
about 26.1% of the queries in this category, the Prediction Engine was not able to provide
any likely-to-match measurement.
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On average, the Prediction Engine identifies respectively 8K, 1K and 66 likely-to-
match measurements for the queries requesting to traverse an AS, two consecutive ASes
or an AS on the path toward another AS.
These results show how the system typically has a large number of measurements
to potentially satisfy a user query. Assuming no constraints in terms of resources and
time, all these likely-to-match measurements could be issued in order to maximize the
possibility to satisfy the user query. However, the used experimental testbeds impose
constraints forcing the adoption of conservative strategies.
5.4.3 Query hit rate
In order to evaluate PANDA, we submitted to the system the queries of each category
and computed the hit rate as the fraction of query satisfied. In this analysis, we adopted
for the system a minimal and naive configuration: only one measurement is performed
to satisfy a query. The measurement to perform is randomly selected among the set of
likely-to-match measurements returned by the Prediction Engine.
To have a reference, we compared PANDA with the bruteforce approach implemented
by the iPlane project [15]. iPlane exploits every day all the active Planetlab vantage points
to trace millions of Internet paths (on average about 24 millions Traceroute traces are
collected per day). The collected dataset is then made publicly available to the research
community4. We compare PANDA to iPlane since a researcher might decide to exploit
this daily collected dataset to investigate the phenomenon of interest. For this reason,
we applied the same set of regular expressions also on the traces collected by iPlane to
compute the corresponding hit rate.
A first important difference between PANDA and iPlane is that the iPlane dataset
is refreshed daily. This implies the risk that the paths provided by iPlane are obsolete,
i.e. not valid any more according to the current routing in the network. PANDA, instead,
provides a monitoring on-demand service: any collected Traceroute trace reflects the
current routing in the Internet. Furthermore, iPlane is agnostic with the respect to
the goals and objectives of researchers and network operators. As consequence, while
invaluable for longitudinal studies on the routing and Internet topology, a bruteforce
approach like the one implemented in iPlane may be largely inefficient: indeed, this
approach is strongly time- and network resources-consuming and it is also potentially
4iPlane project. http://iplane.cs.washington.edu/
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Figure 5.8: Fraction of queries satisfied by (i) PANDA and (ii) iPlane project (a bruteforce approach).
unable to provide the actual information researchers and network operators are looking
for because, for instance, part of the requested paths simply cannot be explored by using
the set of managed vantage points.
Fig. 5.8 reports the fraction of satisfied queries grouped by category. Surprisingly,
even if PANDA performs only about 3K measurements against the 24M measurements
performed by iPlane, the fraction of satisfied queries is similar or higher than the one
reached by the bruteforce approach. By performing only one measurement for each sub-
mitted query, PANDA reaches a hit rate of 57.3%, 35.8% and 58.7% respectively for the
queries requesting to traverse a given AS, a given AS-level link or an AS on the path
toward another AS whereas iPlane reaches an hit rate of 68%, 51% and 32%.
Note that this result is not determined by vantage points used by PANDA and co-
located with the PCH BGP feeds from whose information the regular expressions are
generated: none of the vantage points used by PANDA and iPlane are co-located with
these BGP feeds. The reason at the basis of this result, instead, seems related to the
amount and location of the used vantage points. iPlane uninterruptedly exploits all
the available active vantage points (171 on average) coming from a unique experimental
testbed (i.e. Planetlab) and, even if a bruteforce approach is applied, not all the user
queries have been satisfied. PANDA, instead, makes parsimoniously use of almost 5K
vantage points coming from multiple testbeds (RIPE ATLAS and looking glasses) reaching
a similar or a higher hit rate than iPlane. We can conclude that the network friendly
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combination of a large amount of well-distributed vantage points and a prediction-based
mechanism to identify which vantage point to use and destination to target provides good
performance comparable to the one reached by employing a bruteforce approach from the
vantage points of a single experimental testbed.
Finally, part of the likely-to-match measurements issued by PANDA failed, i.e. they
provided Internet paths not satisfying the characteristics defined requested by the user.
Several factors may explain this result: (a.) Traceroute may be filtered along the path, for
instance, before traversing the requested AS (b.) control plane (BGP) and the data plane
(Traceroute) may diverge [62]; (c.) the IP-to-AS mapping might not be perfectly accurate
due to third-party addresses [102], anonymous routers [52], unmapped hops, Internet
exchange points [13], multi-origin AS prefixes [133] or sibling ASes [134]; also (d.) traffic
engineering policies like hot- and cold-potato routing cause ASes to possibly have multiple
AS-level paths towards the same network prefix [135]. Issuing more measurements for each
user query may represent a first possibility to increase the hit rate of the system.
More in general, the proposed campaign-oriented system performing path monitoring
on-demand where measurements are orchestrated starting from the real objectives of
researchers and network operators may also represent an effective and efficient alternative
solution to the credit-based systems adopted to save and control the managed network
resources, like the one implemented in the RIPE ATLAS system.
5.4.4 Query service time
PANDA offers a monitoring on-demand service. While such a paradigm appears particu-
larly effective to investigate ongoing phenomena in the Internet, the system should provide
results to the users in a reduced amount of time. Fig. 5.9 reports the distribution of the
query service time defined as the length of time between the submission of the user query
and the instant of time in which the results are made available to the user. First of all,
the query service time is independent of the category of queries. On average, the sys-
tem requires 110 seconds to collect and made available the collected results, a length of
time reasonable for the investigation of most of the aspects of interest except for transient
events that represent, however, a category of phenomena well-known to be very hard to
assess.
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Figure 5.9: Time required by PANDA to satisfy a user query.
5.5 Final remarks
In this chapter, we proposed a general architecture able to perform path tracing on demand
and designed to support researchers and network operators aiming at tracing Internet
paths charactered by a priori known properties. By analysing the literature, we observed
how several scientific works would have benefited from a similar system by submitting
queries requesting the system to trace path traversing a given AS [85, 86, 73, 44, 87], a
link between two ASes [13, 11, 12, 22] or an AS on the path toward another AS [77]. To
this end, the architecture solves two important challenges such as (i) aggregating under
a unique interface the vantage points made available by different experimental testbeds,
thus masking the great heterogeneity of the interfaces exposed by these testbeds and (ii)
identifying the vantage point to use and the destination to target in order to the trace
the path of interest for the user.
As a first implementation of the proposed architecture, we designed, implemented
and evaluated PANDA. PANDA aggregates the vantage points made available by RIPE
ATLAS and about 500 looking glasses. Users interact with PANDA through an XMLRCP
interface to submit queries to the system and monitor their status over time. Queries
are defined according to a specifically designed path query language. PANDA exploits
BGP-derived information to identify vantage points and destinations likely to satisfy the
user query. The experimental evaluation showed that PANDA is able to satisfy a fraction
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of user queries that is similar or higher than the one reached by a bruteforce approach
that use all the available vantage points of a given experimental testbed to trace millions
of paths: PANDA reaches this result by tracing an amount of paths that represent less
than 0.017% of the paths traced by the bruteforce approach.
As a first measurement project that systematically benefits from PANDA, we are cur-
rently modifying the MERLIN platform [126, 85, 86] to exploit the path tracing on-
demand service offered by PANDA: MERLIN aims at reverse engineering the router-level
topology of a given AS by using an IGMP recursive probing approach triggered by a
preliminary Traceroute-based experimental campaign. This preliminary campaign is now
entirely delegated to PANDA.
5.6 Future directions
We describe in the following the directions we plan to investigate in future to extend
PANDA.
Security. By providing public API, the security is one of the most important as-
pect to take into account. PANDA must employ advanced mechanisms to (i) defend the
system itself from network attacks (ii) defend experimental testbeds from abuse (iii) de-
fend the networks and devices in the Internet from being attacked. These three goals are
equally important. Advanced authorization mechanisms are required to identify any user
of the system (currently, PANDA adopts a basic HTTP authorization headers). Rate lim-
iting constraints should be applied to limit the query submission rate by also employing
admission control mechanisms: if no resources are available no new queries should be ac-
cepted. Similarly, rate limiting constraints should be applied when (i) using the same
vantage points of a given experimental testbeds and (ii) when targeting the same network
device or subnet. Finally, the system should apply specific strategies to ban users in case
of misbehaviours.
Aggregating private and public testbeds. The proposed system offers path
monitoring on-demand and it is able to satisfy user queries by taking advantage of a large
number of vantage points to perform only very limited number of focused measurements.
This approach allows users to save both time and network resources. One future direction
of this project is to aggregate the vantage points made available by multiple experimental
testbeds encouraging also the participation of those research projects releasing public
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Traceroute-based dataset but not providing access to the managed vantage points.
Additional Prediction Engines. An important open challenge for the system
is to obtain information about all the paths followed by the traffic originated by an AS
hosting a vantage point. Results showed that BGP data provides an exhaustive view
of the best routes only for a limited number of ASes. Accordingly, an important future
direction is to design additional prediction engines to improve the performance of the
system. For instance, one possibility is to take into account previously collected traces
and the stability of the Internet routes. If an Internet route proved to be very stable and
satisfies the user query, we might decide to trace again this route since there is a good
chance that the user query will be actually satisfied. Another possibility is also to explore
and adapt the path stitching approach proposed in [28].
Toward historical queries. Finally, another future direction is to extend the
system to accept also historical queries containing regular expressions to apply on traces
collected in specific time range: essentially, users ask the system to return paths satisfying
the regular expression that have been measured at certain point in the past. A similar
mechanism would make large Traceroute-derived datasets searchable potentially enabling
advanced a posteriori investigation of the impact on the network routing of large-scale
events such as network failures and power outages [101].
Chapter 6
Conclusions
The Internet is the largest distributed system ever built by the human kind supporting
applications used by more than 2 billions of users worldwide [1]. Monitoring the Internet
is essential to guarantee high operational standards and a positive evolution of this infras-
tructure. However, this operation is particularly challenging mainly due to the radically
distributed ownership of its constituent parts: indeed, the Internet consists of indepen-
dent networks, the Autonomous Systems (AS), that exchange traffic based on agreements
dictated by local economic and technological constraints. The competition and collabo-
ration among these independent networks are at the basis of the evolution of the Internet
and the general lack of visibility and centralized control over the infrastructure makes
the Internet a critical yet largely opaque communication system. In this scenario, the re-
search community has developed measurement methodologies and techniques to gather
the fundamental knowledge required for a deep understanding of how this highly complex
and dynamic ecosystem actually operates.
Among the aspects of interest, tracing Internet paths (i.e. routers and links traversed
by the network traffic on the path towards a network destination) has attracted large
interest from the research community with several applications. For instance, tracing
Internet paths proved helpful when managing and troubleshooting the network [22, 23,
100, 101, 25, 24], monitoring or predicting Internet paths and their performance [29, 15],
building efficient overlay networks [34], reverse engineering the network infrastructure [8,
9, 85], etc. Unfortunately, despite the numerous applications, several severe limitations
affect path tracing techniques causing the information obtained about the paths under
investigation to be potentially incomplete or inaccurate with an impact on the applications
relying on Internet path tracing. For instance, state of the art implementations of path
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tracing techniques may provide inaccurate topological information about the network
causing a distortion of the inferred network topology.
Furthermore, researchers, network operators and systems relying on path tracing tech-
niques are often interested in exploring specific Internet routes about which they know
at least some characteristics such as part of the traversed ASes. Unfortunately, the abil-
ity to explore these routes critically depends on the number and locations of the vantage
points used to perform the path tracing measurements and on the ability to identify the
vantage point to use and the destination to target in order to explore a path with a priori
known characteristics: both these factors represent open challenges.
In this thesis, we developed solutions (i.e. methodologies, techniques and a system) for
advancing the state of the art in the research field of Internet path tracing. We started
presenting in Chapter 1, an overview of the importance of tracing Internet paths. Then,
we discussed in Chapter 2 the path tracing techniques proposed in literature as well as
the known limitations affecting them. We also detailed the open challenges we identified
when using Internet path tracing to explore paths with a priori known characteristics.
Starting from the next chapter, we detailed the contributions of the thesis: in Chapter 3,
we discussed the results of our research activities conducted to investigate, mitigate and
resolve important largely-ignored limitations in Internet path tracing. In Chapter 4, we
discussed two additional experimentally-observed limitations of the state of the art path
tracing techniques. Finally, in Chapter 5, we proposed a general architecture and a first
implementation able to aggregate the vantage points of different experimental testbeds
and to identify the measurement to issue in order to explore paths with a priori known
characteristics. We briefly describe in the following the main contributions of the thesis.
As a first contribution, we proposed a set of innovative active probing techniques
augmenting state of the art path tracing techniques with the specific goal to address
unresolved limitations in Internet path tracing (Chapter 3). We developed several novel
measurement techniques built on top of a particular measurement traffic composed by
IP-options equipped probe packets: these probe packets have the potential of gathering
additional invaluable information on the traversed paths.
More precisely, we designed and implemented a measurement multistep technique in
order to identify and locate hidden routers in the traced paths (Section 3.2). Hidden
routers represent a largely-ignored limitation of path tracing techniques having a great
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impact on the inferred topological properties of the network. By using our technique, we
were able to quantify the magnitude of this phenomenon: we detected hidden routers in
at least 6% of the observed paths with the great majority of them located in the prox-
imity of the targeted destination network supporting the idea that many of these devices
are middleboxes (e.g. NATs, Firewalls, etc.). We also presented an active probing tech-
nique to identify third-party addresses in Traceroute traces (Section 3.3). Third-party
addresses may induce one to conclude that the traffic sent towards the destination is flow-
ing across an AS not actually traversed: very few researchers have investigated third-party
addresses with conflicting conclusions by relying on limited heuristics methods or not eas-
ily to collect pre-acquired knowledge about the network topology. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first ones proposing an active probing technique able to classify
the addresses reported by Traceroute as third-party addresses or not: according to our
results, third-party addresses are very common affecting more than 90% of the analyzed
paths. We also observed that third-party addresses affect about 17% of the AS-level links
extracted from large scale Traceroute-based experimental campaign, thus representing an
important source of potential distortion when path tracing is used to infer the AS-level
connectivity as proposed in several scientific works [13, 11, 12, 62]. Furthermore, since
the information provided by path tracing techniques about the intermediate delays ex-
perienced by the traffic sent towards the destination is potentially misleading (e.g. due
to asymmetric routing), we developed an active probing technique able to accurately dis-
sect the overall RTT of a traced path in different chunks related to specific portions of
the network path (Section 3.4). We demonstrated the practical utility of this approach
by isolating the contribution of (i) an home network and (ii) an entire Internet Service
Provider to the overall RTT of an end-to-end communication. Finally, we demonstrated
that path tracing solutions totally alternative to the ones universally adopted actually
exist (Section 3.5). More precisely, we designed, implemented and evaluated three ac-
tive probing methods able to solicit ICMP Parameter Problem messages instead of ICMP
Time Exceeded messages from the routers located along the path: these methods inject
into the network probe packets equipped with malformed IP options. The experimen-
tal evaluation demonstrated that routers in the Internet actually reply to this innovative
type of probe packets: this alternative path tracing solution proved to be complementary
to the classic TTL-based tracing solution providing additional information on the paths
under investigation, although the proposed approach is not able to express its full poten-
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tial mainly due to TCP/IP stack implementations not fully compliant with the Internet
standard.
As a second contribution, we identified for the first time in literature two new addi-
tional limitations of the state of art path tracing technique (Chapter 4): we discovered
that Traceroute may induce one to (i) overestimate the number of equal cost router-
level paths towards the destination and to (ii) infer non-existing changes in the network
routing. Surprisingly, about 32% of the analyzed paths that has changed according to
Traceroute proved to be actually unchanged. In addition, about 14% of the paths expos-
ing multiple equal cost paths towards the destination according to Traceroute turned out
be a unique router-level path. Essentially, we demonstrated that the IP-level view of the
path obtained by using state of the art implementations of Traceroute may be a biased
representation of the actual router-level path followed by the traffic sent towards the des-
tination. For this analysis, we used alias resolution techniques to identify those addresses
owned by the same network device: among these techniques, we also employed Pythia,
a novel active probing technique we presented in this thesis to solve the alias resolution
problem for a specific category of routers on which we obtained promising results when
compared to other techniques.
Finally, as third and last contribution of the thesis, we designed, implemented and
evaluated PANDA, a first implementation of a general architecture we presented in Chap-
ter 5, providing a path tracing on demand service that aggregates under a unique simple
interface the vantage points made available by different experimental testbeds very rarely
jointly used due to the great heterogeneity of the exposed interfaces. The proposed system
is also able to resolve complex user queries requesting path tracing measurements by de-
scribing the characteristics of the Internet paths of interest: PANDA exploits a BGP-based
prediction engine to identify the vantage point to use and the destination to target in or-
der to satisfy the user request. The experimental evaluation demonstrated how PANDA
is able to achieve similar or higher performance when satisfying queries suggested by the
analysis of the scientific literature when compared to a bruteforce approach. This promis-
ing result is reached by monitoring few thousands of paths compared to the millions of
paths traced by the bruteforce approach.
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